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Abstract 
 
Reinventing Infrastructure Economics: Theory and Empirics 
Shagun Mehrotra 
 
My dissertation is a study of the conditions under which state-owned enterprises 
improve infrastructure services—transport, energy, and water—particularly in 
developing countries.  This research is relevant because, despite successful privatization 
of infrastructure that yielded over trillion and a half dollars in investments since 1990, 
infrastructure provision remains dominated by state-owned enterprises (Estache & Fay, 
2007; Gomez-Ibanez, 2003).  The OECD estimates that over the next two decades, US 
$35 to 40 trillion will be required to meet the global infrastructure deficit.  At least half 
of this investment will be made by governments, particularly in, but not limited to, 
developing countries (OECD, 2007).  In contrast to conventional wisdom, my research 
identifies mechanisms for reforming public infrastructure utilities through a new recipe 
for an inclusive reform framework that, unlike the textbook approach, jointly optimizes 
equity and efficiency without privatization.  
 
This dissertation contrasts the world’s largest public utility, the Indian Railways, with 
the ideal-type textbook privatization, illustrated with the case of the British Railways’ 
privatization.  I focus on the Indian Railways as a paradigmatic example of how to 
reform infrastructure-providing state-owned enterprises while balancing equity with 
efficiency concerns.  I analyze primary data gathered through 100 in-depth interviews 
iv 
 
and on-site observations.  The fieldwork was conducted over a period of two years, 
including half a year at the Office of the Minister for Indian Railways.  In addition, I 
utilize secondary data through archival review of policy documents and analyze fifty 
years of the Railways’ statistics. 
 
My dissertation shows how the Indian Railways was transformed, between 2005–2008, 
counter intuitively, without privatization, retrenchment, or fare-hikes for poor 
passengers, under the leadership of a populist politician, the then Minister of Railways.  
I explain how the Railways’ was rescued from near bankruptcy in 2001 to realize US $6 
billion annual surplus in 2008.  An essential element of the Indian Railway’s complex 
strategy was to leverage existing assets by operating faster, longer, and heavier trains 
on the supply-side, as opposed to investing in asset accumulation.  On the demand-
side, the Railways shed a monopoly mind-set in favor of customer centric, dynamic, 
and differential pricing and service provision.   
 
Based on the positive case of Indian Railways, I derive an equitable alternative to 
infrastructure reform: A tripartite inclusive reform framework—diagnostic, invention, and 
agency.  First, crafting space for reform by diagnosis and navigation of conflicting and 
competing interest groups to isolate apolitical variables that jointly increase efficiency and 
equity outcomes.  Second, reinventing reforms by focusing on all manipulable variables for 
supply optimization and demand responsiveness, because profit in public utilities is a 
function of several manipulable variables, not only fares and wages.  Third, agency, 
through radical incrementalism, an approach to minimize the risk of catastrophic errors, 
and yet yield rapid transformations. 
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Chapter 1:  Reinventing Infrastructure Reforms: An Empirical Study 
 
Global Infrastructure Deficit—A 40 Trillion Dollar Crisis 
Infrastructure stock and flow of services, essential for economic development and 
poverty reduction are in crisis.  In most developing countries infrastructure quantity 
and quality of supply far exceeds demand (World Bank, 2010a, p.3).  In developed 
countries the infrastructure assets are aging and need urgent replacement (OECD, 2007, 
p. 13). Economic growth, population increase, rapid urbanization, and eventual climate 
change will pose unprecedented additional demands on infrastructure. Over the next 
two decades, US $35 to 40 Trillion is estimated as the global cost of meeting this 
infrastructure deficit.  Half of this investment will be made by governments (OECD, 
2007, p.13; and Airoldi, Biscarini, and Saracino, 2010, p. 2).  And developing countries 
will need half the total investment in infrastructure.  In the post-financial-crisis world 
economy, global growth is likely to be led by emerging markets within developing 
countries (Canuto, 2010, p.10; and, IMF, 2010, p.2 and 8). 
Furthermore, while in the next quarter of a century the world’s urban population 
will increase by about 2 billion people, doubling the number of city dwellers for the first 
time, half the world’s population is already urban and urban economies are inherently 
infrastructure intensive  (Garau et al., 2005, p. 11) and this will exacerbate the demand 
for infrastructure.  Much of the future expansion will result in the further growth of 
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slums in Tropical cities.  Thus, the lack of physical infrastructure will 
disproportionately burden the poor.  Moreover, public provision of infrastructure 
services has been overwhelmed with under-investment and poor management, 
resulting in dilapidation of the existing stock (World Bank 2010a, p.3, and World Bank, 
1994, p.4).  Thus, efficient and effective management of public infrastructure stock and 
flows in developing countries is an important, but neglected, area of research that this 
dissertation addresses. 
 
Dissertation Overview 
The purpose of this dissertation is to expand the understanding of ingredients and 
recipes for reforming infrastructure utilities, particularly in developing countries.  It 
focuses on the world’s largest public utility, the Indian Railways, as a paradigmatic 
(and, for some aspects, a critical) case of reforming infrastructure-providing state-
owned enterprises (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 230).  Few things in the policy world have been 
as contentious as privatization.  On occasions it has stirred passions associated with 
globalization, with animated street protests, threats to the very survival of governments 
(and their overthrow), and (on occasions) violence and civil disobedience.  An extreme 
example is the water war in 2000, Cochabamba, Bolivia.  This makes infrastructure 
reforms a thing, an object of dispute (Latour, 2004, p.  233) and calls for further research 
on re-conceptualizing the economics that inform infrastructure reforms. 
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Theoretical Basis in Infrastructure Economics 
The theoretical basis for this dissertation is grounded in infrastructure economics (public 
economics for infrastructure sectors), essentially revisiting the framework for efficiency 
gains and expansion of service coverage that are presently restricted to privatization.  
The primacy of a market-dominated framework is inadequate.  Ample empirical 
evidence gathered since the 1990s demonstrates that privatization or corporatization of 
utilities is often politically infeasible (or undesirable).  A recent important example is 
the Indian Railways, one of the world’s largest public sector employers.  Some of the 
leading scholars that have studied infrastructure are categorized into three thematic 
areas: (1) Conceptual economic theory focused on role of institutions, market failure, 
and firms: Coase (1960), Hayek (1944), Hirschman (1958); Keynes (1936), North (1987), 
Polayni (1944), Smith (1776), Stiglitz (1998),  Williamson (1985); (2) Political economy of 
infrastructure reform: Gómez-Ibáñez (2006), Hirschman (1968), Nelson (2005), Sclar 
(2000),  Yarrow, (1999); (3) Empirical studies of recent infrastructure reform: Eustache & 
Fay (2007), Grindle (1997), Kikeri & Nellis (2004), OECD (2007), Rammamurti (1992), 
Shirley (1999), Sclar (2003, 1997), (Tendler (1998), World Bank (2010b). 
 
Argument 
The core argument of my research is that in a restricted policy space—where privatization 
of a state-owned infrastructure enterprise is not politically desirable or feasible—
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conflicting commercial (efficiency) and social (equity) objectives can be met through 
reforms that focus on apolitical components.  Apolitical refers to attributes of the 
railways that are not of immediate interest to the political leadership, and are 
predominantly technical choices as opposed to political ones. For instance, passenger 
fares are politically contentious world over, but freight charges for moving bulk 
commodities are not.  Thus, Railways that commercially  manage the apolitical freight 
market segment can make significant efficiency gains without compromising equity 
concerns.  However there are exceptions in the freight segment as well.  Freight charges 
can be political in nature.  For example, railways in many market economies have to 
adhere to politically determined preferential freight services for national priorities like 
transportation for national defense needs, food grains to public distribution centers, 
supply of coal to public power plants, or fertilizers to farmers.  Yet, there is no 
restriction on providing priority service to more efficient clients within the priority 
sectors, like, preferential service to the power plants that place bulk orders in advance 
and make payments on time.   
 
Counterfactual  
In order to demonstrate how public utilities can improve infrastructure services in the 
absence of privatization, I undertake a comparative case study to explore how an 
alternate approach was crafted and what general lessons can be derived from it.  The 
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counterfactual for the Indian Railways case is the ideal type, that is the text-book policy 
prescription of privatization—independent regulation, retrenchment, and fare-hikes. 
Where appropriate, the Indian Railways is contrasted with unsuccessful or less 
successful cases, such as that of the British Railways and a variety of infrastructure 
privatization efforts in developing countries. 
 This study focused on the successful case of Indian Railways because as Regan 
(2006, p. 644) pointed out “It is the intensive study of the ‘best instances’ of an outcome 
that provides the deepest understanding of ‘how’ an outcome occurs.”  Further, my 
approach to the case is one that seeks a deliberative understanding as opposed to 
seeking paradigms because as Hirschman (1970) has warned, paradigms are a 
hindrance to our understanding because ideological presuppositions yield biased 
justifications rather than insight.  Thus, this research relies on data collected from the 
Indian Railways and its customers, regulators, advisors, private and public 
collaborators, as well as comparable cases like the British Railways and other reformed 
utilities, using interviews, observations, archival research and document review, and 
statistical data spanning the past 50 years. 
 
Policy Relevance 
The research is policy relevant because infrastructure provision in the developing world 
remains dominated by state-owned enterprises, yet, despite limited progress with 
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privatization in the 1990s, most research and policy interventions remain focused on the 
role of the private sector, associated management strategies, and investments.  
Moreover, developing countries have large infrastructure deficits (World Bank, 2010a, 
p.3; World Bank 2004, p.20–21).  Most affected by this deficit are the poor, millions of 
whom pay by shorter life expectancy, high morbidity and lost opportunities.  
Additionally, small and medium size firms suffer because, unlike large firms, they are 
unable to internalize the cost of self-provision.  As both poor households and small 
firms form the backbone of an unskilled labor intensive economy—representative of 
most developing countries—reducing an extreme deficit in physical infrastructure is 
essential to development. In response to the challenge posed by infrastructure deficits, 
policy makers have responded with privatization, which has had a limited impact 
(Birdsall & Nellis, 2003; Estache and Goicoechea, 2005; Estache and Trujillo, 2008; 
Rammaurti, 1999).  Consequently, scholars and practitioners alike, seek theoretical and 
empirical insight into policy alternatives to improve infrastructure services, dominated 
by state-owned enterprises. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is three fold.  First, to review pivotal literature on state-
market issues in economic development with a focus on infrastructure privatization, 
and associated equity-efficiency trade-offs. The review assesses the theory and 
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empirical outcomes of the traditional approach to infrastructure reforms for efficiency 
improvements and service expansion.  Second, to explain in-depth why the traditional 
text-book approaches to reforms assessed in the literature review, and applied by 
British Railways, was not applicable to the Indian Railways. A detailed analysis 
unpacks how the Indian Railways transformed from near bankruptcy in 2001 to a US $6 
billion annual surplus in 2008 without compromising equity considerations.  Third, to 
distill lessons from the above for other infrastructure state-owned enterprises, with the 
aim of developing a theoretical framework that differs from the traditional approach on 
two fundamentals: Transfer to private ownership is not a prerequisite for efficiency 
gains, and social (equity) obligations and commercial (efficiency) objectives can be 
jointly met and need not be trade-offs. 
 
Research Contributions 
Indian Railway Case Summary 
This dissertation provides a thick account of how the Indian Railways were 
transformed in four years, between 2005–2008, counter intuitively, under the leadership 
of a grassroots politician, Lalu Prasad, the Minister of Railways (2005–2009).  The study 
unpacks the unconventional approach that rescued the Railways from near bankruptcy 
to an annual surplus of US $6 billion while retaining state ownership.  Thus, this 
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research explores an important theoretical as well as a practical concern in public sector 
economics about how public enterprises can improve basic services. 
The Indian Railways is a unique state-owned enterprise because of its size, 
ownership structure, and 150-year history.  These attributes, among others, make it a 
complex and intriguing subject to understand.  The Indian Railways is one of the 
world’s largest state-owned enterprises; a utility under a single management structure, 
second in size only to China’s Railways.  With 1.4 million employees and 1.1 million 
pensioners and one of the world’s largest railway networks—over 63,000 kilometers of 
routes—running approximately 13,000 trains each day, including 9000 passenger trains, 
the Railways is a Ministry within the Government of India.  Indian Railways carries 
over two million tons of freight and some 17 million passengers between 7,000 railway 
stations each day.  A fleet of 200,000 wagons, 40,000 coaches, and 8,000 locomotives 
achieves this.  To fathom the scale, consider the fact that Indian trains, each day, 
cumulatively travel four times the distance to the moon and back. 
 Like many state-owned infrastructure service providers, the Indian Railways was 
over manned and charging subsidized fares, as it uneasily attempted to balance 
conflicting commercial and social objectives.  In the financial year 2001, the railway 
defaulted on dividend payments to its primary investor, the Government of India.  The 
cash balance shrunk to US $83 million (Indian rupees 359 crore) and its operating 
ratio—a key measure of efficiency: operating expenditure over operating revenue—
9 
 
peaked to 98 percent.  While nominal improvements were made in the years until 2004, 
the financial condition remained precarious. 
However, in the next four years, under a populist political mandate that did not 
allow conventional policy prescriptions—in the words of the Railways Minister, “no 
privatization, no retrenchment, and no fare-hike” the finances of the Indian Railways, as 
well as the quality of service provided, were transformed.  The Railways’ operating 
ratio improved to 78 percent, thereby generating a cash surplus of US $6 billion (25,000 
crore rupees) with astounding growth in freight volumes, as well as market share and 
earnings.  However, what makes this transformation unique are the counter-intuitive 
approaches and their swift implementation.  Precluding the pursuit of textbook 
solutions, namely, privatization, retrenchment, fare-hikes, and the like, the financial 
solvency of the Railways was restored without imposing a burden on the millions of 
poor Indian travelers and employees.  The Indian Railways’ transformation is attributed 
to a management strategy that optimized the functioning of this complex institution 
along its apolitical variables.  The core supply side strategy can be summarized into 
three words: faster, longer and heavier trains; each word was worth more than a billion 
dollars in annual surplus.  Likewise, the gist of the demand side strategy is dynamic 
and differential pricing which is customer centric.  Drawing on lessons learned from the 
Indian Railways case, the details of a new framework for reforming infrastructure state-
owned enterprise is articulated. 
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Framework for Reforming Infrastructure State-Owned Enterprises 
In the traditional ideal text-book policy prescription, an efficient utility (Y) is a function 
of independent regulation, ring-fenced finances, clear goals, retrenchment, and fare 
hikes.  Thus, it assumes that, if and only if utilities privatize (treatment, denoted by X) 
can they be efficient (outcome).  Through the counter-intuitive approach of the Indian 
Railways, I demonstrate through the Indian Railways case that an efficient utility (Y) is 
not a function of privatization (X), but there are at least three other relevant vectors: a 
programmatic approach to market analysis and response, organizational management, 
and political environment which defines the feasible set of reform options.  Thus, the 
case of the Railways establishes that privatization is not a necessary condition for 
efficiency, and it provides insights into alternative theoretical and practical policy 
approaches.  Additionally, through the case of British Railways failed privatization, and 
other such cases, I demonstrate that privatization is not sufficient for efficiency gains, 
either.  
Traditional text-book solution 
Infrastructure Utility Efficiency (y)=   [Inefficient Public Utility (x) + 
Privatization   (Separation of asset owner and service provider, independent 
regulation, competition at entry, ring-fencing of utility finances + user-fee based 
on commercial pricing, and the like)] 
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New framework for equitable reform 
Infrastructure Utility Efficiency (y) =  [[{Inefficient Public Utility (x)} + {Market 
analysis to identify competitive advantage} + {Political Economy analysis to 
identify apolitical business segments}] + {Supply-side strategy to optimize on 
existing assets by investing in short-gestation-high-return-projects} + {Demand-
side strategy to be customer centric dynamic and differential pricing} + 
{Management strategy to deploy radical incrementalism including the use of 
non-economic incentives }]] 
 
Figure 1.  Inclusive reform framework 
 
 
1. Diagnostic: 
Crafting a reform space—(1) 
Commerically viable (efficient) 
and social desireable 
(equitable); (2) Positive 
politico-bureaucratic 
enagement. 
3. Agency: 
Radical 
incrementalism—(1) 
Management innovation 
(Big 5); (2) Economic, 
normative, and coresive 
incentives within the 
political economy. 
2. Invention: 
Every vairable counts— 
(1) Supply-side asset 
optimizing; (2) Demand-
side customer 
responsiveness. 
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Dissertation Structure 
Every chapter is structured to be stand-alone and focuses on a specific sub-topic so that 
it may be read independently of the rest of the dissertation.  However, the chapters are 
structured into three broad sections corresponding to the three objectives of the 
research: Establish the theoretical basis and scope of traditional approach to 
infrastructure economics, through a counter-intuitive case of Indian Railways; expand 
the scope of the present theory and practice; and present a new theoretical basis for 
reinventing infrastructure economics. 
First, chapters one to three, that is Introduction, Literature Review, and Research 
Design, provide the context for the study and are primarily aimed at establishing the 
limits of the existing literature and associated methodological choices.   
Second, chapters four to eight unpack in detail the unconventional approach of 
the Indian Railways transformation from near bankruptcy in 2001 to super solvency in 
2008 without burdening poor customers. Chapter four, Bankruptcy to Billions, provides a 
snapshot of the transformation and focuses on the management strategy adopted to 
implement change.  The fifth chapter, Political Economy of Reforms, captures the fine 
balancing act between commercial and social obligations of the Railways, including the 
political mandate of ‘no privatization, no retrenchment, no fare-hikes’ and how 
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creatively the space for reforms within this mandate was identified.  The sixth chapter, 
The Market, captures the analysis that allowed for the development of a socially 
responsible and commercially viable understanding of specific business segments that 
offered opportunities for transforming the Railways without burdening poor 
consumers. The seventh and eighth chapters, Milking the Cow and Service with a Smile, 
articulate the mechanism of the reform strategy.  The former captures the supply-side 
strategy while the latter unpacks the initiatives that led to market oriented reforms in 
the freight, passenger, and other coaching segments.   
The third and final section articulates a new theoretical framework for 
diagnosing and reforming large infrastructure firms.  This section consists of Chapter 
nine, Towards a New Theory for Infrastructure Economics,  which summarizes not just the 
financial gains made by the Indian Railways, but gains in productivity, political capital, 
and a host of other vectors.  Further, challenges to sustaining the present generation of 
reforms, as well as the scope for their replication, is explored for other public sector 
dominated services like water supply, electricity, irrigation, and public transportation.  
Finally the chapter summarizes a new theoretical framework for diagnostics and 
reforms along with  avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
The pivotal literature on public economics and development economics is engaged 
through three substantive areas: (a) the role of the state in economic development with 
a focus on creation, maintenance, and growth of markets in a variety of developed, just-
developed, and developing market economies; (b) evaluation of a subset of applied 
economics literature to infrastructure with a focus on the traditional approach of 
privatization, its rationale, results, critiques, and alternatives to reforming large 
infrastructure state-owned enterprises; (c) reflection on the theory and empirical 
evidence associated with equity-efficiency trade-offs of infrastructure reform.  This 
engagement of the literature identifies gaps in the traditional approaches to achieving 
efficiency in infrastructure sectors—water, energy, transport—that requires transfer of 
ownership from public to private as a prerequisite for efficiency gains;  it also argues for 
efficiency gains at the cost of at least short-term equity concerns.  My research question 
is crafted to extend the bounds of the literature on infrastructure economics and 
associated policy prescriptions in the context of developing countries and emerging 
markets.  In particular, my research re-conceptualizes infrastructure reforms in the 
context of contract markets as opposed to spot markets and the associated choices of 
make-or-buy decisions in the production and provision of infrastructure services 
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including internalizing the externalities of production and provision of infrastructure 
services. 
 
 
Role of the State in Economic Development 
To determine the extent to which governments should intervene in the market, this 
review first presents a historical account of how governments actively participated in 
the creation of modern industrial free markets (also known as self-regulating markets).  
Second, an economic analysis of how the state actively intervened in achieving early 
industrialization is discussed.  Third, the analytical approach of economic sociology, the 
preconditions for state’s agency in economic development, is articulated. Fourth, 
through a historical assessment the complementary and contradictory relationship 
between the state and the market economy are presented in an effort to calibrate the 
extent of desirable state intervention and its justification for economic development. In 
conclusion, for determining the degree to which governments intervene in market 
economies, it is deduced that not quantity, but quality of state intervention is what 
matters most. 
 
Birth of Modern Markets 
Free markets emerged as a result of an ever diminishing role of the state, according to 
Friedrich von Hayek in the Road to Serfdom (1944).  However, this is based on a 
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restrictive interpretation of Adam Smith’s natural state of commerce (1776).  
Concurrently and in contrast, in the Great Transformation, Polyani (1944) articulated 
the unusual characteristic of the free-market economy: markets ‘disembeddedness’ 
from society and market liberalism’s subordination of society.  Polanyi argued that 
formation of such a liberal-market economy was not an outcome of natural evolution of 
the pre-capitalist markets; rather, it was formed by conceited efforts of philosophers 
and legislators during the early 19th century. Then, did free markets naturally emerge or 
where they created?   
 
Markets: Old and New 
In his treatise on Ancient Law1, Maine (1861) articulates the evolution of markets from 
ancient societies to post industrial ones as characterized by transition “from status to 
contractus2”. From a state of deeply “embedded” markets to ones that are 
“disembedded” in society, and in theory function, disengaged with society and 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 Maine, Henry Sumner. (1861). Ancient Law: Its Connection With the Early History of Society, and Its Relation 
to Modern Ideas, London: John Murray. 
2 “Status is set by birth—a man’s position in the family—and determines the rights and duties of a person.  
It derives from kinship and adoption; it persists under feudalism and, with some qualifications, right up 
to the age of equal citizenship as established in the nineteenth century.  But already under Roman 
Lawstatus was gradually replaced by contractus, i.e., by rights and duties derived from bilateral 
arrangements.” Polanyi (1957, p. 69, italic as in original text). 
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government.  To illustrate the social embeddedness of markets as well as status and 
Gemeinschaft characteristics of markets, In Aristotle Discovers the Economy, published 
in Trade and Markets in Early Empires3, Polanyi (1957) articulates the attributes of pre-
capitalist markets that are at odds with liberal markets.  In old markets, as understood 
in a thick account of the Arapesh of New Guinea by Margaret Mead, the notion of 
property rights, labor, and transactions are not permanent; these change with time and 
space. Rights are overlapping, at times communal, at other times individual.  Land use 
rights are divorced from land ownership rights4, such that one may own the land while 
another may hold user rights; a complex combination of such rights were distributed 
across the community and within and between families.  Such old markets are deeply 
embedded in society.  Like the Arapesh of New Guinea, ancient societies lacked the 
basis of free-market—well defined property rights, definite ownership, rules of 
economic exchange including liquidity, fungibility, profit motive, production of surplus 
for sale, and so forth. Thus, free markets needed to be created as they were a departure 
from traditional (old) market principles and notions of commerce.  In Birth of a Liberal 
                                                 
 
 
 
3  Polanyi, K. Arensberg, C., & Pearson, H., (eds.) (1957). Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in 
History and Theory, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company  
4 Contemporary example of such overlapping ownership and use rights are the uncommon.  For example, 
this overlap can be seen in mining rights where the state, on behalf of society, may have rights to mineral 
resources below privately owned land. 
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Creed (Chapter 12 in The Great Transformation) Polanyi articulate the contradictions 
between the desirability and distrust, of state interventions in market creation: 
“The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in 
continuous, centrally organized and controlled (state) interventionism.  … contrary to 
expectation…(people) whose whole philosophy demanded the restriction of state 
activities, could not but entrust the self-same state with the new powers, organs, and 
instruments required for the establishment of laissez-faire.” (Polanyi, 1944, p.146-47, 
emphasis and text in brackets added) 
 
In a countermovement aimed at protecting social welfare and minimizing the negative 
effect of the new market, a pragmatic additional state response emerged through series 
of new legislation.  Ironically, “while laissez-faire economy was the product of 
deliberate State action, subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous 
way.  Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not.”(Polanyi, 1944, p. 147).  The 
response is assumed to be spontaneous because it occurred simultaneously in multiple 
jurisdictions with support from a broad spectrum of ideologies and disparate set of 
interest groups.  Thus, creating free markets (a weakly-utopian concept) required, not 
absence, but active state intervention. 
 
Government Intervention in Early Industrialization 
Chang (2002), based on the works of Friedrich List (1841) National System of Political 
Economy, accounts for how England became the first industrialized economy, through a 
combination of protection of infant industry and a series of government interventions to 
facilitate economic development.  List goes on to argue that the subsequent promotion 
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of free trade by British scholars and government was deceptive and intended to push 
nationalist interests.   
Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised 
her manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no 
other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw 
away these ladders to her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, 
and to declare in pertinent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and 
has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth” (List, in Chang, 2002, p.5)” 
 
Most advanced industrial countries were interventionist in the early stages of economic 
development.  A common feature of government support was infant-industry 
protection (List, 1889).  Protectionism was more prevalent in Britain and America (than 
acknowledged in neoclassical economics) than in the interventionist countries of France, 
Germany, or Japan.  Governments financed or subsidized mega projects (railroads) in 
infrastructure and (steel) manufacturing.  Governments also legally financed 
technology transfer by financing research in other countries and illegally through 
industrial spying and acquisition of trained workers; spread of technology awareness 
through expositions and show casing “model factories”.  Publicly financed or 
subsidized research and development through the establishment of universities and 
other science and technology research institutions was common (Chang, 2003). 
In essence, it is incorrect to summarize that state intervention was an exception 
in the postwar era in an otherwise evolving free-market capitalist global economy.  Up 
to the 19th Century, limits to state intervention were due to a number of constraints—no 
income tax, balanced budget, constrained deficit financing, limited monetary policy, no 
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central banks until the late 19th century, not many nationalized industries, no state run 
banks, little investment planning, no anti-trust or environmental regulation.  By the  
early 20th century, state intervention had increased and peaked post World War II due 
to failure of free markets (for details on economic growth rates during these periods see 
Chang, 2003 and Amsden, 2003). 
 
Preconditions for State’s Agency 
A deeper and diversified role for the state in the economy and society of developed 
countries (advanced capitalists, industrialized economies) was instrumental in enabling 
twin aspects of economic development—economic growth and management of 
socioeconomic strife.  However, based on historical comparative analysis of Polanyi, 
and Gershenkron in Economic Backwardness in a Historical Perspective, (1969).the 
state’s ability to intervene in promoting growth and equity is constrained by its internal 
composition as well as the ability to associate with the prevailing composition of 
society. 
Rueschemeyer and Evan’s (1985) analysis reveals two prerequisites for states to 
prevail over such constraints.  First, the bureaucracy should have the structural 
coherence of a corporate-form.  Second, it should have adequate autonomy to conceive 
a coherent strategy as well as provide public goods that cannot be provided in a Pareto 
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optimal manner, instead require compromising the interests of structurally key 
economic and social agents and stakeholders. 
How does state intervention affect its autonomy and corporate coherence in 
bureaucratic action? Autonomy and coherence are often mutually reinforcing 
experiences—acting builds coherence and augmenting state resources increases 
autonomy (as observed by Amsden, 1985, in the case of Taiwan’s economic 
development)5.  However, it is essential to dispel the notion of the inevitability of 
mutual reinforcement.  First, to stem concerns of exponential growth in state power that 
often result in call for state minimalism. Second, not to discourage weak states to 
intervene when they lack capacity to act.  In practice, as state interventions permeate the 
basic institutional arrangements of market and society, the resulting socioeconomic 
transformations interactively reshape the state.  Likewise, as state interventions evolve, 
on occasions they fragment a states’ autonomy with respect to dominant social and 
economic interest groups.  “[T]he contradictions of civil society become more 
                                                 
 
 
 
5 In the case of Taiwan, major state interventions include: (1) agriculture land reforms; (2) industry 
liberalization (accompanied by defense manufactures state-owned enterprises having collaborations with 
major American private high end defense equipment manufacturers, giving the military industrial 
complex comfort with liberalization).  Through a mutually reinforcing arrangement between the state, 
market, and society, the state interventions have persisted from the Japanese colonial period in 
agriculture and import substitution and industrialization to a strong military establishment that evolved 
into a developmental state focused on export-led growth. “Taiwan, then, is more than a case in which the 
essential contribution of state intervention to economic development can be observed.  It is a case that 
demonstrates the reciprocal interaction between the structure of state apparatus and the process of 
economic growth.” (Amsden, 1985, p. 101) 
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embedded in the state as the state more deeply penetrates civil society, potentially 
undermining both its coherence as a corporate actor and its autonomy” (Rueschemeyer, 
and Evans, 1985, p.69). 
However, in my view, coherence is an inappropriate prerequisite—state 
fragmentation offers numerous opportunities.  Inter-Ministerial autonomy, is in fact 
lack of coherence of the State as a whole, but is proof of Ministerial autonomy within 
the state.  It is essential in countries where the multiple Ministries within the State 
manage an increasing proportion of economic and welfare service provision.  As 
documented in my book Bankruptcy to Billions: How the Indian Railways Transformed 
(2009), I articulate how the Indian Railways, a Ministry within Government of India, 
acted in the interest of various factions, while opposing other factions, both within the 
Ministry and the State apparatus  as a whole, as well as segments of society (in favor of 
the poor, at times, at the cost of the middleclass) and the economy (in favor of 
domestically oriented firms at the cost of exporters, who had windfall profits from 
souring global commodity prices).  Complexity offers possibilities; if America had 
waited for cooperation and coherence on climate change within the American state, no 
city or state government would have acted over the last decade.  
 
Complements and Contradictions: Calibrating the Extent of Desirable State 
Intervention 
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All markets have state interventions, some less than others.  Definitions vary by 
geography and with time.—For instance, child labor or slavery was defended on 
grounds of efficiency until the early 19th century in the United States and is still illegally 
practiced in many countries, but laws banning it are not considered state intervention 
anymore (Chang, 2003).  In response to the Great Depression, Keynes, in The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) articulated an active role of the state 
in macroeconomic stabilization through a combination of both monetary and fiscal 
policies, including counter-cyclical spending by governments.  The dirigisme of the 
1950s, (a central planning paradigm of economies with substantial government 
intervention in the post war era) was criticized for the failure of regulation and massive 
inefficiencies and rent-seeking due to the interventionist state, giving way to 
neoclassical economics in the 1980s and 90s (a market oriented paradigm).  At the same 
time, in Empowerment, “Movement politics” Friedman argues for an alternative 
approach to development  which calls on the role of social movements in 
democratization of politics with the aim of converging socio-economic and political 
inequalities and refocusing development on people as opposed to profits (Friedman, 
1992, p.9).  Most recently, with the collapse of the financial sector and associated 
publicly financed bailouts of investment banks, and coordinated stimulus plans around 
the world, state intervention is back.  Thus, state interventionism versus market 
mechanism is not a simple dichotomous choice because ‘contradictions and 
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complementarities’ exist between the state and the market; there are also costs and 
benefits of state action due to its bureaucratic organizational structure (Bardhan, 1990, 
p.3). 
While there are several arguments in favor of the role of the state—provision of 
security, law and order, anti-trust regulation, developmental role through welfare 
considerations ranging for pro-poor subsidies to judicious use of eminent domain—the 
two most important rationales for economic development policy interventions are 
“market failure in signaling investment allocations” and “importance of economies of 
coordination” through central planning.  Likewise, there are ample critiques of the 
failure of state intervention (most notably by Scott, 1998).  In the context of economic 
development policy, excessive intervention results in sluggish growth and rising 
inequality because excessive regulation results in rent-seeking6(see Bhagwati 1982, and 
Krueger, 1974), which is the misallocation of resources due to market distortions.  The 
neoclassical solution is to ‘get the price right’, essentially requiring state-minimalism, an 
argument that received traction due to some spectacular state failures. 
For instance, a number of centrally planned large-scale state interventions in the 
20th century utopian social engineering efforts - failed to deliver the intended welfare 
                                                 
 
 
 
6 Bhagwati (1982), Kruger (1974) on welfare implications of rent-seeking and more broadly Directly 
unproductive activities (DUP) 
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benefits.  For example,  from Corbusier’s Brasilia or Chandigarh, Chinese Great Leap 
Forward, Tanzanian, Ethiopian, Mozambique compulsory Ujuma villages, to Russian 
collectivization.  Failure conditions and logic articulated by Scott include imposition of 
utopian schemas of physical planning into complex interdependent socio-economic and 
ground realities.  Further, the following four conditions, when overlapping, ensure 
large scale failures of state intervention. First, organizational management that requires 
administrative coding and simplification to geometricize nature and space, so as to 
enhance bureaucratic legibility.  Second, knowledge assumptions based on high 
modernist ideology—rational comprehensive model, a belief borrowed from scientific 
and technological engineering, to analyze, identify, and solve complex large scale 
developmental changes.  Third, imposition by authoritarian state—use of state’s 
monopoly over power to implement large scale development projects.  Fourth, weak 
civil society that is unable to resist imposition of state interventions (Scott, 1999, p.4). 
However, quite like state failure, there are new types of market failure like 
imperfect information (Stiglitz, 1999).  With imperfect information, market determined 
prices do not reflect all information, and dispersed markets with proprietary 
information lack adequate coordination.  But such information asymmetries plague 
central planning as well.  Another type of new market failure relates to capturing 
positive externalities from accessing and internalizing technological advancements.  In 
developing countries, non-market actors like large corporations internalize this market 
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failure. But developing countries lack large corporations, thus the ‘activist state’ like 
those of the “East Asian Miracle” Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and Thailand facilitates this learning.  Likewise, 
these states filled the gap of inadequate capital markets (for details on the 
interventionist recipes of East Asian economies see Stiglitz, 1996, and for the case of 
Taiwan’s economic transformation see Amsden, 1985).  However, not all governments 
are capable of making such interventions. The abilities vary as governments differ in 
capabilities and associated functioning.  For instance, fiscal volatility (as observed in 
Latin America over 80s and 90s) may diminish macroeconomic space for government 
action.  In sum, it is not sufficient to just get prices right; organizational abilities and 
incentives matter.  Likewise, as planners and development economists call for central 
planning of investment, the same issues of organizational learning, incentives, and 
management remain a constraint. 
 
Quality, Not Quantity, of Intervention is What Matters 
In most developing countries (and many industrial ones as well), the default condition 
is that the state substantially intervenes, so the key question is not quantity but quality 
of state intervention for economic development.  Why does the quality of intervention 
vary despite the use of similar instruments of intervention?  Why are the results so 
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varied?  The Marxist as well as neoclassical theory of ‘rent-seeking’ states provides a 
better explanation for failures as opposed to successes. 
Some common characteristics of a successful developmental state are: Degree of 
centralized decision making, agility in responding to shifts in markets and adapting to 
new technology (requiring collaboration between the bureaucrats and entrepreneurs), 
discretionary space and autonomy of technocrats involved in economic planning, 
meritocratic recruitment and incentives within the bureaucracy, and the political space 
within a nation state to make structural changes that require trade-offs between the 
interests of farmers, workers, and firms (Stiglitz, 1999, based on the experience of East 
Asia, and Bardhan, 1990). 
Further, instead of a simplistic classification of states as authoritarian (China) versus 
democratic (India), state characteristics such as the extent of autonomy of decision-
makers, provides insight into the degree of agency in economic development policy 
making.  A key challenge is to craft a lasting coalition of interest groups where 
durability is a function of their ability to tackle thick economic development issues—
particularly prosperity with equity.  First, addressing broad equity concerns, as 
opposed to focusing merely on narrow state allocative efficiency, matters.  Second, to 
address opposing interests and strike a bargain through participatory processes is 
important.  Both of these are more difficult to achieve in societies that have highly 
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unequal income distributions and heterogeneous social groups, because finding 
common ground among unequal and different groups is more challenging. 
An analysis of the East Asian experience (Datta-Chaudhuri, 1990, on Korea contrasted 
with India and Westphal, 1990, Amsden, 1985 on Taiwan, Stigltiz, 1996) suggests three 
key characteristics that determined the extent to which governments succeeded in intervening 
in the market. First, state interventions were crafted in tandem with markets.  Second, 
active state cajoling and support of ‘infant industries’ helped domestic firms respond to 
international market opportunities, creating dynamic comparative advantage as 
opposed to protectionist lobbies.  Three, despite imperfect markets in developing 
countries competitive pressures hasten innovation in firms.  Thus, one returns to the 
paradox of free markets: Dynamic competition, a prerequisite for well functioning 
markets, requires an active, not minimalist state. 
Finally, not economy wide, but targeted interventions are more effective—not 
hatchets, but scalpels—choosing to intervene in key sectors and policies at 
various stages during the struggle to industrialization or more broadly economic 
development.  This targeted approach to interventions allows for efficient and 
effective use of limited resources of the bureaucracy, and identification and 
redressing of the social implications of policies in the dynamics of the market.  
The next section explores the literature on state to market transition in the 
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context of infrastructure sectors that are often characterized by inefficient public 
utilities and in many cases have been treated with the antidote of privatization. 
 
Infrastructure Economics 
Privatization 
Privatization is a retreat of the state, from the state as provider to enabler of goods and 
services.  For this evaluation of the literature, the working definition7 of privatization 
includes all “… initiatives to introduce market relationships into the bureaucratic 
production of public services” (Sclar, 2000, p.3).  However, privatization is not a new 
concept.  In the 19th century, the British Empire contracted out railroad construction, 
and New York City has been experimenting with contracting of solid waste collection 
for the last two centuries, both with varying degrees of success8 . 
                                                 
 
 
 
7The scope of definitions vary susbtantially.  At the peak of privatization in 1995 the Wall Street Journal 
provided a boarder definition, “Privatization means relying less on government to meet people’s needs 
for goods and services, and more on private institutions such as the marketplace, the family and 
voluntary organizations.” (WSJ, 1995a).  While Yarrow provided a more restricted definition, “… the sale 
of state owned assets; thus, a company is no longer state-owned when management control (measured as 
the right to appoint the managers and board of directors) passes to private shareholders.” Although this 
definition has some limitations, (see Yarrow, 1986, p. 325).  
 
8 In15th century the Spanish Emperor contracted Columbus to discover new a new route to India where 
Columbus was financed by a pooled fund that was composed of Italian investors and the Spanish 
Monarch.  In addition to a fixed income, Columbus had a revenue sharing agreement with his financiers 
for the potential earnings from his colonial discoveries (McDonald, 2005).   
Likewise, in the 19th century, railroads were constructed through private contracts that were 
provided guaranteed returns on investment—although soon this led to rent seeking by private 
contractors and the state intervened.  The challenges to outsourcing provision of infrastructure services 
and more broadly public goods is illustrated in Adler’s (1999) account of contracting out solid waste 
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Rational—State Minimanlism 
In the 19th century, while capitalism and associated urbanization and industrialization 
had created enormous prosperity and had solved production of private goods, it was 
accompanied with negative externalities, namely environmental degradation, slums, 
and inequality.  In response, Webberian bureaucracies, that were hierarchical, 
autonomous, and meritocratic, were sought to address distributional challenges, 
including the provision of public goods.  Depending on the degree of state intervention 
three typologies emerged—capitalist democracies, socialist welfare democracies, and 
socialist states.  However, since the 1980s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and rise 
of fiscally conservative governments, led by Margaret Thatcher in Britain, scholars and 
practitioners sought a retreat of the state.  While the state had become less 
interventionist up to the financial crisis of 2007, regulation in multiple domains 
subsequently increased.  Governments remain at the center of addressing social 
concerns, but “People merely expect government to do more with less.” Sclar (2000).  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
management to private providers in New York in the 19th century where repeatedly the private 
contractors shirked responsibility, cuts costs to maximize profits as the cost of quality of service.  Many of 
these issues remain part of the contemporary debate on privatization of municipal services.  
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To achieve this state minimalism, a seven-fold rationale for privatization of 
economic infrastructure, that is electricity, water, and transport, was articulated.  
First, reduce public debt by raising funds from disinvestment in public assets.  
Particularly in the transport sector, assets were sold or leased to raise revenue as part of 
a macroeconomic stabilization strategy. In a similar vein, reduce expenditure by 
eliminating subsidies and introducing cost-recovery tariffs in the context of a shrinking 
public purse.  Second, seek efficiency gains in public enterprises by creating new 
incentives and eliminating conflicting objectives of equity and efficiency in public 
utilities in favor of focused commercial objectives.  Third, leverage private investment, 
particularly foreign direct investment, through reform of public services.  Fourth, 
disperse ownership to facilitate for and within market competition.  Fifth, foster growth 
of nascent local capital markets.  Sixth, return to the private sector assets that were 
recently nationalized (Estache and Trujillo, 2008, p. 150, as well as Estache and Fay, 
2007, p. 31).  Seventh, expand infrastructure services to the poor.  Eight, ideological 
commitment to reduce the role of the state.  However, some of these rationales were 
inconsistent.  For instance, increasing efficiency is at odds with the objective to 
fundraise because investors value relatively inefficient  monopoly arrangements at 
higher prices than firms in competitive markets (WSJ, 1995a).   
Latin America was the developing-country region to initiate privatization early 
and at scale. The emphasis laid on the above objectives varied and was a function of 
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initial in-country conditions. Countries like Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru had less 
bargaining power, as they were in the midst of a financial crisis requiring urgent 
privatization of politically contentious infrastructure, while Mexico and Brazil had 
greater bargaining power and thus adopted gradual reforms.  Eastern Europe also 
experience rapid privatization after the fall of the Soviet Union.  Smit (1994) provides an 
overview of legal, economic, and social aspects in Eastern Europe.  
 
Evidence in Support for Privatization—Mostly Theoretical, Less Practical 
Mostly theoretical, less practical, evidence was put forth in support of infrastructure 
privatization.  Theorists argued in the 1980s that there was a renewed potential for 
markets and competition to improve infrastructure service production and provision 
due to technological change and regulatory innovation.  This was a departure from the 
post World War statist era where public monopoly provision of infrastructure was 
justified due to economies of scale (unit costs decline as output increases) and 
economies of scope (joint production and delivery of service costs less than separate 
production).  In the past, to prevent abuse of market power, these monopolies had been 
publicly owned and managed.  In addition to economies of scope and scale, 
infrastructure services were bundled into integrated monopolies to allow for cross 
subsidies from profitable segments to service unprofitable ones, specially the poor 
(World Bank, 1994, p. 52).  However, other critical reasons for public provision of 
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infrastructure remained unaddressed, including issues of eminent domain, 
environmental management, and strategic concerns.  
Technological innovation, in the cases of telecom and power generation, allowed 
for achieving competitive unit cost at lower scales.  Institutional innovation in 
regulation allowed for unbundling of activities that no longer benefited from economies 
of scale from those that continued to benefit in this regard.  The idea was to allow for 
the introduction of competition in non-monopoly market segments.  It was argued that 
potential abuse of market power by private monopolists, who tend to limit output so as 
to hike prices and profits, was less of a concern in developing country markets where 
demand for infrastructure services far exceeds supply.  The assumption was that it 
would be in the interest of monopoly providers to expand services rather than restrict 
them (World Bank, 1994, p. 52).  While challenges to unbundling were posed by 
increasing transaction costs that result from fragmentation of a monopoly firm, in 
theory it was argued that new technology allowed for some of these costs to be 
overcome. 
In practice, privatization had been successful in the production and provision of 
private goods like cars, cement, and steel.  To enhance opportunities for private 
participation and associated competition in infrastructure, two types of unbundling 
were possible.  First, vertical unbundling of the supply chain -  for example, separating 
power generation from power transmission and distribution.  Second, horizontal 
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unbundling of market segments by separation along geographically distinct domains or 
by types of service (Gomez-Ibanez, 2006).  For example, unbundling railways by 
geographic zones they serve, or splitting fixed-line telephony from wireless, and 
similarly, local calling service from international.   
Four market-based solutions were proposed to substitute government 
monopolies:  First, indirect competition from substitutes; Second, direct competition 
within the market (contested or contestable markets); Third, indirect competition for the 
market; fourth, private ownership of monopolies. 
To calibrate degree of private participation for competition for the market, four 
types of contracts were proposed:  First, service contracts in which public utilities 
outsource specific tasks to private firms (short term, time bound, usually annual); 
Second, management contracts where utilities remain government owned but operation 
and management is outsourced to private firms (1to 3  years); Third, lease contracts, 
these are longer term management contracts where the government finances assets 
while the  private firm has access to the revenue stream but bears commercial risk (6 to 
10 years); Fourth, concessions contracts where assets remain publicly owned, but in 
addition to lease arrangements, investment in fixed assets is included (up to 30 years).  
Here, the private provider bears both commercial and financial risk (Triche, 1993). 
 
 
35 
 
Results—Uneven and Account for Small Fraction of Total Demand 
In infrastructure that has public good characteristics, the privatization results are 
uneven and account for a small fraction of total demand.  Privatization has been 
successful where outputs do not have public good characteristics, production and 
provision do not require monopolies, and are not associated with large positive or 
negative externalities.  In other words, the production of private goods characterized  
more by spot market attributes than those of contract markets.   
 
British Railways, A text-book case of railroad privatization by unbundling 
By the mid-1980s, Railways around the world faced stiff competition from alternate 
modes of transport that resulted in declining market share for rail freight and passenger 
transport.  Private Railways in the U.S. and Canada were facing bankruptcy while 
publicly owned Railways, like British Railways, were confronted with rising fiscal 
burdens from subsidies required to sustain operations. (Gómez-Ibáñez, 2006, p. xi).   
Governments introduced two types of competition to improve the performance 
of Railways.  First, vertical unbundling aimed at competition within Railways—through 
unbundling and separation between infrastructure ownership and operations so that 
various train operators could compete like truck operators,  power producers, or 
wireless telephone operators. This approach was adopted in Europe and Australia, at 
times accompanied with privatization. 
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Second, horizontal unbundling aimed at competition for the market—
privatization of Railways with the aim of harnessing efficiency gains from competition 
among investors. Competition for private ownership or management was expected to 
induce incentives for efficient management. 
The rest of the reformers adopted privatization and deregulated while maintaining 
vertically integrated Railways.  
Introducing competition through vertical unbundling was at the center of British 
rail privatization that began in 1993 (Glaister, S. 2006). Competition for passengers and 
freight, for labor and rolling stock, and for train operations and engineering was 
introduced (Forester and Castles, 2004).  After Margaret Thatcher’s government during 
the 1980s had privatized various utilities—telecom, electricity, water, gas, bus—several 
forms of vertical and horizontal unbundling of British Railways were considered.  In 
1993 with the arrival of John Major, another Conservative Prime Minister, British rail 
privatization was implemented to dismantle a vertically integrated public monopoly, 
organized quite like the Indian Railways, which was inefficient and unresponsive to 
customer needs.  As a first step, through vertical unbundling, the ownership of tracks 
(Railtrack), stations and other infrastructure was separated from train operations and 
management.  Initially the focus was on unbundling train operations and privatizing 
train operating companies, while keeping Railtrack (track infrastructure management) 
under public ownership.  The Conservative government, unsure of winning in the next 
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elections, rushed into privatizing Railtrack by 1996 through public stock options 
(Gomez-Ibanez, 2006, p. 6–7 ).  British Rail was unbundled into 70 firms, including 
Railtrack and 25 train operating firms (based on service class and destinations).  
Franchises for 7 to 15 years were auctioned for train operating firms.  An independent 
regulator was established to determine the user-fee Railtrack would charge train 
operators for accessing tracks and stations.  While the regulator allowed open access to 
freight operators, subject to capacity limits, passenger franchises were protected from 
competition as they faced severe competition from alternate modes and required 
subsidies to remain viable.  The passenger franchises were awarded to the firms that 
sought the least subsidies for a given route, and restricting competition on these routes 
allowed for bids with relatively lower subsidies.  The motivation for vertical 
unbundling was primarily to introduce train-on-train competition.  This was achieved 
through liberalizing access to train operations and separation of train and track 
ownership.  While entry barriers were removed, not many challengers to incumbents 
emerged as train operation requires specialized stock and staff that were not easily 
available in the short run.  As British Railways reforms demonstrated, vertical 
unbundling possessed serious coordination problems.  While in the past rail track 
maintenance and train operation were with one firm, the state-owned enterprise, now 
these tasks were split into two separate entities.  After the unbundling, coordination 
had to be negotiated through contracts.  Gomez-Ibanez (2005, p.19) argues that 
38 
 
unbundling of Railways is less effective than outright privatization as train-on-train 
competition offers no incremental gain over intermodal competition.  Additionally, 
quality of service depends on train-track coordination, which is harder to achieve when 
these functions are split between independent firms.  This coordination failure was the 
case for British Railways as well. 
In 2001, during the Labor government, Railtrack was confronted with costs due 
to high profile train accidents and associated disruption of service and challenges in 
track upgrading leading to bankruptcy.  The Labor government restructured Railtrack 
into Network Rail, a non-profit firm under state-management and ownership.  Several 
explanations are provided for this unsuccessful privatization.  First, instead of vertical 
unbundling of tracks and trains, perhaps geographically distinct horizontal unbundling 
(similar to the structure of British rail pre-nationalization in 1948) would have yielded 
better results because unlike roads, telecom or electricity, railroads have special 
coordination requirements that require joint management of track and trains. (Gomez-
Ibanez, 2005, p. 19; also see Gomez-Ibanez, 2003, p. 331–337) Second, competition was 
not effectively introduced, and hard budget constraints were not enforced during rail 
privatization due to political interference, particularly during Labor party rule.  Thus, 
while British Rail incurred the cost of privatization, but prior to reaping benefits of 
privatization the process was disrupted (Glaister, 2006, p. 49).  Third, rail privatization, 
while unsuccessful in Britain, has worked well in other parts of Europe.   
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There were several critiques of unbundling Railways.  Given intermodal 
competition train-on-train competition is unnecessary, and is observed to be slow to 
materialize in practice.  Unbundling makes coordination difficult, both among 
operators as well as between operators and infrastructure asset managers.  Lack of 
coordination resulted in cost overruns and reduced safety leading to the bankruptcy of 
Britain’s Railtrack in 2001.  There was a trade-off between benefits from train-on-train 
competition and the additional costs of coordinating train and track operations 
undertaken by separate firms; the benefits did not exceed the costs. 
The benefits of unbundling Railways were identified as the following. First, 
unbundling has worked outside Britain.  Second, British failure is attributed to a lack of 
political commitment on the part of the Labour Government.  Third, outright 
privatization has limited success in developing countries as the state and private 
operators disagree “over tariffs and conditions of services.” (Gómez-Ibáñez, 2006, p. 
xii). 
In sum, deregulation, the reduction in government control of tariffs and type of 
service, was the text-book solution.  Unbundling requires a greater role of government 
in regulating the market to avoid mergers which lead to vertical integration; 
furthermore, coordination is required among train operators and the operators of train 
and track companies respectively.  Deregulation is common where competition from 
alternate modes of transport and locational competition is intense.  In practice, a 
40 
 
combination of unbundling, privatization, deregulation, or both were experimented 
with in developed as well as developing countries with a spectrum of results.  For the 
purpose of this dissertation, the substantive lesson is that privatization is not a 
sufficiency condition for efficiency gains, and may be accompanied with equity losses.   
 
In developing countries—some efficiency gains, not much investment outside telecom 
Privatization of infrastructure in developing countries brought some efficiency gains in 
public utilities, but little investment given the scale of the challenge for expanding 
much needed infrastructure services (Table 1). 
Table 1.  Infrastructure deficit in developing countries disaggregated by income 
Country 
income level 
% of 
population 
with access to 
networked 
electricity 
(2000) 
Number of fixed 
and mobile 
telephone 
subscribers per 
1,000 people 
(2005) 
% of population 
with access to 
improved water 
sources (2005) 
% of 
population 
with access to 
sanitation 
(2005) 
Low 31 114 75 61 
Lower-
middle 
82 511 82 77 
Upper-
middle 
87 901 94 91 
Developing 58 523 83 80 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2007 
Data on private sector finance for infrastructure are limited to commitments, not actual 
disbursements.  Thus, the figures that follow are overestimated.  Between 1990—2005, 
about US $1 trillion was committed and these private international financial flows 
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peaked in 1996 after which, along with the Asian financial crisis, these commitments 
steadily declined (Estache and Goicoechea, 2005).  The investments were geographically 
and sectorally uneven.  First, Latin America, followed by East Asia, gained the most, 
while Africa and South Asia each received only 5% of the total financial flows. Even 
within these poor regions, investment is concentrated among a few countries.  Second, 
telecom followed by power generation, received 75% of the investment, while water 
and electricity (transmission and distribution) as well as transport received the 
remaining 25%.  Third, of all investments from 1990 to 2005 in developing country 
infrastructure, only 20 to 25% was from the private sector.  The rest was provided by 
the state.  In sum, private participation in developed countries is much less than widely 
assumed by scholars and practitioners.  A review of privatization investments in 
infrastructure sectors indicates that private financial flows9 remained a small fraction of 
total demand, which is estimated at US $900 billion a year for developing countries 
alone (World Bank, 2008).  Fourth, where large public and private firms have failed to 
serve the poor, small-scale providers play a central role.  For example, in 23 African 
countries small-scale-private providers supply water to the slums (Mehrotra et. al., 2005 
                                                 
 
 
 
9 In lower and upper middle income countries, between 2000—05 committed private flows for 
infrastructure, as 0.85% of GDP, or about 25 % of estimated demand.  In Least Developed Countries, 
during the same period, 0.69% of GDP was committed, accounted for 10% of estimated demand. 
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as well as Kariuki and Schwartz, 2005).  Finally, local large private investors account for 
up to half of the different types of privately financed projects. 
Latin America was the region that received the most private investment, 
although the results were mixed.  The variance in privatization results within Latin 
America can be explained by some of the following characteristics.  First, as new 
technology allowed for divisibility in production and provision of services, like wireless 
telecom or power generation, multiple providers could compete with relatively lower 
levels of investments.  Thus, telecom and power drew private interest, while the rest 
did not.  Second, sectors where user fees are charged and that are less dependent on 
equity considerations, telecom for instance (but not water), had more success in 
drawing private firms.  Third, countries facing large fiscal deficits were able and willing 
to take politically difficult disinvestment decisions and liberalize markets, including for 
infrastructure10, when necessary.  Fourth, the privatization of infrastructure through 
lease or concession of public asset stock had positive effects in the short-run as cash 
infusion allowed the reduction of the fiscal debt burden and helped macroeconomic 
stabilization.  However, in the medium-term the flow effects are eroding these gains.  
Renegotiation of contracts by private providers are reducing private investment 
                                                 
 
 
 
10 Infrastructure privatization is highly contentious politically and thus unless absolutely necessary, 
governments in developing countries avoid quick disinvestments.   
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commitments and increasing demands on public subsidies.  Thus, the gains from stock 
effect are being eroded by the flow effect.  Moreover, high expectations from increased 
private investment crowded out public flows, resulting in a net reduction in total 
infrastructure spending.  Fifth, privatized infrastructure had productivity gains and 
quality of service improvements.  Labor was retrenched in the short-run, leading to 
productivity gains per employee as well as improvements in service quality when 
compared to pre-privatization levels.  However, public opinion surveys continue to 
demonstrate large dissatisfaction among people (Estache and Trujillo (2008).  Details of 
such equity-efficiency trade-offs are discussed later in this Chapter. 
 
Critique 
There were two main theoretical shortcomings of the privatization assumption in 
infrastructure.  First, infrastructure privatization was conceptualized within the 
neoclassical market models of price mechanisms built around spot markets. 
However, infrastructure sectors are characterized by incomplete contractual markets 
and need to be re-conceptualized in the context of transaction cost economics11 (Coase, 
                                                 
 
 
 
11 As Demsetz (1988) in Theory of the Firm Revisited, points out firms choose to centralize within their 
hierarchically organized structures various forms of production in order to reduce transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937) associated with the price mechanism in a decentralized neoclassical market arrangement. 
Privatization debate has neglected this crucial area of research that provides insight into why both public 
and private sector firms choose to have large hierarchical organizational structures.  Furthermore, unlike 
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1937, Williamson, 1985, North, 1987, Demsetz, 1988).  Unlike perfect spot markets where 
multiple profit maximizing producers compete to engage with utility maximizing 
consumers mediated by the price mechanism; in practice, infrastructure markets are 
imperfect due to information asymmetries (Stiglitz, 2000), barriers to entry, 
externalities, bounded rationality (Simon, 1947; 4th ed., 1997), and incomplete markets 
requiring national security as well as equity consideration.  Moreover, even where 
perfect markets exist they yield Pareto-optimal distributions that neglect initial wealth 
inequalities and thus avoid broader distributional concerns (Arrow, 1974) that are 
essential to basic infrastructure services.  As a result, markets in practice exemplify 
imperfect competition, and firms in many sectors associated with public goods 
provision have market power.  Additionally, firms attempt to consolidate markets so as 
to extract monopoly rents.  The efficient market hypothesis is further compromised in 
case of public goods provision because political considerations coexist with 
contradictory economic objectives.  Furthermore, the choice between public or private 
production is not obvious in the case of delegated arrangements12 where government 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
individuals, organizations process and respond to incentives in complex ways as they balance reactions 
to a combination of external and internal pressures (Hirschman, 1970, in Exit, Voice and Loyalty). 
 
12 The make or buy decision is central to privatization. If the decision is to buy the choice is between ‘spot 
markets or a contract market’ (Sclar, 2000, p. 18). In spot markets that tend to exist for standardized goods 
and are competitive markets, the decision is based on cost of internal production versus external 
purchase. Here transaction costs are negligible.  In contrast, contract markets, that tend to be less 
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(principal) contracts a private or public sector (agent) to deliver public goods.  
Operating natural monopolies or addressing externalities creates complex contractual 
choices and associated transaction costs due to uncertainty and information asymmetry 
that pose similar challenges to both private and public providers (Sappington and 
Stiglitz, 1987). 
In sum, the privatization debate has neglected the new institutional economics 
literature, in particular, organizational issues involving transaction costs of contracting 
out production.  Instead, simplified assumptions such as public monopolies with 
centralized hierarchical in-house production are inefficient, and competitively procured 
contracting can yield efficient production are erroneously held.  Thus, privatization is 
considered to be the optimal solution.  However, in practice contracting out services to 
private players for public goods often lacks sustained competition (direct or indirect), 
and long-term contracts for complex tasks leave ample room for unanticipated 
contingencies that cannot be provided for in contracts.  In these incomplete contracts 
the issue of discretion associated with residual rights is a critical factor in determining 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
competitive and cater to provision of specialized tasks (defense, space travel, or even infrastructure 
services) involve complex transactions and associated high costs. The process requires prices to be 
bargained as markets are imperfect (require price discovery), oversight to ensure consistency in quality, 
and mechanisms to tackle high social cost contingencies. 
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the choice between governments making or buying public goods.  These discretionary 
residual rights are not limited to infrastructure contracts.  Mavroidis (2007) provides a 
comprehensive case-law based account of complexities associated with incomplete 
contracts in the context of international trade agreements.  The outcomes of contracted 
services are difficult to determine and are contingent on the tripartite combination of 
competition at entry (screening), maintaining contestability of markets, and public 
control over residual rights.  In sum, competition through contracting is an assumption 
that holds only under very specialized market conditions and should not be taken for 
granted in privatization of infrastructure. 
Second, user-fee-based financing to replace tax-based financing led to wide spread 
unpopularity among poor consumers.  First, the poor greatly value basic services as 
demonstrated by the very high prices they are willing to pay for water and electricity to 
informal vendors in African slums; however, in many cases,  non-budget constraints 
such as inability to access formal institutions mean that the poor are unable to access 
adequate services.  Second, user-based financing neglected positive externalities from 
access to basic services for the poor, leaving positive externalities of private provision 
uncompensated.  Third, the poorest are unable to afford market prices for services and 
private firms focused on profit maximization were unwilling to subsidize and provide 
access to the poor.  The cost of capital for private firms and associated rate of return in 
developing countries is over two times greater than that for equivalent infrastructure 
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investments in developed countries due to exchange rate fluctuations, variability in 
demand and regulatory and political risks.  The cost of capital is escalating due to the 
recent financial sector crisis and associated credit rationing.  This makes cost recovery 
tariff levels rather high and politically infeasible to implement, especially in basic 
services like water supply and mass transit.  This mismatch between the needs of the 
poor and their ability to afford services  as well as private benefits (access to services) 
and public benefits (public health gains and so forth) should have been bridged through 
publicly financed subsidies instead of regulatory coercion of the private sector to serve 
the poor.  
 
Alternatives 
There is a spectrum of alternatives being researched by scholars and implemented by 
policymakers.  Alternatives range from privatization to corporatization, which is 
operating public utilities under private company law.  Such considerations include 
fiscal federalism accompanied by decentralization of service provision and innovations 
in independent regulation through a combination of need-based contracting and in-
house experts.  Hansmann (1980) and Krashinsky (1986) articulate the role of non-
profits to compensate for contract failure in public goods provision, particularly when 
the evaluation of quality of services rendered is difficult in the short-term and where 
cost of service is borne by individuals that are not the beneficiaries of the service—for 
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example in the case of donations made by Americans to feed hungry children in India 
or, to a lesser degree, when parents pay tuition for the education of their children.  Two 
other alternatives that I consider critical are discussed. 
First, focus on pro-poor service expansion—be it public, private, or both.  In 
the privatization reforms conceived under the neoclassical price mechanisms, subsidies 
were seen as market distortions.  In contrast, practitioners, while agreeing to some 
degree of ineffectiveness (poor targeting, capture by middle class) and distortions due 
to subsidies, argue that these are essential for increasing access to the poor in order to 
make services affordable.  Yet, a neglected attribute is the market failure in pricing total 
benefits of improved services.  The basis for subsidies need not be for equity reasons 
alone.  As access to improved services has positive externalities for public health to 
society, as well as industry (economy), these benefits should be covered through 
subsidies (instead of constituting a proportion of the user fee).  Users, particularly the 
poor, should pay for the private benefits of these services only.  This is an area that 
needs further research for developing a programmatic approach to enhancing 
infrastructure services to the poor.  Four illustrative instruments to increase access to 
the poor include:  First, specific service obligation contracts for utilities to serve the 
poor, rather than avoid them, for example through output-based aid or slum franchises 
like sub-network master-operator arrangements (Mehrotra, 2005); Second, reducing the 
upfront cost of new connections through amortization of costs built into the tariff, or 
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direct and targeted subsidies for connection to the poor; Third,  reducing institutional 
and location-based barriers to bill payments by the poor; Four, enhancing consumer 
voice through citizen report cards; this is a utility benchmarking process that places 
citizen involvement at the center of accountability and transparency.  
Second, reinventing the state.  Given the above constraints to private investment 
in infrastructure, the role of the state needs to be re-conceptualized keeping three 
central issues in mind:   The extent of public provision; the type of regulation in 
politically sensitive sectors with market failures; and appropriate distribution of 
provision and regulation responsibilities among levels of government.  Public 
ownership and provision dominate economic infrastructure.  Most infrastructure assets 
in developing countries remain publicly owned (Table 2).  80% of new infrastructure 
investments in developing countries between 1990–2005 were publicly financed.  Of the 
remaining 20% that was privately financed, some contracts have been renegotiated, 
seeking increased public assistance for both capital investments and operation and 
management. 
  
Table 2.  Extent of public ownership 
(Percent of countries without large private outlays in infrastructure2004) 
 
Income 
Level 
Electricity 
generation 
Electricity 
distribution 
Water and 
sanitation 
Railways Fixed-line 
telecoms 
Low 59 71 82 66 50 
Lower-
middle 
52 63 50 74 38 
Upper- 42 52 63 40 28 
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middle 
Developing 53 64 65 64 41 
Source: Estache and Goicoechea 2005. Note: Data for Railways are from 2002. 
However, public investment is about “50 to 120%” less than the estimated demand for 
infrastructure that would support high economic growth rates.  In resource-scarce 
economies, infrastructure investment tends to be demand-driven, as opposed to supply 
oriented, (see Hirschman’s (1958) development via shortages).  However, this shortage 
in public funds, in part, was the motivation for privatization. 
Implications for policy makers are to seek mechanisms to improve the 
performance of existing state-owned enterprises and public expenditure effectiveness. 
Most scholars recommend corporatization but this approach confronts many of the 
challenges that privatization faces.  Further, the private sector has cherry-picked the less 
politically contentious and easier to fix utilities, leaving more difficult utilities to be 
addressed (Gomez-Ibanez, 2006).  This makes understanding the conditions under 
which state-owned enterprises improve infrastructure services an important area of 
research that has been neglected over the last two decades (Mehrotra, 2009, Sclar, 2000, 
p. 61).  This dissertation serves to fill this gap. 
 
 
Equity-Efficiency Trade-offs 
Policy reforms for infrastructure privatization during the 1990s articulated that short-
run equity losses were inevitable for greater efficiency in the medium-term, which 
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would eventually lead to long-term equity gains. This section weighs up the theoretical 
arguments and empirical outcomes of these equity-efficiency tradeoffs with regard to 
privatization of infrastructure state-owned enterprises in developing countries to 
evaluate the conditions under which such trade offs hold true. 
 
 
Economics Theory 
There are two broad debates on equity-efficiency trade-offs in public economics.  The 
first, concerns the terms of trade, which is how much efficiency is lost to gain a unit of 
equity?  The second is value-laden: How much does a society value reducing inequality 
versus inefficiency?   (Stiglitz, 2000, p94).  Differing levels of prosperity among nation 
states can be explained according to North (1990), in large part, due to developed 
country preferences for productivity-oriented institutions over redistributive ones.  
However, both of these debates assume a fixed-pie scenario where equity can only be 
achieved at the cost of efficiency or visa versa, an assumption that is questioned below.  
For this reflection on the literature, efficiency gain is defined as more output for a unit 
of input, essentially a measure of productivity.  Equity gain concerns the redistribution 
of benefits that accrue to marginal populations, namely from non-poor to poor, or that 
benefit only the poor without taxing the non-poor, as in the case of pro-poor Pareto-
efficient outcomes.  
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Equity and Efficiency In Infrastructure Privatization 
The policy case of infrastructure privatization argues that public utilities are 
vertically-integrated, inefficient, state-owned-infrastructure monopolies, whose 
efforts to achieve equity are ineffective.  Public utility subsidies are untargeted, often 
captured by the middle class and the rich, and only indirectly serve the poor 
consumers, if at all.  Moreover, the subsidies are large enough to cause fiscal deficits 
that threaten the very viability of public utilities.  In order to continue infrastructure 
services, it is imperative to enhance the commercial viability of these utilities—
ostensibly through efficiency gains from privatization (Kessides, 2004, Yarrow, 1999, 
Shirley, 1999).  Thus, infrastructure privatization poses the equity-efficiency 
conundrum.  
It is argued that in the short-run, equity will be compromised, at least in the 
popular perception, due to retrenchment, fare-hikes or the sale of national assets that 
may benefit local elite and ‘foreign corporations’.  In return, privatization will yield 
much needed efficiency gains through: a reduction in subsidies, better targeting of 
residual subsidies, a reduction in non-revenue services (disconnection of illegal services 
that tend to benefit the poor), improved profitability, gains for investors, and broader 
growth and welfare benefits to society.  In the long-term, with these efficiency gains, 
firms get better access to services and new jobs are created.  As the utility becomes 
financially viable, it further expands services to previously underserved poor 
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neighborhoods, resulting in equity gains.  Thus, in the short-run, equity needs to be 
compromised so that the utility can pursue efficiency gains that eventually yield long-
term broader equity goals.  In sum, a vicious cycle is converted to a virtuous one.  
However, privatization of state-owned enterprises in developing countries over the 
1990s yielded a wide-variety of outcomes.  An analytical framework is discussed to 
articulate the conditions under which equity-efficiency trade-offs occur, or not.  
 
Framework For Assessing Equity-Efficiency Trade-Offs 
Trade-offs between equity and efficiency are imminent when an economy is at its 
production frontier and perfectly competitive with no asymmetries of information, no 
incomplete markets, no externalities and so forth. 
 
Conditions Under Which Trade-Offs are True—Strictly Substitutes 
Case 1: In perfect markets, efficiency accrues only at the cost of equity. For a given level of 
technology, capital, labor, and institutions, when the economy is on the production 
frontier (perfectly competitive), equity gains are possible only by compromising 
efficiency.  This requires moving along the production frontier, that is from A (more 
efficient, but less equitable) to B (more equitable, but less efficient), see Figure 2.  Under 
such rare perfect market conditions, efficiency-equity trade-offs hold true. 
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Figure 2.  Perfect and imperfect markets 
 
Perfect Markets Imperfect Markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE 1 
Efficiency-Equity can only be substitutes 
Perfect markets, movement along production 
frontier 
CASE 2 
Efficiency-Equity can be complements or 
substitutes 
Imperfect markets, movement within 
production 
Frontier 
Source: Adapted from Birdsall and Nellis, 2003 
 
 
Conditions Under Which Efficiency-Equity can be Complements, Substitutes, or Both 
Case 2: Imperfect markets offer opportunities to simultaneously enhance efficiency and equity 
Most economies around the world are not perfectly competitive, particularly so in 
developing countries. As these economies are not at their production frontier, 
simultaneous efficiency and equity gains can be achieved which makes the trade-off 
unnecessary.  That is moving from C (inefficient and inequitable) to D (more efficient 
and equitable), see Figure 2. 
A 
B 
Efficiency 
Equity 
Production 
Frontier 
C 
D 
Efficiency 
Equity 
Production 
Frontier 
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In principle, given that efficiency and equity can be simultaneously addressed, as 
economies are not perfectly competitive and within the production frontier, it should be 
possible to privatize so as to achieve both objectives.  “To the extent that privatization 
reduces monopoly rents held by the wealthy, for example, it is likely to increase both 
efficiency and equity in the economy as a whole.” (Birdsall and Nellis, 2003, p. 1619).  
However, in practice, depending on the initial socio-economic conditions and the 
process of privatization, a variety of outcomes occur when infrastructure is privatized.  
Some stylized country cases illustrate these concerns.   
In Russia, initially low levels of efficiency, along with the assumption that 
privatization of public monopolies will result in competitive markets, had unexpected 
outcomes. First there were efficiency gains due to privatization but at the cost of equity.  
Infrastructure privatization benefited a few oligarchs at the cost of many working class 
and poor people who lost jobs, and who also sold shares in public utilities at low prices. 
Second, the private monopolies further eroded competition, leading to loss in efficiency 
gains and further loss of equity as services were cut and prices rose to seek monopoly 
rents (Roland, 2008, Sclar, 2000, Kikeri and Kolo, 2006).  Efficiency and equity were 
initially substitutes; this was followed by profitability and efficiency being substitutes, 
where profits accrued at the cost of efficiency, leading to adverse impacts on equity. 
In Peru, the privatization of a state-owned electricity company that was 
inefficient and inequitable, because it did not serve the poor and subsidized service was 
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provided to the rich and middle class, had initial gains in efficiency.  Subsequently, 
there were gains in equity as services were extended to the urban poor, although the 
rural poor remained underserved.  Thus, privatization in this case had efficiency gains 
that preceded equity gains, and the equity gains were unequally distributed among 
urban and rural poor.  Here, efficiency and equity were simultaneously complements 
and substitutes. 
In a study of infrastructure privatization in Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, and 
Nicaragua, McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) found that while on average price of 
services remained the same, poor workers lost jobs due to utility restructuring.  
Improvements in the quality of service and expansion of services to poor 
neighborhoods disproportionately benefited the poor more than non-poor households.  
However, the poor who lost jobs where not the ones who were supposed to benefit 
from better services.  Here again, while equity and efficiency were strictly complements, 
equity was achieved for some at the cost of others. 
In Britain’s electricity privatization, by contrast, while there were unexpectedly 
large efficiency gains, these gains were captured by the newly appointed private firms 
because the regulators were not effective in transferring benefits to the consumers 
(Hunt, 2002).  This resulted in efficiency being achieved at the cost of equity even 
though production occurred within the production frontier (due to incomplete 
markets).  In this case, while efficiency and equity were potential complements, in 
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practice they were substitutes.  For British Railways, introducing competition, in 
passenger and freight, labor and rolling stock, train operation and engineering, was at 
the center of privatization efforts that began in 1993.  After Britain privatized telecom, 
electricity, water, gas, and bus services, the Railways were vertically unbundled such 
that the ownership of tracks, stations and other infrastructure was separated from train 
operations and management.  British Rail was unbundled into 70 firms, including 
Railtrack, that managed track infrastructure and two dozen train operating firms (based 
on service class and destinations).  A series of complex transactions followed where 
certain groups of passengers, freight customers, laborers, franchise owners won while 
others lost, through a complex arrangement of equity-efficiency gains and losses.  
Eventually, competition was not effectively introduced and hard budget constraints not 
enforced during rail privatization due to political interference. While British rail 
incurred the cost of privatization, prior to reaping benefits the process was disrupted 
(Glaister, 2006, p. 49, and Gomez-Ibanez, 2006, p. 6-7).  This resulted in a loss of equity 
in the short run due to retrenchment of labor and reduction in unprofitable services, 
while the long-run efficiency gains were lost owing to a misjudged privatization 
process. In sum, while there were no efficiency gains, equity was compromised as 
consumers paid the price of failed privatization.  Table 3.  Summarizes a range of 
considerations that affect distributional and productivity outcomes of infrastructure 
privatization.  
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Table 3.  A Summary of distributional effects of privatization 
 Privatization Potential equity and efficiency outcome 
Assets 
distribution 
Public asset sold to 
private sector 
 If asset is sold below value (due to 
distress sale or corruption) equity 
declines 
Labor asset 
utilization 
Often improves return 
on labor 
 Retrenchment of unskilled workers 
that find it difficult to get new jobs 
reduces equity 
 Growth and productivity gains in the 
economy can create new job that 
enhance equity 
Capital asset 
utilization 
Often improves return 
on capital 
 If new owner utilizes assets better 
efficiency gains, else losses 
Fiscal 
effects 
Increase or decrease tax 
burden, benefit from 
improved public 
services, privatization 
receipts may be 
consumed to reduce 
debt burden 
 Tax burdens may shift among income 
groups 
 Poor tend to rely more on public 
services but access and benefits differ 
by communities 
Price and 
access 
Increase, decrease, or 
both 
 Prices decrease if stiff competition or 
some efficiency gains are transferred to 
consumer due to regulation. However, 
in infrastructure price increase is 
common, as in past under pricing was 
the norm or regulation of monopolies is 
weak 
 Price for rich and poor may also change 
differentially as quality of service and 
willingness-to-pay varies. Additionally, 
for the same nominal price, lower 
quality of service results in a higher 
real price. 
 In infrastructure the poor are 
disproportionately burdened by cost 
recovery tariffs, disconnection of illegal 
connections, collection of arrears, fees 
to expand network in underserved 
areas (usually poor communities, 
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slums), improved service quality for 
higher user fee 
Source: Author’s compilation 
Finally, the conditions for near perfect markets (Case 1) and imperfect markets (Case 2) 
can also coexist, or one can evolve into another within a country context.  For example, 
in the case of India’s liberalization and associated competition in telecom markets, 
which had been dominated by an inefficient and inequitable state-owned enterprise,  
dramatic efficiency and equity gains were achieved.  Wireless service rapidly improved 
in quality with new technology that allowed divisibility and lowered the barriers to 
entry (due to significantly lower initial costs); this increased competition and lowered 
the cost of service, making it more affordable for the poor. This is a classic example of 
how infrastructure can successfully be provided by the private sector when competition 
is possible due to new technology, low negative externalities and the interests of the 
consumer can be protected by effective regulation13.  While the Telecom began as a Case 
2 example of an imperfect market, it is rapidly evolving to resemble Case 1 like 
conditions of a competitive market, where, eventually, hyper-efficiency gains will 
accrue at the cost of equity.  For now, efficiency and equity are complements. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
13 However, in later 2010 due to discretionary allocation of spectrum bandwidth a large scale loss in 
public revenue was uncovered. 
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Equity and Efficiency Outcomes Offer Lessons 
Based on two decades of infrastructure privatization in Latin American the following 
ten attributes illustrate the complex relationship between the privatization 
assumptions and associated equity and efficiency gains or losses over the short and 
long-run, offering lessons for future consideration.  First, the fiscal costs of 
infrastructure provision remain to be addressed.  Despite privatization, infrastructure 
requires continued public investments in capital stock and public subsidies in operation 
and management (flow).  Thus, the assumption that market distorting subsidies will be 
eliminated with efficiency gains from privatization do not hold in practice.  Second, in 
non-competitive sectors (Case 2 conditions) the rate of return has a greater spread than 
cost of capital, which continues to increase due to political and regulatory risks, thereby 
making private participation riskier and more difficult to sustain (Estache and Trujillo, 
2008).  Third, regulatory authorities were unable or unwilling to transfer a portion of 
productivity gains (and associated profits) from utility privatization to the poor. This 
lack of equity gains or distribution of benefits is a source of grave discontent, even as 
efficiency gains have been achieved.  Fourth, retrenchment, although small in 
proportion compared to the total labor force, gains attention. While jobs were lost in the 
short-run, subsequently, with the expansion in the supply of services, many workers 
were re-employed in the medium-term. Additionally, grievances with job losses 
associated with macroeconomic conditions were also ascribed to privatization, leading 
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to large-scale discontent.  Fifth, regardless of whether price increases were accompanied 
by better services, or prices decreased for the same level of service, in most cases 
government subsidies decreased with the aim of improving cost recovery.  In general, 
when the total cost to the poor for basic services increased, it led to widespread 
discontent.  This was epitomized in Bolivia’s failed water concession between 
Cochabamba city water works and Bechtel, a British water conglomerate.  Sixth, taxes 
on privatized services increased the burden on the poor.  Various levels of governments 
have been imposing taxes on privatized infrastructure, all of which is passed on to the 
consumer by the private providers.  Furthermore, private utilities are sharing efficiency 
gains with the government rather than the user, and under regressive tariff regimes this 
disproportionately burdens the poor.  Thus, to analyze the equity implications in 
diverse contexts, tariff comparisons need to consider taxation levels, as taxes vary by 
country.  Seventh, frequent negotiations by private operators have resulted in a 
reduction in investment commitments, increase in subsidies, or rate hikes, all of which 
have created uncertainty for consumers and public coffers, posing challenges to the true 
cost of efficiency from privatization.  Eight, competition for the market in infrastructure 
services has been weak with two or three bidders on average for any given concession, 
posing challenges to ex-post efficiency gains (Estache and Trujillo, 2008).  Ninth, each 
infrastructure market has a small number of dominant players that account for most of 
the transactions.  This further dampens potential for competition.  For instance, water 
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privatization was dominated by 5 major European firms.  Tenth, corruption scandals 
associated with privatization have also shaken public confidence.  In sum, the efficacy 
of privatization needs to be assessed in the context of the broader socio-economic 
transformations that have often resulted in a complex mix of equity and efficiency 
outcomes that vary by sector, with time, and for different socio-economic groups. 
 
Causal Inference of Equity and Efficiency Outcomes Needs Caution 
While equity gains or losses (or in some cases efficiency gains that preceded equity 
gains or losses) correlated with privatization, they may be affected by several 
confounding or non-confounding covariates such as other concurrent processes of 
liberalization or other state-market transformations.  Some of these covariates in the 
context of Latin America’s privatization were discussed earlier.  Thus, equity impacts of 
privatization require studying them on a case-by-case basis contextualized within the 
broader the political economy of reforms.  Likewise, privatization is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for efficiency gains. This is because efficiency is a function of several 
variables including market conditions, regulation, competition policy, and access to 
credit, among other things.  Short-run gains from privatization are from sale receipts 
that provide a one-time infusion to the public coffers.  The longer-term gains occur with 
reduction in public subsidies for the provision of these services and higher tax revenue 
from more profitable private firms.  In sum, the efficiency and equity impacts of 
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privatization can have a variety of outcomes contingent on initial conditions of the 
economy, the nature of privatization process, social, political, and economic context 
post-privatization. 
 
Gap in the Literature—Neglect of Public Infrastructure 
To extend the bounds of the literature on infrastructure economics and associated 
policy prescriptions in the context of developing countries and emerging markets, this 
section identifies gaps and articulates my research question.  In particular, my research 
re-conceptualizes infrastructure reforms in the context of contract markets as opposed 
to spot markets and the associated choices of make-or-buy decisions in the production 
and provision of infrastructure services, including the internalization of externalities.  
Presented here is a review of the gaps in pivotal literature focused on an 
overview of the debate between theory and practice, and addresses the following issues.  
First, from a historical perspective based on the earlier discussions, despite the private 
origins of infrastructure, I explore why state-owned enterprises exist and what their 
limitations are.  Second, the motivations for governments to privatize their public 
utilities are presented.  Third, there is a discussion about the implications of the next 
generation of reforms like corporatization, and its critique.  In conclusion, if there is 
inevitability to state-ownership in infrastructure, then what are the approaches to 
improving infrastructure efficiency? 
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State or the Market? 
Many kinds of infrastructure services have had private origins, be it the railroads 
sparked by the invention of the steam engine by James Watson, the telephone by 
Graham Bell or electricity by Thomas Edison.  Further, after World War II, with the 
birth of nation-states in Africa and South Asia, and reconstruction efforts in Europe, 
many of these services were nationalized (Figure 3).  However, with the expectation of 
enhancing efficiency, inviting private investment, and expanding supply, in the early 
1990s many developing countries followed the liberal reforms pioneered under 
Margaret Thatcher in England (Shirley, 1999, p.26).  Yet, Gomez-Ibanez (2003, p.1), 
notes that in the long-term the policy emphasis on privatization and nationalization has 
been cyclical.   
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Figure 3.  Extent of state ownership in seven countires, 1980s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: McCraw 1986. 
Government intervention in infrastructure stems from several concerns.  First, 
the natural monopoly characteristics resulting from scale economies;  these are a 
consequence of the high initial costs of developing service provision networks, which 
require lumpy and immobile investments with returns accruing only in the long-run.  
Second, there are high barriers for competitors to enter the market.  Third, often there is 
a need to use eminent domain to acquire the right of way.  Fourth, given positive and 
negative externalities, it is desirable to the citizens that a socially optimal level of service 
is provided.  Finally, governments intervene due to the public good characteristics—
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non-rival and non-excludable—and equity considerations such as cross-subsidies for 
extremely poor consumers.  Not surprisingly, after a decade of unimpressive outcomes 
from deregulation in the developing countries, private investors sought the highest 
returns, selectively choosing investments.  As a result, the benefits of privatization have 
been unevenly distributed, both geographically as well as sectorally:  Latin America 
and East Asia received most of the investment and, among sectors, telecommunications 
has benefited most (Izaguirre, 2002, p.3), (see Figure 4a and 4b).   
Between 1990 and 2006, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia received little or no 
investment (Figure 4a), especially in sectors like water, electricity, and transportation 
(Figures 4b).  Therefore, the importance of understanding the role of state-owned 
utilities in infrastructure provision was retrieved by this and similar World Bank 
reviews of privatization between 1990–2001.  Consequently, it is fair to conclude that an 
ideological oscillation of policies between privatization and nationalization is unlikely 
to result in better infrastructure.  Moreover, Goulet (1986) has observed that competing 
rationalities driven by technological, political, and ethical concerns that attempt to 
dominate the reform arena predominantly by contradicting or negating each other in a 
counter-productive ideological battle, essentially impede meaningful action. 
 
Figure 4.  Investment commitments to infrastructure projects with private 
participation in developing countries by region (1990–2006) 
 
2006 US$ billion 
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Source: World Bank and PPIAF, 2007 
 
Figure 5.  Investments commitments to infrastructure projects with private 
participation in developing countries by sectors (1990–2006) 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank and PPIAF, 2007 
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Yet, the general debate on state-owned enterprise reform favors privatization as 
a solution.  But the debate has been inconclusive.  Early observation by Yarrow (1986, 
p.332) is still relevant.  He notes that “…it cannot be expected that one form of 
ownership will be superior to the other in all industries and in all countries”.  Among 
the various types of state-owned enterprises, the opportunities for exercising market 
power to seek monopoly profits and compromise on equity objectives are by far the 
greatest in infrastructure, due to the natural monopoly characteristics that persist in 
incumbent state-owned utilities; this remains the case despite recent technological and 
institutional innovations.  These characteristics of state-owned enterprises make their 
privatization controversial and the resultant risks have constrained private engagement, 
especially in the developing world, where sophisticated and truly independent national 
regulatory authorities14 remain a distant goal.  The regulatory agency can play “catch-
up” as privatization muddles through, but infrastructure is often associated with basic 
                                                 
 
 
 
14 The lack on independence in regulation is not limited to the developing countries.  For example, see the 
Aviation Safety Oversight Hearing: Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security of the United States Senate 
committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Thursday, April 10, 2008 (SR–253).  This hearing 
was regarding the inability of the regulator--Federal Aviation Administration—to exercise oversight over 
Southwest Airlines in ensuring safety inspection.  
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=377ee05b-346e-4ae6-
82a8-79a489a024b9 
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services, and the associated political risks constrain political support.  Thus, most of the 
infrastructure service delivery remains with state-owned enterprises15 (Shirley, 1999). 
Moreover, as Tendler (1998) points out, there are several misconceptions 
regarding state enterprise reforms among the donors and their policy makers:  First, 
most literature focuses on failures of public enterprises as opposed to learning from 
successes.  Second, best practices are drawn predominantly from developed countries 
or the recently industrialized East Asian “tigers”, making them less relevant for poor 
developing countries.  Third, the overriding view of many scholars and practitioners is 
simplistically nationalistic and categorizes countries as good or bad as opposed to 
seeking to understand intra-country variations and local successes.  Fourth, a bias 
towards market solutions inherently discounts the performance of public enterprises 
when on occasions it has been observed to be efficient.  Fifth, there is a neglect of 
lessons learned in the industrial performance and workplace transformation literature 
(IPWT) for understanding poor performance of firms in the Tropics.  Sixth, there is an 
over-reliance on user-led or consumer-voice-fed reforms, thus neglecting supply-side 
issues such as the need for motivation and responsive frontline workers.  Seventh, there 
is a simplistic understanding of labor unions as resisters of reforms (Tendler, 1998).  
                                                 
 
 
 
15 The one exception is telecommunications where changes can be largely attributed to technological shifts 
that lowered barriers to entry, allowed for competition and thus private engagement, see Kessides, (2004, 
p. 41) for further details. 
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Thus, there is a need to revisit public enterprises in developing countries with a curiosity 
to seek a nuanced understanding of the conditions under which public enterprises can 
improve infrastructure services.   
Further, policymakers assume that corporatization is a close substitute for 
privatization.  This is because corporatization aims to create market conditions for state-
owned enterprises, simulating the conditions that private firms operate in.  Shirley 
(1999) identifies five key aspects for such a commercialization:  Incorporation of state-
owned enterprises under commercial law; repealing barriers to entry, subsidies, and 
special privileges; equal competition for private finance; and equal autonomy and 
incentives to public managers as their private counterparts.  Corporatization is a 
substitute because it does not involve politically difficult interventions associated with 
efficiency gains in privatization: retrenchment, removal of subsidies, economic as 
opposed to politically patronizing use of resources and so forth (Baietti 2006).  
Moreover, public enterprises, often shielded from bankruptcy and acquisition, do not 
face the threat from predatory firms as their privatized counterparts.  Second, due to its 
public ownership, public managers do not have the same property rights and authority 
that allow for sale of assets or large structural changes in the firm’s operations (Stiglitz, 
1989).  The post-privatization solution that governments and their international policy 
advisors seek is corporatization, a close, yet inferior, substitute for privatization. 
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But does the assumption that corporatization is a poor substitute for 
privatization withstand scrutiny?  It is possible that state-owned enterprise reforms are 
likely to face similar constraints in implementation and will confront similar 
controversies as privatization.  Shirley (1999) conducted an empirical analysis of 12 
countries in 1995 at the peak of the privatization era.  The research concluded that 
reforms, whether privatization or corporatization, had three prerequisites: political 
desirability, feasibility, and credibility.  First, desirability occurs when the cost of reform 
to political leaders does not exceed its benefits.  This takes place when there is a critical 
mass among the various constituencies in the electorate that favors change.  An extreme 
example is an economic crisis that realigns interest groups.  Second, political feasibility 
occurs when leadership has support from government agencies like the legislature, 
bureaucracy, and local government, and has the ability to withstand opposition from 
the negatively affected interest groups like the state-owned enterprise employees.  
Third, political credibility is essential for investor confidence.  This entails the ability to 
resist policy reversals in the wake of unforeseen opposition and can be assessed 
through private investor risk ratings and historical precedents.   
Furthermore, Gomez-Ibanez (2006) identifies four reasons why corporatization 
and privatization are complements, not substitutes.  First, the  resistance to 
privatization that resulted from the trade-offs between efficiency considerations 
(commercial goals) over equity considerations (social goals), remains equally applicable 
72 
 
to corporatization.  Second, the institutional constraints—judiciary, domestic capital 
markets, independent regulation—that derailed privatization remain a challenge for 
corporatization as well.  Third, while privatization targeted the more viable state-
owned enterprises, most state-owned enterprises left for corporatization, or more 
generally for reform, are the “most politically sensitive and commercially weak” 
(Gomez-Ibanez, 2006, p.5).  Fourth, if economic gains are the goal, corporatization is an 
indirect method.  What is even more surprising is that Shirley’s analysis found “that 
privatization and corporatization have generally similar political costs and that, when 
countries are politically ready to reform, these reforms can complement each other” 
(Shirley, 1999, p.115).  Yet this critique has been marginalized by policymakers and their 
advisors (PPIAF, 2008, p.6, and Baietti 2006).   
Thus, there is little reason to believe that corporatization will succeed where 
privatization failed, or that if corporatization succeeds it will yield significant 
improvements.  Empirical evidence from previous efforts in developed economies 
remains weak.  Yet, while there is a lively debate between scholars and practitioners on 
the theoretical and practical implications of corporatization, empirical evidence of the 
impacts of these reforms on state-owned utility performance and their benefits to the 
marginalized is scant (Estache and Fay, 2007).   
In sum, about 80% of all infrastructure services world-wide are provided by 
incumbent state-owned enterprises (Estache and Fay, 2007).  Much of the capital stock 
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remains under public ownership and management, thus privatization or 
corporatization is likely to remain only a minor part of the solution; indeed private 
investment to date is limited to marginal investments in the residual 20% of 
infrastructure.  Supply-side restructuring focuses on how state-owned infrastructure 
enterprises can respond to the looming challenge posed by a large and ever-expanding 
infrastructure deficit, a short-fall in capital stock, poor management and service 
provision, and capital constraints for much needed additional infrastructure.  While 
there are doubts expressed by scholars (Shirley, 1999 and Gomez-Ibanez 2006), 
practitioners in lead international development organizations like the World Bank and 
reform-minded bureaucrats in developing countries are strongly in favor of 
corporatization of state-owned enterprises and ignore the critique offered by scholars 
on the associated political risks and resultant limitations.  A classic example was the 
advice provided by the Rakesh Mohan committee, Government of India, to corporatize, 
and then privatize the Indian Railways in 2001.   
Thus emerges the research question:  When privatization or corporatization of 
utilities is not politically feasible (or desirable—and unnecessary as my research will 
demonstrate) under what conditions do state-owned enterprises improve infrastructure 
services in developing countries?  This question is policy relevant because 
infrastructure provision in the developing world remains dominated by state-owned 
enterprises, yet despite limited progress with privatization in the 1990s, most research 
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has remained focused on the role of the private sector, associated management 
strategies, and investments.  In sum, in a pareto optimal world, the state substitutes for 
the market in the provision of public goods to achieve a socially optimal level of 
service..  Thus, the issue is not whether state provision is better than private provision; 
instead in many geographies and sectors, it is about mediocre state provision versus 
(more) efficient state provision, because the private option is not politically feasible, 
desirable, or even necessary. 
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Chapter 3:  Research Design 
 
Introduction 
The detailed research methodology along with considerations of epistemology is 
presented in this Chapter on Research Design.  My dissertation uses the case study 
method to examine the Indian Railways.  I address the question of how this Railways, a 
state-owned enterprise, improved its profitability, thus making it more efficient, 
without burdening the poor customers or its 1.4 million employees.  As Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1986) conceptualize learning16, the role of detailed case studies is essential in 
this process because only complex and selective applications of the basic principals 
informs action in ways that develops expertise.  Flyvbjerg (2001) has further elaborated 
the value and need of case studies in the social sciences, in what he calls the need for 
exemplars.  In this respect, I join the long tradition in infrastructure economics, policy, 
planning, and management literature where the use of case studies has been essential to 
understanding the particularities of infrastructure markets and their failures in various 
jurisdictions.  Three pronounced works that use the case study approach are 
Development Projects Observed (Hirschman, 1968), The Privatization of Public Service: 
Lessons from Case Studies (Sclar, 1997), The Limits of Market Organization (Nelson, 2005), 
                                                 
 
 
 
16 In the Dreyfus model of acquiring skills students evolve through 5 stages of learning from the novice, to 
the advance beginners, competent, proficient, and finally to the experts. 
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and Regulating Infrastructure: Monopoly, Contracts, and Discretion (Gomez, 2006).  
Common to these works is the emphasis on deliberative, as opposed to a calculative, 
rationality with the aim of identifying causal mechanism for policy manipulation.  In 
addition, the case method has long been a distinguishing factor of urban planning 
programs and the Harvard Business School’s pedagogical approach to teaching 
business administration. 
 
Comparative Case Method and the Treatment of the Counterfactual 
As Gee (1950, p. 230) defines it, a “case study method emphasizes the total situation or 
combination of factors, the description of the process or sequence of events in which 
behavior occurs, the study of individual behavior in its total setting.”  Thus, the goal of 
my case study is to present a “historically interpretive and causally analytic” Regan 
(1987, p. 35) view of the Indian Railways transformation, from its near bankruptcy in 
2001 to its revival in 2008.  The advantages of this method are that it provides a 
continuous account, including historical context, and an intimate knowledge of the 
situation (Gee, 1950, p. 230).   
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I draw on an interpretive17 approach that explores the case of the Indian Railways’ 
transformation over a four year period beginning in 2004.  The purpose is to identify 
causal mechanisms to achieve efficiency (and answer the question: how it works?) 
through the tools of detailed description in the case analysis.  The objective is to seek 
specific effects, with a sense of faithfulness to “depicting a world, rather than finding 
information for a specific hypothesis”) (Lin, 1998, p.171).  I emphasize the need to 
understand causal mechanisms in this public utility because it is a prerequisite to 
manipulating them for desirable policy outcomes:  Such as faster, heavier, and longer 
trains.  Further, I use Regan’s (1987) classification of the distinctive features of case-
oriented methods.  First, they are designed to uncover patterns of invariance and 
constant association.  This focus on invariance encourages greater specificity in causal 
arguments.  Second, the focus is not on relative frequency, but on the variety of 
meaningful patterns of causes and effects that exist.  Three, cases are studied as whole 
entities as opposed to a collection of variables.  Finally, case studies are aimed at 
stimulating a dialogue between ideas and evidence. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
17 The alternate approach is a positivist one and it seeks to discover causal relations (as opposed to 
mechanisms) by asking questions like “what it consists of” and uses statistical tools with the objective of 
finding average effect for representative units of analysis. 
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Through a case study of the Indian Railways, I explore the transformation of one such 
state-owned enterprise.  The broad focus of the study remains grounded in institutional 
incentives and organizational strategies.  In order to demonstrate that utility reforms 
can be undertaken, despite a restricted policy space, I undertake a case analysis and the 
approach is deliberative (as well calibrative).  In contrast to the conventional notion of 
comparison between two similar units of analysis—for example, two utilities with 
geographical, sectoral, or ownership variations and related degrees of reform success—
my research compares the restructuring of a public utility through a Weberian18 
approach to the “ideal-type” policy prescription.  The ideal-type is grounded in the 
experience of British Railway privatization reforms (1993–2001), among other cases.  In 
this manner, I establish not only the limitations of the present policy approach to 
privatization and corporatization, but it also enables me to critically assess 
contemporary theory on improving efficiency of public utilities.  Additionally, this 
approach helps develop the theoretical ingredients, in an inductive manner, of a 
nuanced and pragmatic approach to optimizing public utilities. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
18 “An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the 
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual 
phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified 
analytical construct (Gedankenbild).”  Weber, M.  (1947, p. 90). The Methodology of The Social Sciences. 
Translated by Edward A.Shils and Henry A.Finch.  New York: Free Press.  
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Nested-Unit of Analysis, Options, and Choice 
State-owned enterprises can be studied in several ways.  Some well-known approaches 
in the rich literature on state and market include a focus on explanatory variables such 
as transaction costs (Coase, 1960), institutions (North, 1987), asymmetric information 
(Stiglitz, 1989), activist state for capital accumulation (Amsden, 1989), and co-opted 
state for mopping-up after capitalism (Harvey, 1973).  Also, from a historical and 
economic sociology perspective, the market economy and the nation state are 
conceptualized as embedded in society and culture (Polanyi, 1944).  An alternative 
approach, often absent in development economics and planning, is the study of the 
state from the perspective of the society pioneered by the subaltern scholars like Partha 
Chaterjee (1993) and Gayatree Spivak (1988).  These scholars study the state in the post-
colonial context from the perspective of the masses (a bottom-up view as opposed to the 
conventional top-down perspective of the elite).  For example, in Spivak’s 1988 seminal 
essay "Can the Subaltern Speak," she deconstructs the notion that the subaltern scholars 
have given voice to the feminist perspective on sati (widow sacrifice, banned by the 
state) in the post-colonial identity of brown women.  Similarly, this can also be done 
within the structure of a bureaucracy, for example, in the literature on street-level 
bureaucracy.  For example, Lipsky (1980) and Tendler (1998) point to various aspects 
that place frontline workers at the center of policy making due to the discretion they 
enjoy.   
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 However, the appropriate method to study the transformation of the Indian 
Railways is from an organizational perspective.  Through preliminary fieldwork, it 
emerged that the nature of the transformation of the Railways had been led by creative 
endeavors of the bureaucracy that focused on asset optimization: faster, heavier, and 
longer trains.  This follows in the long tradition crafted by Weber (1947) with his focus 
on the rationalization of the state that results in bureaucracies, the routine, and the 
focus on means and ends (understood here as policy interventions for achieving an 
organizations’ multiple social and commercial goals of equity and efficiency).  Thus, my 
unit of analysis is nested, the organization of the Indian Railways, a public utility, 
within the context of the transportation market in India.  Drawing on Denters & 
Mossberger (2006) I explore a multi-level analysis of the Indian Railways through a 
part-whole relationship between the Railways and its constituent departments.  I also 
research the Railways’ relationship to consumers and producers of the complement and 
substitute services, such as alternate modes of transportation.  The Railways is studied 
in the context of the macroeconomic conditions in India that are in turn shaped by 
global markets, particularly in commodities like steel, cement, coal, and iron ore where 
the Railways is a dominant service provider.  In sum, this organizational analysis 
focuses on the administrative hierarchy of the Railways and addresses its relationship 
with the political leadership, its relations with other state-owned enterprises, line 
ministries, and the economy (including the market—firms, and households—that act as 
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consumers as well as producers).  I create a reference class of state-owned enterprises in 
several infrastructure sectors to which the Indian Railways belongs (see Figure 5, an 
updated version of Figure 3) to establish the universal set to which railways are a 
subset, and the Indian Railways an exemplar.   
 My case selection criteria is based on Flyvbjerg’s case classification (2006, p. 230).  
This is a paradigmatic case because it develops a metaphor for improving infrastructure 
services through state-owned enterprises (see Table 4).  It is argued that if the Indian 
Railways (one of the world’s largest state-owned enterprises thereby one of the most 
complex entities in this regard) can be made efficient without privatization, then so can 
others.  In contrast, the British Railways is a critical case because it establishes that 
privatization is not a sufficiency condition for achieving efficiency gains in public 
utilities.  Moreover, the case of the Indian Railways addresses a matter of concern, a 
social concern, (instead of a matter of fact), Latour (2004, p.231) and thus is worthy of a 
scholastic endeavor.   
 
Table 4.  Case selection criteria: Is efficiency a function of private ownership? 
 Ownership (X) 
Efficiency (Y) 
State (Public Utilities) Private (Corporatized or 
Privatized Utilities) 
Inefficient Outcome 1: Weak 
Most Public Utilities: Weak case to 
study, because theory and most 
empirics demonstrate that utility 
is inefficient if nationalized. 
Outcome 3: Critical case  
British Railways: A study of this case 
reveals why privatization is not a 
sufficient condition for efficiency. 
Efficient Outcome 2: Paradigmatic case Outcome 4:  Weak 
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Railways, India: Strong case to 
study because this is a counter-
intuitive but desirable outcome.  
This occurs when privatization is 
not feasible, as is the case with 
most public utilities. 
Reliance, Bharti Airtel, Idea Cellular, 
India: Private efficient utilities are 
over studied, yet under represent 
the total population of utilities that 
remain under state-ownership. 
 
Most scholars as well as practitioners argue that outcomes 1 (inefficient public utility) 
and 4 (efficient private utility) are expected.  Thus, to improve the efficiency of utilities 
that are state-owned, privatization is a prerequisite.  My dissertation argues that 
privatization is infeasible for as large a proportion as up to 80% of utilities (see Figure 5, 
also Sclar, 2005; Eustache and Fay, 2007; OECD 2007; World Bank 2010b; and Airoldi, 
M., Biscarini, L., & Saracino, V., 2010) and thus to improve efficiency there is a need to 
explore reform recipes that allow translation from outcome 1 (inefficient public utility) 
to outcome 2 (efficient public utility), as opposed to outcome 4 (efficient private utility).  
Moreover, a corollary to the above question is: while the study of the Indian Railways 
establishes that privatization is not a necessary condition for efficient utilities, is 
privatization a sufficiency condition?  The case study of British Railways (outcome 3), a 
textbook case of privatization, provides insight as to why privatization does not fulfill 
the sufficiency condition for efficiency as well.  However, given the obvious trade-off 
between depth and breadth of analysis, this dissertation will focus primarily on the 
Indian Railways, contrasting this with the ideal type privatization attempt of British 
Railways.   
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Figure 6.  Extent of state versus private ownership in 2010 
 
 
Note: percentage indicates extent of private ownership 
 
The geographical scope of my research is predominantly limited to the developing 
country context with references to related policy trends in North America and Western 
Europe, particularly British Railways.  I focus on the Indian Railways in the context of 
the economic liberalization of the economy post 1990s to explore the causal recipes that 
allow for the uneven improvement in the Railways’ performance.   
 
Treatment of Time 
The treatment of time in research is important.  For example, in The Great 
Transformation, Polanyi (1944) explores state-market relations through a historical 
evolutionary lens.  State-owned enterprises can be explored in a similar manner.  
Further, in the literature on organizational routine, Nelson and Winter (1982) develop 
an evolutionary lens for organizational change, and explore how decision making about 
Country GDP  Airlines Power Telecom Oil and Gas Rail Water Road Post 
United States 13,543.33 0% 25% 0% 0% 5% 75% 90% 100% 
China 11,606.34 50% 75% 75% 75% 85% 75% 50% 
India 4,726.54 20% 75% 50% 95% 100% 95% 90% 100% 
Japan 4,346.08 0% 0% 25% 25% 25% 100% 
Germany 2,714.47 0% 25% 0% 0% 50% 75% 
United Kingdom 2,270.88 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 
France 2,040.11 20% 75% 25% 25% 100% 50% 50% 
Brazil 2,013.89 50% 50% 50% 75% 100% 75% 
Russia 1,908.74 75% 75% 75% 75% 100% 100% 
Italy 1,888.49 100% 25% 25% 25% 100% 50% 
Spain 1,310.21 25% 0% 0% 100% 50% 
Korea 1,250.49 75% 100%  Mexico 1,249.74 50% 100% 0% 100% 100% 95% 75% 100% 
Canada 1,217.07 0% 75% 25% 0% 5% 100% 90% 
Indonesia 1,053.70 75% 100% 50% 75% 100% 25% 
Saudi Arabia 95% 80% 75% 100% 100% 75% 100% 
Bangladesh 
Pakistan 100% 100% 50% 75% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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adoption of technology within a firm is internalized, then replicated, and eventually 
integrated into the firm’s DNA over time.  Yet, not much is understood about how 
public sector enterprises—in particular public utilities—adopt technologies, internalize, 
and integrate them into their routines.  Moreover, time is important because when action 
occurs is as important as the fact of its occurrence (Tilly and Aminzade in Griffin, 1992, 
p. 416).  Thus, I use Griffin’s (1992, p. 403), three attributes of temporality in my 
dissertation.  First, I examine time retrospectively through historical bracketing of the 
Indian Railway from its inception 150 years ago to the present.  The most critical event 
during this period was the creation of India as an independent nation in 1947, which 
was accompanied by the consolidation and nationalization of the Railways.  This 
historical review focuses on four salient institutional and technological developments—
financing through bonds, advancement in technology, development of safety standards, 
and evolution of institutional structure—with the aim to contextualize the unit of 
analysis, the Indian Railways and the associated reforms.  Additionally, I focus on 
trends over the last 50 years to identify periods of interest; for example, points of 
inflection, where there was a significant change in the performance of the Railways as 
well as longer term trends, such as change in (or adoption of) new technology, like the 
switch from the steam engine to the electrical and diesel engines.  These data provide 
information about the financial performance of the Railways and the composition of its 
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physical stock, so they can be used only indirectly to deduce changes in institutions.  
For an insightful example of linear temporal bracketing see Beauregard (2007).  
 Second is the causal emplottment19 (White 1973) 2001 onwards (2001–2008).  
During this period particular attention is given to temporally delimited causal 
generalizations (Griffin 1992, p. 407) and the conditions that led to a near bankruptcy in 
2001 (Figure 6).  Additionally, I address the ideal policy prescription that called for 
reforms aimed at corporatization and eventual privatization of the Indian Railways 
with the aim of achieving commercial viability.  Further, a deliberative analysis of the 
limitations of these prescriptions is articulated.  Finally, a thick description of the four 
year period starting in 2004 articulates the crafting of an alternate approach to the 
Railways reforms.  Here, there is a focus on the diagnostics of the challenges within the 
Indian Railways in 2001, the identification of spaces for reform, and the eventual 
crafting of a management strategy that worked—for instance, by running faster, longer, 
and heavier trains.   
 Third, and most important, the temporal attribute regarding causal mechanisms 
(causal fluctuations) is elaborated through identifying and analyzing transformations in 
temporally specific causal patterns (Griffin 1992, p. 408).  This includes an explanation 
                                                 
 
 
 
19 Emplottment refers to ‘where do you begin’.  White (1973).  “It is emplottment that gives significance to 
independent instances, not their chronological or categorical order.  .  .  As a mode of explanation, causal 
emplottment is an accounting (however fantastic or implicit) of why a narrative has the story line that it 
does.  (Sommers and Gibson, 1994, p. 59).”  
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of the temporal conditions (when and where) under which conditions certain causal 
mechanisms come into play20.  For example, when and where is it more conducive to 
negotiate on issues where unions resist?  Or when is senior management more open to 
introducing change? 
Figure 7.  Revenue and expenditure 
 
 I refer to both primary and secondary data.  Over a two-year period, I collected 
primary data through in-depth (structured and semi-structured) interviews of about 
100 key informants, including railway staff at various levels of the bureaucracy (ranging 
                                                 
 
 
 
20 Abbott provides a full conceptualization of sequence of events: continuous or discontinuous, 
convergent or divergent; volatile or stable; and when does order matter (Abbott, 1983).   
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between the top management to the frontline workers), the customers, and independent 
analysts.  I spent half a year based at the Office of the Minister of Railways, Government 
of India, during which special emphasis was given to the role played by strategists who 
advised the Minister of Railways.  They were interviewed to tease out attributes of the 
reform strategy that focused on balancing efficiency and equity considerations in a 
commercially viable and socially desirable manner.  Additionally, I observed on-site the 
various aspects of the Railways functionings including the railway port inter-phase, 
large passenger terminals, and the utility’s senior policy makers and bureaucrats at 
work (see Annex 1). 
 I collected secondary data through an archival review of policy documents, 
including the annual Railway budgets, internal memorandums, policy reports 
(prepared by the Rakesh Mohan Committee, Government of India, the Ministry of 
Railways, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank), and its analysis by the 
popular media21 (Economic Times, Times of India, Business Line, Dainik Bhaskar, Nai 
                                                 
 
 
 
21 Some illustrative questions are provided.  Macro issues: What was the role of Internal and (or) external 
factors that led to the transformation of the Railways.  What specific organizational change resulted in the 
improved revenues?  What macroeconomic conditions did you benefit from:  Particularly, a boom in the 
commodity prices accompanied with high oil prices? 
Micro issues: What role did institutional incentives play?   What are the salient issues in the political 
economy of institutional change?  What operations and decision making processes in the railways  were 
changed, related benefits, and what remains the same?  Particularly addressing the three strategic actions 
taken in regards to freight (increased wagon carrying capacity-CC+8+2, wagon turnaround time, freight 
reclassification and its commercial pricing) and demand responsive passenger services (increasing 
occupancy rates, volume of upper class seats and leasing of parcel capacity). 
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Duniya, among others).  Further, I collected statistical data on the last 50 years of the 
Railways performance to analyze the role of long term trends in the recent 
transformations.  These data were prepared by the Ministry of Railways and are 
available for the period following Indian independence.  Indicators to measure the 
performance of the Railways include the organizational capacity (labor and capital 
stock variables), as well as performance measures like operating ratio, revenue and 
expenditure, average passenger fares, freight volumes measured in Net Ton Kilometers, 
and so forth.  I also located the case of the Indian Railways in a reference class created 
from the global railways database (a World Bank data base of 100 railways) as well as 
state-owned enterprises in general (an updated version of the McCraw-Economist 1978 
matrix, see Figure 5).  In sum, the data collection techniques that I relied on are two-
fold.  First, I used a set of in-depth semi-structured interviews along with participant 
observations to gather primary data.  Second, I collected archival data including 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
In particular, I am interested in understanding explanations to how, and why now, the 
transformation occurred?  How the vision of the Rail Minister regarding these actions was translated to 
the Board and eventually through the complex structure of the organization to the zones down to the 
street level bureaucrats at the weighing bridge and the like.  If the decision making process was not top 
down then how did it occur?  And how, and how much, did ideas and feedback trickle back upwards to 
the policy makers.  How interest group conflicts were managed (particularly groups outside the railways 
that may have little to gain)?  Was this made easier because of the rapid growth in commodity prices and 
other macroeconomic conditions? What were the partial and general equilibrium considerations, ex-ante 
for the above specific actions that lead to a radical increase in revenue in a remarkably short time? 
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internal policy documents and statistical data to complement as well as triangulate or 
contextualize the primary data. 
 
Data Analysis Procedures 
Weiss (1966) notes that a complex situation is one in which several interrelated 
phenomena are studied concurrently.  The analysis of such subjects call for a holistic 
approach, and the case study of the Indian Railways lent itself to this holistic aim of 
understanding organizations through a density of empirical detail (Weiss, 1966, p.202).  
Further, there was a focus on causal recipes because the interesting aspects of the 
Railways case are various combinations of causes that contributed to how the reform 
happened (Regan,2006, p.639).  Additionally, a fuzzy set approach was adopted.  There 
was an emphasis on the degree of membership of a causal variable or strategy, in order 
to identify the extent to which a variable contributed to the cause, in this study, various 
attributes of the reform strategy that led to efficiency gains (Regan 2006, p.640).  The 
thinking was in terms of set theory (and fuzzy sets) and subset of relations.  For 
example, a necessary condition (but not a sufficient one) is a subset of the solutions 
(Regan 2006, p.642-3).  There was an emphasis on within case analysis (Gerring, 2006, 
p.724) through the comparison between better and worse performing services within 
the Railways and addressing the temporal variability of causes.  Finally, the grounds of 
generalization were based on Weiss’ (1966, p.203) criterion.  First, that there is a 
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“necessity of a particular kind of organization given certain conditions.“  In other 
words, “If the values of essential elements of the system are given, then the system as a 
whole must result.”  Second, “the elements or the organization of the case to the 
molding forces in social context.” 
 In sum, the case study of the Indian Railways’ transformation from bankruptcy 
to billions was conceived as configurations, and through an outcome-oriented 
investigation, causal inference was drawn through causal conjectures that are a 
heterogeneous combination of variables and embody temporal variance that resulted in 
efficiency gains while adopting an unconventional strategy. 
 
Additional Theoretical and Practical Considerations and Limitations 
While general equilibrium considerations, that is economy wide impacts, are important, 
they are not the primary focus of this research.  Further, for this research it is assumed 
that one type of economic model (mono-economics), at all times, is not applicable for 
developed and developing countries alike.  This is because the latter has several 
distinguishing conditions, including a spectrum of unique market failures (particularly 
in capital markets, knowledge production), efficacy of institutions, and large-scale 
unemployment that violates the full employment assumption of many economic 
models.  The external validity of the research remains to be tested, given the unique 
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conditions of railroads in India.  Findings, lessons, new theoretical insights, and 
recommendations are cautiously drawn. 
 
While the glossary defines several technical terms that are specific to infrastructure 
sectors, particularly those used in the context of the Indian Railways, two key concepts, 
namely infrastructure and infrastructure economics, are defined here.  Infrastructure, 
broadly refers to transport, energy, and water utilities, what Hirschman (1958, p.83-84) 
defined as social overhead capital (SOC):  
 
“SOC is usually defined as comprising those basic services without which primary, 
secondary, and tertiary productive activities cannot function.  In its wider sense, it 
includes all public services from law and order through education and public health to 
transportation, communications, power and water supply, as well as such agricultural 
overheads capital as irrigation and drainage systems.  The hard core of the concept can 
probably be restricted to transport and power”(p. 83-84, emphasis added). 
 
Hirschman identifies three necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for categorizing an 
activity as social overhead capital: first, services that enable a wide range of economic 
activity; second, service provision is predominantly by ‘public agencies or private 
agencies subject to public control’ (1958, p.83) at subsidized prices; third, services are 
non-tradable.  Further, a service is considered strictly social overhead capital, or 
infrastructure, if the investments to provide such services are ‘characterized by 
“lumpiness”(technical indivisibilities) as well as by a high capital-output ratio’(p. 84).  
Railroads, like other network infrastructure such as water, power utilities, and road 
transport networks are a classic example of such services, as large scale investments are 
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required upfront.  And infrastructure economics is public and development economics 
applied to infrastructure sectors.  
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Chapter 4:  Bankruptcy to Billions! 
Introduction 
Here is an overview of how the Indian Railways was transformed in four years (2004 to 
2008), counter-intuitively, under a populist leader, the Minister of Railways of during 
this period.  What makes this surprising is that while retaining state-ownership, the 
railway graduated from near bankruptcy in 2001 to US $6 billion22 annual cash surplus 
in 2008.  
Soon after the railway had earned a cash surplus of 15,000 crore rupees (US $3.5 
billion) in 2006, the Minister was keen that this financial gain translate into rewards for 
the Railway employees and tangible benefits to poor travelers that rely on the Railway 
for transportation.  Of his propositions, the most striking was his insistence on reducing 
second class passenger fares by a rupee per passenger.  The Railway Board members 
were perplexed, “Why reduce just one rupee?  In most transactions nowadays, a rupee 
(2½ cents) has no value.  This fare reduction will cost the railway 250 crore rupees (US 
$58 million) and the passengers will hardly benefit.”  The Minister responded with a 
reference to his constituents, “Hathua ki gwalan apna dudh Dilli me nahi balki Siwan me 
bechati hai.  Aur Hathua se Siwan ka kiraya maatr saat rupaih hai (a milk vendor from 
                                                 
 
 
 
22 One US dollar is 43 rupees at 2008 average market exchange rates.   
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Hathua—the Minister’s political base in Bihar eastern India—sells her milk not in Delhi, 
but in Siwan.  And the train fare for Hathua to Siwan is just seven rupees).  Lagta hai ki 
air-conditioned office me rahne walon ko yeh ehsaas nahi hota ki ek garib gwalan ke liye ek 
rupaih ke kya kimat hoti hai (It seems that those who reside in air-conditioned offices do 
not realize what a rupee means to a poor milkmaid).” Further, the Minister elaborated 
that it is likely that all her relatives live within a 70 mile radius, and thus most of her 
work and life related train trips are within this microcosm.  At the end of this exchange, 
the Railway Board agreed to a one rupee fare reduction. 
This anecdote is grounded in a larger reality.  An analysis of passenger trips 
revealed that 88 percent of railway travelers—namely, all suburban and ordinary 
passenger train users—have an average fare of about ten rupees.  As the Minister got 
the second class passenger fares reduced by three rupees over four years, the minimum 
passenger fare reduced from seven rupees in 2004 to four rupees in 2008; a 42 percent 
reduction in the minimum fare.  As a result, a rupee reduction in the fare is not just 
symbolic, but it has a substantive effect on the total fare for these travelers.  During this 
period, the annual bonus for Railway employees was increased from 59 to 73 days of 
their respective wages.  However, what is critical is that because the poor consumers, as 
well as railway employees, directly benefited from the Railways’ financial gains—
annual cash surplus grew to 25,000 crore rupees in 2008 (US $6 billion), the railway was 
not accused of profiteering.  Further, this proved to be a popular initiative to the extent 
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that it was central to the Minsiter’s public meetings, even with his constituency, as is 
evident in the following conversation.   
The Minister asks a gathering of people from his constituency, “Tum ko malum hai ki railway ne pichle 
char saal mein 70,000 crore rupaiyah munafa kamaya” (Do you know, in the last four years the 
railway earned 70,000 crore rupees in profits?) 
A voice from the crowd responds, “Na Saheb.” (No sir.) 
The Minister asks, “Char saal pehle Hathua se Siwan ka yatri kiraya kitna tha?” (Four years ago what 
was the passenger fare from Hathua to Siwan?) 
The people respond, “Jee saat rupaiyah.” (Sir, 7 rupees.) 
The Minister, “Abhi kitna hai?”  (Now, how much is the fare?) 
The audience responds, “Chaar rupaiyah.”  (Sir, 4 rupees.) 
The Minister “Pahle kisi rail mantri ne yaatri kiraya kam kiya tha” (Did any Railway Minister ever 
reduce passenger fares in the past.) 
The audience responds, “Na Saheb.”(No, sir.) 
The Minister “Hamne har saal yaatri kiraya kam kiya, phir bhi 70,000 crore kamaye.  Kaisa laga?”(Every 
year, I reduced the passenger fares, yet the railway made a profit of Rs.70,000 crore rupees over 
the last four years.  What do you think?) 
The excited audience screams back, “Wah Wah sarkar! Yeh toh kamal ho gaya.”  (Congratulations sir, 
this is great.) 
 
The above exchange between the Minister and his constituency draws attention to the 
need to balance commercial objectives with social concerns such that the market metric 
is balanced with the societal one.  Not only is there a compelling moral imperative but 
also a political and economic rationale to address the needs of the marginal, if the 
overarching commercial goals are to be achieved and sustained. 
 
 
Despite the Odds—Financial Crisis to Super Solvency 
Financial Crisis 
The railway is as critical for the poor as it is for the economy.  On one hand, it is one of 
the only affordable means of transport for millions of commuters as well as aspiring 
96 
 
migrants who travel to realize their dreams in the city.  On the other hand, freight trains 
haul critical commodities that crank the wheels of the economy—taking raw materials 
to power, steel, and cement plants as well as food grains to ration shops and fertilizer 
for farmers.  This institution, and one of the largest employers with 1.4 million 
employees and 1.1 million pensioners, faced a severe financial crisis in 2001 when its 
cash balance shrank to a paltry 359 crore rupees (US $83 million23), the operating ratio24 
deteriorated to 98 percent, and it defaulted on the payment of a dividend to the 
Government of India.  The severity of this financial crisis is aptly captured in the Mohan 
committee report (2001b). 
To put it bluntly, the Business As Usual Low Growth will rapidly drive IR to fatal bankruptcy, and 
in fifteen years GoI (Government of India) will be saddled with an additional financial liability of 
over Rs. 61,000 crore (US $14.2 billion, p.180).  . . .On a pure operating level IR is in a terminal debt 
trap and can only be preserved by continuing and ever increasing subsidies, year-on-year, from the 
central government. As is well known such subsidies are not available (p. 181). 
 
During the 1990s, the core profit making freight segment grew at the ‘business as usual 
low growth’ rate of 2 to 3 percent, and wages grew at a faster pace than the growth in 
labor productivity (Mohan, 2001b, p.178).  As a result, in the five years that led up to the 
2001 crisis, Railways’ expenses grew at over 13 percent per annum, while its revenues 
                                                 
 
 
 
23One US$ = 43 Indian rupees 
24The operating ratio is calculated by dividing operating expenditure with operating revenue.  The 
operating expenditure is all cash and non-cash expenses including depreciation and appropriation to 
pension fund, but excluding the dividend payable to Government of India.  The operating revenue is 
gross traffic receipts.  Therefore, the lower the operating ratio, more efficient is the enterprise.  The 
Railways was spending 98 cents to earn a dollar. 
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lagged at 8 percent.  This was unsustainable as the railway was unable to generate 
sufficient cash to cover the cost of replacement and renewal of its aging assets.  The 
World Bank (2006) noted that had the railway made adequate provision for 
depreciation it would have been bankrupt. 
It is to be noted that IR’s (Indian Railways’) operating ratio of 0.96 is substantially understated, as 
the provision of depreciation is well below actual requirements.  If IR were to make adequate 
provision for annual asset renewal, a fortiori if it were to make adequate provision for the large 
backlog of overdue equipment and track renewals, as well as pension accruals, in normal 
commercial accounting terms, it is very likely that IR would be a heavily-loss-making entity—in 
fact one well along the path toward bankruptcy, if it were not state owned (p.5). 
 
This under-provisioning for depreciation endangered operations and led to stacking-up 
of replacement arrears year after year.  To liquidate these arrears the Government of 
India had to establish a special railway safety fund worth 17,000 crore rupees (US $4 
billion) two-thirds of which it gave as a dividend free grant, while the rest was financed 
through a safety surcharge on passenger fares.   
Super-Solvency in Four Years 
While improvements were made up to 2004, the Railways’ financial condition remained 
precarious.  However, in the next four years a populist political mandate did not allow 
conventional policy prescriptions; in the words of the Railway Minister, “no 
privatization, no retrenchment, and no fare hike”.  Yet counter-intuitively, the finances 
of the Indian Railways have been transformed.   
The cash surplus of the Railways rose steadily from Rs. 9,000 cr. in 2005 to Rs. 14,000 cr. in 2006 to 
Rs. 20,000 cr. in 2007.  The august House would be happy to know that in 2007–08, we will create 
history once again by turning in a cash surplus before dividend of Rs. 25,000 cr. (US $6 billion).  
Our operating ratio has also improved to 76%.  Indian Railways is a government department.  
However, we take pride in the fact that our achievement, on the benchmark of net surplus before 
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dividend, makes us better than most of the Fortune 500 companies in the world (Budget Speech, 
Minister of Railways, 2008, February 26, p.1).  
 
There was a complete reversal from a projected terminal debt trap to a cash-rich 
organization with a bank balance of over 22,000 crore rupees (US $5.1 billion).  In 2008, 
the railway internally generated six times more cash than its annual debt repayment 
obligation of about 4,000 crore rupees (US $0.93 billion), making it a significantly under-
leveraged organization.  This was acknowledged by investors in the United States, 
whose subscription to Indian Railway Finance Corporation’s bonds in a matter of hours 
amounted to over four times what was available; at 5.94% in 2007, this coupon rate was 
better than that was offered to the best private firms in India.  The Railways’ operating 
ratio, at 76 percent, is better than the operating ratio of the Chinese Rail, as well as the 
class-one American railroads; its 21 percent return on net-worth is better than that of 
some of the contemporary blue-chip Sensex companies in India.  Earlier, the investible 
surplus was insufficient to finance the replacement of aging assets, but in 2008 the same 
Railways generated an investible surplus of 20,000 crore rupees and its capital 
expenditure tripled compared to 2001 (see Table 5). 
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Table 5.  Financial indicators 
 2001 2008 
Cash surplus before dividend 4,790 25,006 
Investible surplus (after payment of dividend) 4,204 19,972 
Capital expenditure 9,395 28,680 
Fund Balance (bank balance) 359 22,279 
Operating Ratio 98.3% 75.9% 
Ratio of net revenue to capital-at-charge and  
investment from capital fund (return on net worth) 
2.5% 20.7% 
Debt service cash coverage ratio 1.74 6.53 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways 
 
Freight and passenger volumes clocked a compound annual growth rate of nine percent 
between 2004 and 2008.  During this period asset and labor productivity grew at twice 
the rate of the 1990s.  Earlier the Railway was heading towards bankruptcy because 
expenses were growing five percent faster than revenue, but this trend was reversed, 
with subsequent revenues growing over five percent faster than expenses (see Figure in 
Table 5). 
Freight business profits have boomed because of growing volumes, declining 
unit costs (from 61 to 54 paise), and increasing unit revenue due to selective fare-hikes 
(from 74 to 93 paise, see Figure in Table 5).  Despite the reduction in passenger fares of 
most travel classes, losses in the passenger business have been curtailed by virtue of 
stable unit costs (38 to 39 paise) and an increase in unit revenue due to a change in the 
product-mix in favor of high-value and high-margin air-conditioned, and long-distance 
travel segments (23 to 26 paise, see Figure 7).  Further, the growth rate of ‘other 
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coaching’ as well as ‘sundry earnings’ have doubled from around 10 percent in 1991–
2004 to over 22 percent in 2005–2008.  This has been achieved by enhancing non-
passenger fare income through leveraging eyeballs and footfalls of travelers25 and by 
tapping unutilized parcel capacity. 
Figure 8.  Freight and passenger unit revenue and cost 
  
  
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railway, 2008. 
Apart from the financial transformation, customers have benefited from faster, safer, 
and better services.  Additionally, the identity of the organization and the morale of the 
employees received a boost as did the stature of the Minister.   
 
Management Strategy 
                                                 
 
 
 
25 For example by providing subsidiary services for travelers through private sector participation in 
restaurants, shops, and advertizing on railway stations.  
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What makes this financial transformation unique is its distinct approach and swift 
accomplishment.  The financial health of the railway was restored without burdening 
millions of poor Indian travelers, or railway employees.  As hypothesized by skeptics, 
this transformation is not merely the result of commodity cycles or a booming economy, 
but structural change resulting in significant gains in operational efficiency.  Nor is it 
the result of creative accounting or unsafe over-loading of wagons; rather it is largely 
due to labor and asset productivity gains.  The core supply-side strategy can be 
summarized in three words, each worth over a billion dollars in surplus: faster, longer, 
and heavier trains.  The demand-side can be summarized in another three concepts: 
dynamic, differential, and market-driven.  To execute these demand-and-supply strategies, 
the management created cross-functional teams, leveraged existing resources and 
synergized operational interventions.   
Yet, these management strategies along with operating faster, heavier, and 
longer  trains are not new, and in fact date back to the very inception of the Railways.  
In this regard, the Minister is often asked by skeptics, “If it is so simple, why it wasn’t 
done earlier?”  his response is straightforward, “The Indian Railway has a huge 
potential, it’s like a Jersey cow; if you don't milk it, the cow falls sick.  Therefore, we are 
milking the cow fully and taking good care of it.”  However, what remained 
unanswered was why this metaphorical ‘cow [was] not milked’ earlier.  There may have 
been several other factors at play but a conceptual constraint was the conflict between a 
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populist political mandate that was at loggerheads with the policy prescriptions of the 
experts.  As captured in the Mohan committee report (2001a), it was this conflict that 
had debilitated the Railway. 
On the one hand, IR (Indian Railways) is seen by the government, and by itself as a 
commercial organization.  It should therefore be financially self-sufficient.  On the other 
hand, as a department of government it is seen as a social organization which must be 
subservient to fulfilling social needs as deemed fit by the government.  It is now essential 
for these roles to be clarified (p. 5). 
 
Over a 150 year history, the railway has confronted several formidable challenges.  At 
its inception, the railway was built under the difficult conditions prevalent in the mid-
nineteenth century, followed by the post-independence challenge of nationalization and 
modernization, after which came the critical operational crisis in the 1980s.  On each of 
these occasions, the Railways’ technically sound staff rallied around shared objectives 
and strategies, and it demonstrated its ability for adaptive resilience.  This is because of 
two core institutional strengths of the Railways—namely, its people and systems.  It has 
some of the most qualified bureaucrats and technocrats recruited through extremely 
competitive civil service exams.  It has an equally strong organizational structure with 
its robust field-units as well as articulated procedures and processes.  Yet, this 
institution was unable to cope with the financial crisis of 2001.  This was primarily due 
to a structural shift triggered by the liberalization of the Indian economy in the 1990s.  
On the one hand, the Railways’ profitable freight and air-conditioned passenger 
segments became vulnerable to stiff competition from alternative modes of transport.  
On the other hand, the shrinking fiscal space resulted in declining support from the 
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federal coffers.  To compound the crisis, the railway continued to be burdened with 
social obligations like low passenger fares.  Consequently, the rising cost of operations 
was often offset by increasing tariffs of the lucrative freight and air-conditioned 
passenger travel segments, further eroding the Railways’ market share in these 
segments.   
To revive the financial health of the Railway, experts recommended 
restructuring—passenger fare-hikes, retrenchment, corporatization, and independent 
regulation (Mohan, 2001b).  However, there was no political space to implement these 
recommendations as it entailed sacrificing the interests of the Railways’ employees as 
well as poor travelers.  This inherent contradiction between the policy prescriptions and 
the political mandate led to a deep rooted cynicism within the staff (Tandon, 1994). 
The feeling has built up at all levels that the solutions lie above their level: a “They” complex; only 
“They can decide.”  . . .The whole attitude builds a sense of helplessness and there is growing 
evidence of lack of commitment and involvement, a rigidity and drift (p.7). 
 
To break free of the widespread cynicism within the railway, the staff needed to be 
reassured that the commercial objectives and social considerations were compatible, 
and indeed could be reconciled.  The essence of this challenge is captured in the words 
of the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. 
The challenge before the political leadership in India today is to meet the aspirations of 
an energetic new India, and, at the same time, take care of the concerns of the less 
endowed, less privileged sections of our society, who are no less energetic (Economic 
Times, October 9, 2006, p.19). 
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Translating the mission of inclusive reforms—defined here as meeting 
commercial objectives without compromising the needs and aspirations of the 
poor—into action, required a deep understanding of the political economy of the 
Indian Railways.  Moreover, it required a re-conceptualization of what reforms 
actually meant.   
Reform is, in the final analysis, about changing mindsets.  We must have the courage to 
think out-of-the-box.  We must have the courage to think anew.  To question old beliefs.  
To seek new pathways.  As an old Chinese saying goes—a road is made by walking.  We 
must learn to walk in new directions and create new roads to progress (Economic Times, 
October 9, 2006, p.19). 
 
Despite having the will to think anew, how were market considerations harmonized 
with societal obligations?  The ‘split-personality’, as the Mohan committee experts 
described the conflict between commercial and social objectives, implied that there were 
only two possible outcomes of any policy initiative—either a loss on the political 
objectives while gaining on the commercial front or vice-versa.  Initiatives like 
increasing lower-class passenger fares or sanctioning non-remunerative new-lines fall 
into these categories.  But, increasing axle-load to carry more freight or adding coaches 
to a popular passenger train enhances earnings per train, and is welcomed by 
consumers as well as benefiting the Railways.  Thus, policy outcomes fall into four 
categories, not two (see Table 6). 
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Table 6.  Feasible set of reform outcomes 
 
Commercially viable Commercially unviable 
Politically 
desirable 
Outcome 1: Win-Win 
Reform efforts that fall in this category 
create win-for-all outcomes and face no 
resistance.  For example, increasing the 
length of a popular passenger train 
enhances earnings per train and is 
welcomed by consumers because it helps 
clear long waiting lists.   
Outcome 3:  Exclusively social returns  
Reforms of this nature are extremely 
contentious because there is tremendous 
political will, yet these are commercially 
unviable.  For example, maintaining loss 
making branch railway routes (or 
opening new ones) for marginal 
communities in remote areas.   
Politically  
undesirable 
Outcome 2: Exclusively commercial 
returns 
Reforms that are socially sub-optimal 
and commercially viable are contentious 
because they lack political will, typical of 
the ‘split personality’ scenario of the 
Railways.  For example, increasing 
passenger fares in second-class ordinary 
passenger trains.   
Outcome 4:  Lose-Lose 
These outcomes are neither politically 
desirable, nor commercially feasible.  For 
example, new railway projects sanctioned 
on constricted departmental 
considerations compromise the 
institutional objectives. 
 
 
Each policy initiative was examined to determine the type of outcome.  The strategy 
was to look beyond the obvious, to reconcile perception with reality, and to find out if 
the conflict between the political mandate and commercial objectives was the principal 
reason for the deteriorating condition of the Railways.  For example, the total cost 
function of the Railways is largely inflexible because the railway does not have the 
political space to retrench at will, to shutdown, or even sell loss making branch lines 
and business units.  On the other hand, if the total cost is distributed over greater 
volumes then unit cost declines.  This volume driven strategy has no political 
implications, and benefits customers and the Railways alike.  Similarly, while an 
increase in passengers  fares is extremely politically sensitive, increasing yield per train 
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by adding additional coaches to popular trains benefits both waitlisted customers and 
the Railways.  Assessing the hidden opportunities behind the veil of political economy 
led to some striking discoveries.  Through a rigorous analysis, it was demonstrated that 
about 80 percent of the Railways’ revenue stream as well as investments are not 
politically sensitive and can be market driven (see Figure 8).  
As illustrated in Figure 9, the entire freight, parcel, and air-conditioned 
passenger segments are apolitical and can be market driven. The Mohan committee 
attributed the declining market share, even in bulk commodities, to freight fares cross-
subsidizing passenger services.  As these cross-subsidies affected all commodities, then 
why was there a dichotomous response in the transportation of finished products 
versus raw materials?  For instance, while the Railways’ market share of finished 
products like steel and cement declined sharply in 1990s, the share of iron ore, coal, and 
other minerals remained stable during the same period.  Both iron ore and steel are 
heavy commodities; however, there is a key distinction.  In the case of iron ore, the 
Railways provides a door-to-door service—from the mine-pithead to the factory.   
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Figure 9.  Traffic and investment in fiscal year 2008 
  
Note: Total revenue for fiscal year 2008 was 71,720 crore rupees (US $17 billion). 
The social components include all earnings from passenger trains with the 
exception of air-conditioned and first-class.  Essentially, income from poor 
passengers are included and from non-poor excluded. 
 
Source: Computed with data from Ministry of Railways (2008a). 
Note: Total invetment for fiscal year 2008 was 28,680 crore rupees (US $7 billion).  The 
social components include all expenditure in new railway lines,  urban transportation 
projects, and gauge conversion.  Essentially, expenditure for projects considered to be 
pro-poor are included, and the rest is excluded.  By and large these proportions have 
been consistent over the last few years. 
 
 
Thus, the rail freight is equal to the total ‘door-to-door’ logistics cost borne by the 
customers—implying that incidental costs of rail transportation are negligible.  On the 
other hand, in the case of steel, the Railways provides a ‘station to station’ service.  
Nevertheless, steel is neither produced nor consumed at railway stations.  As a result, in 
addition to the rail freight, the customer incurs incremental costs due to multiple 
transfers, bridging, warehousing, inventory, and so forth.  In essence, rail freight is only 
a small component of the total door to door logistics cost to the customer.  Truckers, on 
the other hand, provide door to door service for transportation of steel, and the 
incidental costs of road transportation are negligible.  Thus, the railway has a strong 
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competitive edge in transportation of iron ore, while it is very vulnerable in case of 
steel.  To compound the problem, the Railways determined freight rates based on the 
value of the commodity rather than elasticity of demand.  Hence, relatively low-cost 
raw materials like iron ore were charged less, with expensive finished products like 
steel being charged more.  On the contrary, based on the competitive strength of 
Railways in the market place, the pricing policy for these two types of commodities 
should have been the reverse higher charges for transportation of iron ore and less for 
steel.  As a result, the Railways was losing market share in steel, while retaining the 
same share in iron ore.  In sum, the differential loss in market share was not on account 
of cross-subsidies, but due to misconceptions about the competitiveness of the Railways 
in the market place as well as a monopoly mindset.  Likewise, while successive 
Ministers were reluctant to increase non-air-conditioned class passenger fares, this 
prevented the Railways from decreasing air-conditioned class-one and two fares to face 
the competition from low-cost airlines.  Thus, the Railways’ core profit making business 
segments were under threat largely due to an aversion to profit, a monopoly mind-set 
despite shrinking market share, poor commercial orientation, and lack of customer 
focus.  
In the same vein, barring construction of new railway lines, urban transportation, 
and some gauge conversion projects that are sanctioned based on political 
considerations, the remaining 80 percent of investment decisions have no political 
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implications.  Essentially, the bulk of investments made were not yielding results due to 
narrow departmentalism that routinely compromised institutional goals for 
departmental gains (Tandon, 1994).  For instance, investments made in the 1980s and 
1990s of 30,000 crore rupees (US $7 billion) for strengthening the railway track structure 
did not yield commensurate results- not because of political interference,  but on 
account of lack of cross-functional coordination and risk aversion to increasing axle-
load.   
Such analysis was done policy by policy, business by business, and activity by 
activity.  It revealed that the space for reforms was extensive.  For instance, there are no 
significant political implications with regard to operation, maintenance, train 
examination policies, and other day to day operations.  Conflicts between the social and 
commercial obligations of the railway were not the primary constraint.  Therefore, the 
focus of the reforms graduated from no privatization, no retrenchment, and no fare 
hikes to identifying, and expanding win-win outcomes and leveraging them to 
maximize financial returns without social costs.  As an immediate step, care was taken 
to minimize lose-lose outcomes by inducing synergies between departments, 
establishing cross-functional teams, and encouraging project focused co-ordination with 
well defined targets under the close-eye of senior management.   
While the above understanding was a prerequisite, it was not sufficient.  The 
whole organization could only be galvanized by the transformational mission of 
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inclusive reforms if the top leadership demonstrated fairness.  Achieving this was a 
herculean task for the Minister because of the image associated with his rule in Bihar.  
Initial incidents like the Minister’s in-laws forcing, at the last minute, a change of 
platform for a Rajdhani Express train in Patna or party workers found travelling in a 
higher-class than assigned on the ticket, seemed to confirm people’s apprehensions.  
However, on each occasion the Minster stood firm and directed the railway staff to 
enforce rules in an impartial manner.  Moreover, senior railway officers were worried 
that transfers and postings decisions would be colored by caste-considerations—
favoring some social sub-groups.  But the Minister maintained a hands-off approach, 
allowing the Railway Board autonomy in making merit based decisions regarding 
transfers, postings, and the awarding of contracts.  This gradually fostered mutual trust 
and understanding between the bureaucracy and the political leadership.   
It is not uncommon for the bureaucracy and politicians to hold each other in 
contempt as they confuse the democratic mandate of ‘no privatization, no fare-hike, no 
retrenchment’ with political interference, namely meddling with the Railways’ 
everyday management.  While the bureaucracy learned to respect the political mandate, 
the political leadership reciprocated by not interfering with the routine operations of 
the Railways.  The above constructive politico-bureaucratic engagement allowed for 
translating the mission of inclusive reforms into concrete outcomes.  Further, a deep 
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commitment to reform was fostered.  As members of the core reform team often 
summarized, “we eat, drink, sleep, and dream Railways.”   
 
Breaking the Myths 
Once this critical hurdle of establishing trust with the staff was overcome, it unleashed 
the Railways’ core strengths—its qualified staff, and robust systems—to initiate change.  
In the spirit of ‘questioning beliefs’ and ‘seeking new pathways’, assumptions about the 
nature of business and its purpose were revisited: including variables like the very 
nature of the Railways business and its rationale, the cost structures, revenue streams, 
competitive strengths, and relative elasticity of price and non-price factors, cost 
variability and sensitivity to load and length of train, as well as its manipulation. 
The first assumption was the notion that the railway is a monopoly service 
provider that required tariff regulation.  However, this was inconsistent with declining 
market shares.  In practice, the railway was facing a competitiveness problem 
characterized by poor growth rates, falling market shares, and low or negative margins.  
The Railways was losing out to alternative modes of transport—pipelines, airlines, 
roadways, shipping lines, and so forth.  Thus, a grounded view of the Railways was 
that of a transporter operating in a competitive market place where it enjoyed an edge 
in some profitable segments and not in others.  The erosion of competitiveness was 
unlikely to be solved by regulation; instead, it required offering superior and 
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compelling value to the customers.  Thus, the focus shifted from tariff regulation to 
reducing unit costs, improving yields, margins, market shares, productivity, product-
mix, and quality of service with a customer focus. 
 Second, in the past, profit was not the primary focus.  Instead, the Railways’ 
operations and technology-based considerations dominated decision-making.  This lack 
of profit orientation is not confined to public utilities like the Railways but, as observed 
by the CEO of Nissan Motors, is also seen among large private corporations.  
“. . .Nissan wasn’t really engaged in the pursuit of profit. . . . They were selling cars without 
knowing if they were taking losses or making profits. . . . Sure, executives discussed profitability, 
but the company wasn’t managed to that end.  And when profit is not a motivating element, it 
won’t simply materialize as a result of good luck.  You have to place profit at the center of your 
concerns.  No magic is going to bring it about.” (Ghosn and Ries, 2005, p. 98).  
 
Yet, the new found profit orientation of the Railways differs from private corporations, 
because its focus is to earn profits while serving the interests of the common people.  
This required a new perspective as well as business savvy: spotting, seizing, and 
encashing business opportunities were of essence.  A striking example that 
demonstrates this savvy is a fivefold growth in freight earnings from transporting iron-
ore for export—from 900 in 2004 to 4,400 crore rupees in 2008 (US $209 million to over a 
billion).  The international prices for iron ore soared while the cost of mining remained 
relatively stable, thus the iron ore mining corporations were reaping wind-fall profits.  
The Railways has a formidable competitive edge in transporting this commodity due to 
geographic conditions, bulk quantities, and long distances from the mine to ports.  In 
addition, the Railways recognized that its services were underpriced; this was reflected 
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in a long waitlist of over 10,000 indents—requests for rakes to transport iron ore for 
exports.  Through consecutive freight rate hikes in iron ore for export, the freight rates 
were increased by nearly 400 percent and the Railways encashed this opportunity 
offered by the global commodity boom, yielding an additional 9,000 crore rupees (US $2 
billion) in profits over the four years period (2004–2008).  Such opportunities are short-
lived and therefore timely action is of the essence. 
Third, business assumptions regarding variability of costs were revisited.  The 
Railways’ finance code prescribes the long-term variable costs of the railway as being 
78.5 percent.  An analysis of the variability of costs from 1983 to 2004 revealed that 
while operating expenses had increased ten times at nominal (current) prices, real 
(constant) prices had decreased marginally.  Meanwhile, the Railways’ throughput, 
measured in gross ton kilometers, had more than doubled.  This illustrates, that the 
increase in unit costs was predominantly a result of inflationary pressures and not on 
account of growth in throughput.  Thus, the variability of costs for the Railways was 
substantially less than prescribed in the code even in the long-term, and was negligible 
in the short-term.  This relative insensitivity of unit cost to output is due to economies of 
scale, slack in the system, improvements in operating strategy, and technology.  For 
instance, with half the number of wagons and locomotives, the Railways now carries 
twice the amount of load due to gains from technological improvements.  Likewise, as 
the operating strategy changes to run heavier and longer trains, unit costs decline.  This 
114 
 
is because the cost of operation is relatively insensitive to load and train length as the 
same crew, engine, tracks, and so forth is required.  This analysis was central to the 
scale driven strategy to increase freight volumes, reduce unit cost, gain market share 
and margins, and make billions of dollars in profits.   
Fourth, was revisiting the pricing policy based on affordability.  Poor passengers 
and low-value commodities like iron-ore and minerals were charged much less while 
wealthier passengers and expensive commodities, usually finished products, were 
charged higher fares.  However, Ministers are not concerned whether steel freight is 
more costly than iron-ore or the other way around.  While politicians are hyper-
sensitive to pricing for poor passengers, they also welcome fare reductions in air-
conditioned segments.  With this new insight, the pricing policy was creatively 
modified.  Now, the pricing for the freight, parcel, and air-conditioned passenger 
business segments is market driven and customer centric, while the affordability based 
pricing continues for low-end passenger segments.  The past policy of across-the-board 
increase in prices to compensate for rising costs was replaced with a policy of selective 
price increases based on the relative competitive strength of the Railways.  Freight 
charges were increased where the Railways had a competitive edge, and decreased 
where it was lacking.  Further, uniform pricing across seasons, routes, and to and fro 
traffic flow succeeded in the planned economy of the statist-era, but had little relevance 
in a liberal economy.  This has been substituted with a differential and dynamic pricing 
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policy.  On the one hand, substantial discounts are offered during the lean season as 
well as in empty returning trains.  On the other hand, surcharges are levied during the 
busy season and on congested routes.   
Fifth, the past fixation with price per passenger or per ton has conceded ground 
to yield per train, unit costs, margins, product-mix, and so forth.  The profitability of a 
train is a function of several variables including price, and non-price variables like 
occupancy rates, carrying capacity, load and length per train, and other aspects that 
determine asset utilization.  In turn, each of these variables is further a function of other 
variables, for instance carrying capacity depends on axle-load, design of the wagons 
and coaches, tare weight, volumetric capacity, density of the commodity, and so forth.  
Thus, the focus has shifted from pricing per passenger or per ton to maximizing profits 
through yield and margins per train.   
Sixth, the emphasis on construction and procurement of new assets has been 
replaced with a focus on asset maintenance, enhancing productivity, and better 
utilization—namely by operating faster, longer, and heavier trains.  Reducing the seven 
day turnaround26 time to five days enabled the Railways to run an additional 230 trains 
each day on average.  All else being constant, incremental revenue from just these trains 
alone amounted to 10,000 crore rupees (US $2.3 billion).  Furthermore, by adding an 
                                                 
 
 
 
26Turnaround is the time lapsed between two successive loadings. 
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extra six tons of load per wagon, the railway transported 90 million tons of incremental 
load each year or achieved 6,000 crore rupees (US $1.4 billion) in incremental revenue.  
Finally, by attaching additional coaches in popular mail and express trains with long 
waitlists, the incremental revenue from 3,000 such coaches translated into 3,000 crore 
rupees (US $0.7 billion) of additional revenue. 
Finally, traditionally the Railways has been an insular organization driven by its 
processes and products.  But now the focus is on value creation and customer 
satisfaction and a tech-savvy approach.  This requires an agile and outward oriented 
management strategy.  Information technology and strategic alliances have been 
leveraged to create value and improve the quality of service so as to provide cheaper, 
safer, and more reliable travel.  For instance, e-payments, value added services such as 
half train load as opposed to a full train load of 2,500 tons, multiple location unloading 
facilities, and faster delivery of cargo have benefited the freight customers as well as the 
Railways.  Likewise, travelers have benefited from systemic changes in services like e-
ticketing, nation-wide train enquiry call centers, as well as better catering, cleanliness, 
and improved ambience of stations and trains.  The management was confronted with 
the task of translating this insight to improved profits.   
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Crafting the Coalition of the Willing 
Post 2001, under the uncertainty of corporatization plans proposed by experts, the 
Railways’ staff had low morale.  There were concerns about job losses and panic over 
pensions was on the rise.  To instill confidence within the bureaucracy and provide a 
sense of mission to the staff, the Minister’s stance and phraseology were critical.  Thus, 
the political mandate of no privatization, no retrenchment, no fare hikes was 
encouraging for the Railways’ staff.  The Minister constantly referred to the Railways as 
a sone ki chidia, a golden bird with great potential, and this transition from critique to 
complements was a first step in reinstating confidence among the railway employees.  
In essence, the political mandate not only reflected the needs of the electorate but also 
provided security and restored confidence within the bureaucracy. 
Second, to empower the Railways’ staff, the Minister adopted a hands-off 
approach to day-to-day management of the Railways—including finalizing of tenders, 
evaluation of bids, award of contracts, and staff transfers and postings.  Instead, he 
focused on finding qualified and talented officers for the job.  This was in the same 
spirit as the routine corporate practice.  Jack Welch, ex-CEO of General Electric, is 
known to have said, “I have no idea how to produce a good [television] program and 
just as little about how to build an engine. . . But I do know who the boss of NBC is.  It is 
my job to choose the best people and to provide them with dollars (Slater, 2003, p.17)”.  
Welch goes on to say that he gets rid of staff if they do not deliver (Pandya and Shell, 
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2005, p. xvii).  In contrast, the approach adopted by the Railways’ leadership was to 
stand by employees even if they failed to deliver despite their sincere efforts.  This was 
not just a constraint of the bureaucracy—where retrenchment is not a viable 
proposition—but was also a matter of principle.  Gradually, as the coalition of 
reformers was expanded across the organization, authority for decision making was 
decentralized, for example, the discretion to grant discounts on incremental freight was 
placed with staff at field units.  Customers that approached the Railway Board with 
their grievances in the past, now resolve most concerns at the zonal level.  Thus, 
devolution of powers not only empowered the staff but also motivated the organization 
to act.   
Third, working by consensus was adopted.  While such deliberative decision 
making was frustrating and a cause of delays, it was still worthwhile because it 
developed a deep ownership for change.  For instance, increasing axle-load or 
improving train examination practices required inputs from various experts with 
allegiances in different departments—mechanical, financial, traffic, electric, civil—and 
the participatory decision making required resolving these conflicting views, yielding 
robust solutions.  Occasionally, consensus required accommodations and compromises 
to balance conflicting views.  For instance, when the reformers proposed to introduce 
free upgrading of passengers to fill vacant seats from lower to upper classes, the finance 
department was resistant, insisting that it would result in losses.  After a lot of debate 
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and delays, finally a compromise solution was arrived at where the upgrading scheme 
would be tried on a few trains for only a few days.  Once the pilot was a success the 
scheme was scaled-up nationwide, and the new Finance Commissioner championed it.  
Finally, once consensus-based decisions were arrived at, skepticism in implementation 
was not tolerated.  In essence, decision making was consultative because it not only 
yielded better solutions, but also instilled a deep rooted ownership within management, 
resulting in quick implementation. 
Fourth, incentivizing performance within the bureaucracy.  Unlike the private 
sector where degrees of performance are rewarded with differential pay, perks and 
career trajectories, in the Railways, quite like other public sector enterprises, promotions 
are seniority based and salaries and perks are uniform across comparable grades, 
irrespective of individual performance.  Further, the organizational culture of the 
railway was one of a large family where quality of work and sharing of benefits were 
valued more highly than performance based discrimination.  Thus, it is not uncommon 
to find several generations of Railways employees from the one family—in some cases 
up to five consecutive generations have worked exclusively for the Indian Railways.  In 
response to this organizational culture, the railway reformers adopted a strategy of 
leveraging the deep rooted commitment and loyalty that the Railways’ staff has 
towards the organization.  To motivate this 1.4 million strong bureaucracy, a 
combination of normative incentives were adopted, differentiated across various staff 
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grades—from the frontline workers to the senior management.  For instance, on a field 
visit the Minister met some frontline workers, namely gang-men and key-men, whose 
working conditions were dire—barehanded and poorly clad in severe winter weather, 
they were working with rather basic tools.  In appreciation of the critical role of 200,000 
such frontline workers the management allocated uniforms, hand gloves, and better 
tools.  Likewise, to terminate the practice of the train crew carrying dry meals to cook 
enroute, the Railways now provides subsidized meals in railway canteens to drivers 
and the rest of the train crew on duty.  Similarly, for senior officers the perks were 
revised to include a house-help, laptop computers, mobile phones, personal cars, and 
possibilities for short-term training abroad.  Such incentives are common in the Indian 
corporate sector that has traditionally paid less than its multinational counterpart.  
While these are small gestures and were required more for improving the working 
conditions of the staff than for motivating them, it clearly demonstrated that the 
institution cares about the employees and was critical in motivating them.  Further, to 
reward performance when the railway achieved its mission—600 million tons of freight 
loading and a cash surplus of 10,000 crore rupees (US $2.3 billion)—the senior 
management approved group-cash awards for the teams that contributed to the success.  
In essence, through a combination of normative and economic incentives, the reformers 
motivated the railway employees to seek ownership of the change and improve their 
productivity, while non-performers were not penalized.   
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From Ideas to Action 
While re-conceptualizing the Railways’ business to reflect realities on the ground and 
motivating a team committed to reform were essential steps of the management 
strategy, the next step was implementation.  Swift execution was central to action.  
Operating longer and heavier trains had been debated for decades within the Railways, 
but the management could not make the decisions that would result in implementation.  
The Railways’ narrow departmentalism, a monopoly mindset, and cynicism towards 
the political mandate had been critical obstacles in the past.  However, with a new 
mindset, a business perspective was translated into action through five critical 
management interventions.  The Indian Railways deployed a combination of 
management strategies: setting stretched targets, leveraging resources to optimize 
existing assets, working through cross-functional teams, fostering alliances, investing 
strategically, adopting a deliberative and calibrated approach, and chasing projects to 
swift completion to reap high returns.  These management strategies are outlined 
below. 
 First, thinking beyond the resource constraint required leveraging resources 
such that aspirations exceeded the resource endowment of the Railways.  Here 
innovation and asset optimization—as opposed to asset accumulation—were central.  
The strategy was to fully utilize assets by running faster, longer, and heavier trains.  
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Second, was coordination and cooperation requiring functional and spatial synergy as 
well as complementarities among various kinds of policy interventions, such that the 
sum of the parts was greater than the whole.  This was achieved through establishing 
cross-functional taskforces that were assigned specific decision-making tasks to be 
delivered in a time-bound manner.  Third, strategic investments were made for a 
systems-based approach to improve the utilization of existing assets—low hanging 
fruits.  Low-cost, short-gestation, high-return, and rapid-payback were the criteria for 
these investments.  Such investments included lengthening platforms to accommodate 
longer trains, and investing in ameliorating network bottlenecks like small segments of 
weak railway tracks on high density networks.  These interventions were given top 
priority and authority was devolved to allow swift implementation.  Fourth, strategic 
alliances were forged to meet soaring demand, co-opt competition in areas where the 
Railways’ lacked competitiveness, and forge long-term alliances with the existing 
customers so as to offer better service.  Fifth, was a deliberative and calibrated approach 
where projects were first piloted to learn, revise, and scale-up in a phased manner.  A 
classic example of this incremental approach was the gradual increase of axle-load in 
small increments of two tons on selected routes and gradually expanding this across the 
high density network.  However, presiding over these themes was the organizational 
mission to champion inclusive reforms—the political mandate of transforming the 
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financial condition of the Indian Railways without burdening the poor travelers and 
railway employees. 
To implement the strategy the management had to aggressively chase targets.  
The senior management identified new policy targets, chased, and grabbed them.  The 
chase has several elements.  First, among these was setting stretched targets.  Second, 
the set of strategic inputs was pursued simultaneously.  Third, timing, because in this 
context, when to act is of essence.  Fourth, change was induced by demand.  Finally, in 
contrast to the past tedious process of decision making, where the Railways had 
deliberated over critical issues like increasing axle-load or introducing more efficient 
train examination practices,  implementation was surprisingly swift, because the 
Railways has both the technical prowess, procedures, capacities, and the discipline to 
implement large and small changes27. 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
27This resonates with the experience of transforming Nissan (Ghosn and Ries, 2005). “. . . as long as 
management gives clear directions that everyone understands, as long as you’ve got a clear, thoroughly 
explained strategy, you don’t need to worry too much about how well and how fast it’s carried out.  
Don’t get me wrong, you still have to expend a lot of time and energy, but it’s remarkable how execution 
falls into place (p. 210).” 
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Outcomes, Sustainability, and Replication 
The outcome has been a win-win for the Railways with over US $6 billion in annual 
profits of 2008, customers have better service, and the Minister has gained a positive 
reputation.  Some skeptics are critical of the long term implications.  Four concerns 
dominate in this regard—on one hand those who claim that the Railways’ performance 
is a result of accounting trickery or at the cost of safety, while on the other hand are 
those who state that this successful transformation of the Railways is a result of 
plucking low-hanging fruits or due to an upswing in commodity cycles.   
These concerns for sustainability are substantially misplaced.  While the 
Railways’ freight business benefits from surging demand in a booming economy, 
encashing this required structural improvements in the functioning of the Railways.  As 
for its accounts and financial statements - these are verifiable as for any other public 
enterprise.  Further, during the 1990s, the Railways was unable to afford replacement of 
over-aged assets.  In contrast, for the fiscal year 2009, assets, internal generation, and 
non-budgetary resources contributed 78 percent of an annual plan outlay of 37,500 crore 
rupees (US $8.72 billion). Likewise, all operational changes in the Railways are closely 
scrutinized by the Railways’ Research, Designs and Standards Organization—better 
known by its acronym RDSO—as well as an independent Commission of Railways 
Safety, administered by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Government of India.  
Additionally, the number of train accidents has declined from 473 in 2001 to 194 in 2008, 
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and the allocations for replacement of over-aged assets has increased from 2,300 to 7,000 
crore rupees over the same period; the Railways’ profits have also soared, implying that 
safety, productivity, and profitability are complexly interdependent. 
As for the low hanging fruits argument, there is little substantiation for this.  The 
scope to optimize utilization of the Railways’ existing assets—through ‘innovations in 
systems, processes, policies, and technology’—along with augmenting its capacity to 
respond to future demand, provide a strong base for perpetuating the present success of 
the Railways.  This is partially demonstrated in the Railways’ ability to have sustained 
significant growth in traffic earnings for four successive years.  Moreover, for a glimpse 
into the underutilization of the Railways’ existing assets, consider the following 
comparisons with Chinese and American railroads.  While the state-owned Chinese 
railroad has a comparable network and about the same number of passenger 
kilometers, the Chinese railroad carries four times more freight than its Indian 
counterpart.  Likewise, the freight only, class-one American railroads have about one 
tenth the labor force of the Indian railway but carry three times the amount of freight.  
Thus, the scope to continue improvements in the utilization of existing assets in Indian 
railway is immense. 
For the short-term, the Indian railway is investing much more than before in 
building as well as acquiring additional assets.  Over the last seven years the annual 
budget of the Railways has tripled from 11,000 in 2003 to 38,000 crore rupees in 2009.  
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Likewise, in the same period, the production of engines has increased from 180 to 500, 
wagons from 6,000 to 20,000, and construction of new broad-gauge routes from 1,000 to 
3,500 kilometers.  These investments will yield greater productivity gains because the 
capacity of new wagons is between 22 to 78 percent more than the old ones.  Likewise, 
the capacity of new passenger coaches is enhanced by between 5 to 20 percent.  To 
augment the capacity of the existing rolling stock, they are being retrofitted and the 
production of lower capacity coaches and wagons is being phased out.  
For the long-term, along with the introduction of capacity and efficiency 
enhancing technology, systems, and procedures, the Railways plans to invest about US 
$53 billion (230,000 crore rupees) during the next five years (2009–2013) for enhancing 
capacity.  All this investment is being strategically channeled to projects that have a 
commercial orientation.  For instance, through route-wise planning the entire high-
density network’s capacity will be augmented on a priority basis over the next five 
years at a cost of 75,000 crore rupees (US $17.4 billion).  Likewise, priority is being given 
to strengthening iron ore and coal routes so as to carry 25 ton axle-load.  Finally, to 
enhance capacity in the long-term, dedicated freight corridors are being developed 
along the length and breadth of the country to match the national highway building 
program, better known as the golden quadrilateral and its diagonals.  To meet a surge 
in demand, factories are being built to manufacture engines, wagons, coaches, and their 
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parts, as well as multi-modal logistics parks are being developed.  In essence, Indian 
Railways is investing to sustain its growth trajectory.   
 Sustaining the management impetus after the Minister and his team leave 
office is less of a concern as the policy reforms have been embedded in the institutional 
DNA by mainstreaming systemic and procedural reforms. These have become part of 
the organizational routine, manuals, and to some extent norms.  This can largely be 
attributed to leading change while respecting and strengthening the organizational 
identity and morale of employees.  Through a consensus based approach the reforms 
have developed deep roots within the institution.   
 However, what remains a real threat for the future of the Railways are three 
critical, yet little discussed factors.  First, is the importance of macroeconomic stability 
which is characterized by low inflation and interest rates.  This is critical to reduce unit 
costs at current prices—a lynchpin of the Railways’ recent financial transformation.  In 
the 1990s, a combination of low growth in the freight business segment, at an 
annualized rate of two percent, combined with high inflation, averaging 11 percent per 
annum, resulted in costs increasing faster than revenues, leading to a financial crisis.  
However, between 2005 and 2008, the combination of macroeconomic stability 
characterized by annualized inflation rates of five percent, a booming economy, and an 
upswing in the commodity cycles provided a fantastic opportunity for the Railways.  
The Railways seized this opportunity by growing freight volumes at nine percent per 
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annum for four consecutive years.  This was four percent higher than the average rate 
of inflation.  Consequently, nominal (current) costs declined by two percent each year, 
and the Railways’ freight unit cost declined from 61 paise in 2001 to 54 paise in 2008, 
resulting in a doubling of profit margins, despite no across-the-board increase in fares.  
Further, passenger losses reduced because costs remained stable while the product mix 
was changed in favor of high-value high-margin business segments.  However, high 
inflation and high interest rates may reverse this virtuous cycle of declining unit cost, 
improving profit margins, and growing market shares. 
Second, unlike the past when the Indian Railways was the preferred employer 
for the talented youth, including the elite IIT and IIM graduates, now there is a gradual 
disinterest in working with the Railways largely due to the competition from private 
employers.  Third, the Indian Railways is sustaining an internal drive to constantly 
innovate so as to create value for the customers such that the railway is the preferred 
mode of transportation in various freight and travel business segments.  
This successful transformation of the Indian Railways consists of a number of 
transferable lessons that can be replicated in other public utilities as well as large 
corporations that are increasingly organized like large bureaucracies.  The conventional 
prescription of corporatization, privatization, retrenchment, fare hikes, and 
independent regulation often works wonders in sectors where user fees are not 
politically contentious as in the case of telecom and aviation.  A classic case of such 
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efforts is the telecom industry in India.  However, there is a need to rethink this text-
book approach to reforms in sectors like, energy, water supply, irrigation, and railways 
where these are politically infeasible.  Three striking lessons are outlined.  First, 
counter-intuitively, the experience of the Railways transformation demonstrates that the 
commercial objectives and social obligations can be reconciled.  This can be achieved by 
dissecting business segments into political and apolitical ones, and then further 
disaggregating into nano-constituents so as to identify apolitical variables that can be 
manipulated to improve profitability without compromising the interests of the 
political constituencies—in the case of the Railways it was the poor consumers and the 
Railways’ employees.  In essence, an in-depth business and political analysis is a 
prerequisite for crafting an effective strategy.  Such analysis reveals that there is 
immense scope for expanding desirable win-win outcomes where the social and 
commercial objectives are met simultaneously.  For instance, across sectors there is 
much room to improve efficiency by optimizing an underutilized system, fixing 
loopholes, and reducing revenue losses.  To translate this insight into action requires 
working across departmental silos, introducing a commercial orientation to the 
organization, and breaking free of a monopoly-mindset.  And above all, this requires a 
productive politico-bureaucracy interface such that the bureaucracy respects the 
political mandate, and in return the political leadership refrains from interfering with 
the routine functioning of the bureaucracy. 
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Second, thinking anew.  In a fast changing external environment it is critical for 
public utilities to question past assumptions about the nature of the business, its cost 
structures, pricing, and respond appropriately.  For instance, the widespread obsession 
with construction, procurement, and expenditure should to give way to effective and 
efficient utilization of existing assets for enhancing productivity.   
Third, there are the big five approaches to implementation: namely, setting 
stretched goals, cross functional and spatial coordination, strategic investments, 
fostering alliances, deploying a deliberative and calibrated approach, and aggressively 
chase for results.  And finally, but most importantly, there is no substitute for business 
savvy. 
In conclusion, the Railways transformation is an exemplar for how state-owned 
enterprises can improve services despite all the odds of balancing commercial and 
social objectives to deliver inclusive reforms.  The following chapters will unpack the 
various attributes of the transformation strategy in substantial depth.   
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Chapter 5:  Political Economy of Reform 
Introduction 
To conceptualize the functioning of the Railways, this chapter begins with a brief 
introduction, an outline of the organizational structure, followed by an account of the 
institutional and technological evolution of the Indian Railways post-independence.  
Three key events are discussed illustrating how the Railways faced the challenge of 
integration and modernization post nationalization, a resultant operational crisis in the 
1980s, and most recently a financial crisis.  Then, I explore the complexities associated 
with the political economy of reforms and present some surprising facts with respect to 
the expert recommendations and their mismatch with the realism of a populist Minister.  
Next, I discuss the challenge of establishing trust between the political leadership and 
the Railways’ bureaucracy.  Finally, the process of crafting space for reforms within the 
political economy of the Railways is presented along with a few pragmatic steps taken 
to initiate change. 
 
Indian Railways’ Organizational Structure and Functioning 
Due to its size, ownership structure, and 150 year history, the Indian Railways is a 
unique state-owned enterprise.  These attributes, among others, make it a complex and 
intriguing subject.  The Indian Railways is one of the world’s largest infrastructure-
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providing state-owned enterprises.  The Railways is a Ministry within the Government 
of India with 1.4 million employees and 1.1 million pensioners (see Table 7). 
Table 7.  Staff strength 
Type of unit Number of staff (2008) Staff grade 
 
Number of staff (2007) 
Railway Board 
 
1,842 Group A and B  
 
16,000 
Manufacturing Units & 
Public Sector Enterprises 
50,426 (44,426 + 6,000) Group C  
 
907,000 
16 Zonal Railways 
(including 68 divisions) 
1,326,663 Group D  
 
484,000 
Total 1,378,931 Total  
 
1,407,000 
Source:  Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways, Government of India.  
 
It has one of the world’s largest railway networks—over 63,300 kilometers of routes—
and runs approximately 13,000 trains each day, including 9,000 passenger trains.  Indian 
Railways carries over two million tons of freight and some 17 million passengers 
between 7,000 railway stations each day.  This is achieved with a fleet of 200,000 
wagons, 40,000 coaches, and 8,000 locomotives.  To fathom the scale, consider the fact 
that Indian trains, each day, travel four times the distance from the earth to the moon 
and back.  The Railways is vertically integrated and horizontally differentiated into 
functional silos.  Under this single umbrella organization, the Indian Railways finances, 
builds, owns, and manages most of its assets.  This includes the locomotives, wagons, 
coaches, rail tracks, stations, and enormous stretches of land as well as hotels, schools, 
hospitals, and staff housing.  Additionally, through a range of subsidiaries, it 
manufactures and maintains most of these assets in-house (see Figure 9).  This 
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monolithic structure of the Railways has been a contentious issue among senior policy 
makers in the Government of India as well as international organizations who have 
argued for unbundling and privatization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Author, based on information from the Ministry of Railways, Government of India.  
The apex body in the railway is the office of the Minister, which brings with it a political 
mandate and associated leadership.  This is followed by the three-level bureaucracy of 
the Indian Railways—railway board, zones, and divisions (see Figure 9).  The 
bureaucrats are organized in a matrix of functional and geographic specialties.  At the 
top is the Railway Board.  It is composed of one member from each of the functional 
specializations of the Railways—electrical, engineering, finance, mechanical, staff, and 
traffic.  The board is led by the Chairman—better known as CRB or Chairman of the 
Field units, several within 
each zone, also 
geographically distinct 
Autonomous 
administrative units 
organized geographically 
Policy formulation and 
technical leadership 
Political representation 
Minister 
asisted by two 
Ministers of strate 
Railway Board 
Manufacturing 
Units 16 Zones  
68 Divisions 
Public Sector  
Enterprises 
Figure 10.  Organogram of the Indian Railways 
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Railway Board.  All members of the Railway Board rise through the ranks of the 
institution, and thus have enormous experience and insight but short tenures—it is 
generally a year or two before they retire from these positions.  Thirty five directorates 
assist the board in fulfilling its functions.  
Zones are the apex bodies in the field, and they also act at an intermediate policy 
level.  These are relatively autonomous units that govern the functioning of the 
Railways and are organized into 16 geographic areas.  Each zone is led by a general 
manager who leads the administrative activities of the concerned zone.  Members of the 
Railway Board provide oversight over the technical functions in the zone.  Furthermore, 
each zone is parsed into several divisions, each led by a Divisional Railway Manager.  
The division is the lowest administrative level where the zone departmental heads 
provide a similar oversight role as the Board provides to the zones.  Finally, there are 
several public sector enterprises and manufacturing units, workshops, and other 
training institutions that report directly to the Board. 
 
Evolution of the Indian Railroads (1800s to 2000) 
The inception of the railroads in India is often associated with the maiden journey of a 
fourteen carriage train carrying 400 passengers at 20 miles per hour between Mumbai 
and Thane on April 16, 1853.  But this was not the first railroad in India.  From 1836 to 
1837, about 17 years earlier, linked to a stone quarry, a three and a half mile long 
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railway track was laid in Chennai—then known as Madras Presidency.  On this ran the 
first freight train in India.  Yet another surprising fact is that it was powered by wind 
sails and consequently was called the Wind Carriage Railway as reported on December 
30, 1837 in the Madras Herald (Bhandari, 2006, p.2).  With the looming concerns of 
climate change that threaten the modern economic models based on consumption of 
fossil fuels, in hindsight, the use of a renewable source of energy like wind was 
astonishingly progressive.   
Much of the initial railroad construction was led by private firms including the 
East India Company.  This construction was financed through investments from capital 
markets in England backed by British government guarantees.  The princely states of 
Bikaner, Gwalior, Jodhpur, among others financed their own railroads as well.  
Eventually, the crown realized that the incentive structure for the private contractors 
did not encourage parsimony.  This was primarily because all risk was borne by the 
state, which guaranteed a five percent return on investment.  Furthermore, the contracts 
had provisions to buy back the infrastructure if it was unprofitable for the private firms 
that built it.  Additionally, the state provided land gratis and required its mail to be 
carried free of charge.   
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Source: Adapted from Bhandari (2006) 
 
As a result, in some cases private contractors spent lavish amounts to construct 
railroads.  Such public-private collaboration in the nineteenth century resembles the 
contemporary cost-plus models with assured rates of return.  To counter the private 
disincentives, and respond to security concerns due to the revolt of 1857, the British 
government decided to take on the task of railway construction and management.  Fast-
forwarding to Indian independence in 1947, there were about forty-two Railways that 
Figure 11.  Evolution of the Indian Railways 
 
 
1836 
A short railroad 
built near 
Chintadripet, 
Chennai.  Train 
powered by 
wind. 
 
 1853 
Bombay to Thane  
passenger train 
service 
inaugurated on 
April 16. 
 
 
1891 
3rd class coach 
get toilets.  
 
1925 
First 
electrified 
train service, 
Mumbai to 
Kurla. 
 
 1936 
Air-
conditioned 
coaches 
arrive. 
 
 
1950 
First 
indigenous 
steam engine 
made in 
Chittaranjan. 
 
 
1967 
Cement Concrete 
sleepers 
introduced. 
 
1969 
Rajdhani 
Express makes 
maiden journey 
Delhi to Howrah.  
 
 
1984 
Introduction of first Metro 
Rail system in Kolkata. 
Next year, Computer-based 
passenger reservation 
introduced. 1988 Shatabdi 
begin service. 
 
 
1971 
Policy adopted for 
gauge conversion.  
Two years later 
steam engine 
production 
terminated. 
 
 
 
2006 
Garib rath and 
e-ticketing 
initiated. 
 
 
1849 
Financial guarantee for 
private railways that 
construct and operate–5 
percent return on 
investment, buyback policy, 
social obligation of 
transporting official mail and 
military, land given gratis. 
 
 
1887 
Victoria Terminus built. 
 
 
1924 
Ackworth 
Committee 
recommends 
separate budget 
for railways. 
 
1890 
Indian Railways Act passed. 
 
 
1905 
Railway Board 
formed. 
 
 1950 
Railways organized into 6 
zones, Central Advisory 
Committee endorses. 
 
1947 
Indian independence and 
nationalization of 42 
railroad companies. 
 
 
1998 
Guinness Certificate for  
Fairy Queen, world’s oldest 
working steam Engine, 1855. 
 
1930 
Central Standards 
Office, technical 
standard enforcing 
agency established. 
 
 
 
2002 
7 additional railway 
zones created, making 
the total 16. 
 
 
1957 
Research, Design, and 
Standards Organization 
established to consolidate all 
technical standard 
enforcement. 
 
1999 
World Heritage sites status for 
Darjeeling rail.  Guinness 
Certificate for largest Route 
Relay Interlocking System, 
Delhi. And Indian Railways 
Catering and Tourism 
Corporation (IRCTC) created. 
 
 
Technological Evolution 
 
Institutional Evolution 
 
1992 
Adoption of 
uni-gauge 
policy. 
 
 
1998 
Konkan 
Railway begins 
operations. 
 
 
2002 
Jan-Shatabdi 
Train 
launched. 
 
1974 
Rail India Technical and Economic 
Services (RITES), a consultancy 
unit created.  Two years later, 
Indian Railway Construction 
Corporation (IRCON) created. 
 
 1979 
Central Organization for Railway 
Electrification (CORE) created. 
 
 1988 
Container Corporation of India 
(CONCOR) created.  Net year, 
Indian Railway Welfare 
Organization (IRWO), formalized. 
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were all nationalized and consolidated into one state-owned enterprise.  The timeline 
below illustrates the pivotal events in the evolution of the rail industry in India (see 
Figure 10).  
Indian Railways has an affinity for technological development and possesses the 
in-house engineering prowess to keep pace with the progress in the global rail industry.  
At the risk of over simplification, assume a railway consists of only four important 
components that constitute its capital stock; the railway tracks, the carriages that roll on 
them, the engine that pulls these carriages, and the signaling systems that tell the engine 
driver when to start and stop.  After 1947, during the post-independence nationalization 
and resultant consolidation of the Indian Railways, several types of rail technology 
were inherited from the numerous independent regional railway enterprises.  
Enormous efforts were put into standardizing this uneven capital stock. 
 
Operational Crisis of the Nineteen Eighties 
In the period following nationalization of the Railways there were some critical 
technological improvements.  The old stock consisted of less efficient and high 
maintenance technology.  The brake system was vacuum based, and most engines were 
steam powered.  Wagons had unreliable plain bearings and four wheels—implying 
shorter wagon length as well as lower load carrying capacity.  Further, screw coupling, 
138 
 
the device that linked wagons to form a train, was manually operated and had limited 
strength, so forming longer and heavier trains was difficult. 
The new stock consisted of better technology.  The new diesel and electric engines 
were more effective because they could pull heavier loads, used less energy, provided 
greater operational flexibility, and were less polluting28.  Wagons had lower-friction 
roller bearings and eight wheels—namely, covered and open BOX and BCX 
respectively, with greater volume and load carrying capacity.  The centre buffer 
coupling29 device was also better.  In essence, through a combination of such 
technological improvements, the Railways had better rolling stock.  However, as the 
lifespan of rolling stock is between 35 to 40 years, old stock continued to operate along 
with the new stock. 
Further, goods were accepted in both wagon and train loads.  This created 
operational inefficiencies.  Piecemeal freight required frequent en route marshalling, 
examination, and formation of wagons between trains.  At an interval of every 400 
kilometers the Railways maintained goods yards for this purpose.  This was 
complimented with a logistical network to repack small parcels en-route at repacking 
                                                 
 
 
 
28 So every time a passenger peeped out of a moving train they did not have their face covered with black 
soot, but as a train left the station the travelers missed out on the dramatic start of a puffing steam engine. 
29These are also know as the CBC type of coupling and make the train safer and faster.  Incase of an 
accident this coupling ensures that coaches remain firmly connected together in the vertical plane.  This 
arrangement prevents one coach from stacking up on another. 
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sheds before they were finally sent to their destinations.  To further complicate the 
matter, the old and new stocks of wagons were mixed and forming a train required 
linking incompatible types of couplings via a bridging device—know as a ‘baby 
coupling’ which was perpetually in short supply as it was frequently stolen and resold.  
The repeated reconfiguration of rakes—a set of wagons that form a train—needed 
issuance of new brake power certificates that required frequent inspections, leading to 
delays.  Additionally, the steam engine required repeated halts for operational needs 
like coal and water refills and crew changes. 
The old and new stock of wagons with different types of couplings and bearings 
were jumbled to form freight trains.  Frequent shunting was required because of 
piecemeal movement of wagons.  This was a critical obstacle in the very functioning of 
the railway system.  As a result the entire railway system was reduced to operating on 
the strength of its weakest link.  Railway sidings  (auxiliary tracks), were cluttered with 
(under repair) wagons, and yards had become bottlenecks, mainly due to wagons 
waiting to be remarshalled and transferred to other trains.  Furthermore, there was a 
union of engine drivers which was also making tough bargains.  In sum, these and 
other operational and management practices caused uncertainties and long delays in 
the entire freight operations—power plants awaited coal supplies and transportation of 
essential commodities such as food grains and petroleum products was severely 
constrained.  
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On November 17, 1980, through an extraordinary executive order by the then 
Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, the entire Railway Board was replaced.  She identified 
M S Gujral to be appointed as Chairman of the Board, the first General Manager of the 
Railways to be directly appointed to this post.  Gujral took bold steps on arrival.  He 
had a twofold strategy.  First, he segregated the old and new types of wagons—
specifically, four wheeler from eight wheeler, screw coupling from center buffer 
coupling, and roller bearing from plain bearing. 
The steam engines were mostly utilized on short routes, like operating trains 
between yards and shunting; for long haul journeys’ higher horsepower engines were 
deployed.  As a corollary to the separation of stock, Gujral improved the maintenance 
practices at the start of each train journey so as to abolish the practice of en route 
examination of trains called ‘safe to run’ at every 400 kilometers (and ‘intensive’ at 
every 800 kilometers for intensive routes).  This was replaced by end-to-end 
examination.  Second, to further improve the operational efficiency, he terminated the 
practice of accepting freight consignments that were less than full train load and 
introduced the concept of ‘block and point-to-point trains’, thus eliminating the need 
for trains to halt en route.  He revised the unit of transportation from a wagon load to a 
train load.  Earlier, for every change of steam engine, new brake power certification was 
required through a safe-to-run examination.  Further, train examinations were required 
when trains were re-marshaled, because the unit of transport was a wagon load.  
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However, following reform, trains did not require renewal of brake power certification 
for a change of locomotive at short distances.  He further ordered the elimination of 
several redundant yards.  As a result of these two actions the time spent on shunting 
wagons at yards, or the need to halt at every yard, was reduced.  
Gujral introduced long-term measures, including improved brake, bearing, and 
coupler technology in all wagons as the standard practice.  Second, the production of 
higher capacity and better-designed air brake BOXN and BCN wagons was initiated, 
high power diesel locomotive production was ramped up, and high capacity diesel 
powered breakdown cranes were acquired.  Third, he prioritized the electrification of 
railway routes, improved utilization of diesel and electric locomotives, and ordered the 
complete phasing out of steam engines. 
In sum, the Gujral reforms resulted in a quantum leap in the Railways’ operational 
performance.  Trains ran faster and an increased amount of freight was transported.  
For example, there was a fourfold increase in freight carried in the decade following the 
reforms compared to the preceding decade.  Gujral had also explored the need to 
increase the axle load—essentially carrying greater amounts of load in a freight 
wagon—on his rather abrupt departure.  The risks associated with the decision took 
precedence, resulting in no further follow-up for the following two decades.  The 
Railways’ present transformation leveraged the new rolling stock that Gujral had 
introduced through his long-term plans. 
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Financial Crisis in 2001 
In 2001, Indian Railways faced a severe financial crisis.  It defaulted on dividend 
payments to the Government of India, its cash balance shrank to a paltry 359 crores 
rupees, (US $83 million) and the Railways did not earn enough to replace over-ageing 
assets resulting in large replacement arrears.  The profitable freight business was 
recording a poor growth rate of 3 percent and its expenses were growing faster than 
revenues.  The Railways financial condition was unsustainable and it was on the verge 
of bankruptcy.  There were a range of internal and external factors that led to the 
Railways deteriorating operational and financial condition.  In response to the currency 
crisis in 1991, the Government of India initiated liberalization of the command and 
control economy—this marked the retreat of the license raj (Fabian regulatory regime).  
These reforms reduced barriers to trade—revoking quotas, licenses, permits, as well as 
reducing tariffs on imports of intermediate and finished goods.  Additionally, with 
deregulation of the internal markets, restrictions on large and small firms were 
gradually repealed.  As a cumulative effect of these liberal reforms, firms began feeling 
the competitive pressures from domestic and international firms because in a liberal 
trade regime, domestic prices of tradable goods and services converge with global ones.  
Moreover, the cost of international freight transportation has been declining.  In 
response to stiff competition from domestic and international firms, producers began 
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reviewing their cost structures, including total logistics costs—namely, cost of 
transportation, inventories, multiple modal transfers, delays, damages, and so forth. 
In the pre-reform era, under the freight equalization scheme, the cost of 
transportation of crucial bulk commodities like steel and fertilizers was neutral to the 
distance these goods were transported, as the difference was paid by the public 
exchequer through a subsidy. Steel made in Jamshedpur cost about the same in Ranchi 
and Gujarat, owing to the freight equalization policy for steel.  Further, oil pool 
accounts for petroleum products and the retention pricing scheme for fertilizers played 
a similar role.  In essence, the producers of these commodities were not concerned 
about the costs associated with transportation because they could pass on these costs to 
the state.  Liberalization began dismantling this arrangement.  Hence, firms became cost 
conscious and began seeking cheaper transport services.  Since transportation of bulk 
commodities lay at the heart of the Railways’ post-Gujral phase, liberalization was 
putting pressure on the freight business model as customers migrated to other modes of 
transport. 
Moreover, a fiercely competitive private road transportation sector was 
increasingly acquiring the Railways’ market share.  There were other competitors on the 
horizon as well: international logistics firms, shipping industry, and oil pipelines.  
Further, the Railways experienced another external shock from the reformed 
macroeconomic environment.  There was a sharp decline in the ability and willingness 
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of the central government to provide budget support through fiscal transfers for capital 
investment needs or recurring expenses like the increase in wages due to the 
recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission that determines the wage structure of all 
Government of India employees, including those of the Railways.  The former enhanced 
competition from the demand responsive private road transport market, and the latter 
eroded hopes of bailouts through fiscal transfers.   
Finally, over the 1990s, seven billion dollars (30,000 crore rupees) was invested in 
improving the quality of tracks30.  The new tracks were stronger and could endure 
heavier loads.  Additionally, by the turn of the century, billions of dollars were invested 
in acquiring race horse like engines—relatively expensive high horse power diesel and 
electrical locomotives.  Yet, the modernization efforts and the inherent strength of the 
bureaucracy were not translated into benefits, despite surging demand for freight 
services because of a lack of synergy among the Railways’ departments and a missing 
commercial focus, among other things.  These constraints will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters.  In sum, while there were significant technological and 
institutional improvements over the past two decades, it did not lead to tangible 
                                                 
 
 
 
30Earlier, railway tracks consisted of 90 pounds (44.65 kilogram per meter), rails resting on cast iron or 
wooden sleepers manually laid on a bed of 200 millimeter size gravel, also known as ballast cushion.  In 
1980’s and 1990’s most of the track structure on the high density network was upgraded to either 52 
kilogram or 60 kilogram rail with 72 or 90 pound ultimate tensile strength, pre-stressed concrete sleepers 
1540 to 1660 numbers per kilometer density and mechanically laid ballast cushion of 250-300 millimeter 
size gravel. 
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improvements in productivity of the Railways.  As the Minister describes the condition:  
The Railways had acquired a Jersey Cow, but did not milk it adequately, resulting in a 
sick cow. 
 
Beyond Bankruptcy 
The financial condition of the Railways was so precarious that the Government of India 
convened some of the brightest policy makers and private sector experts to diagnose 
and advise on corrective measures.  Rakesh Mohan, the Deputy Governor of the 
Reserve Bank of India was the chairman of this expert group.  The combined intellect of 
the Government of India’s expert group on railway reforms as well as the global 
experts, attributed this near bankruptcy scenario to the ‘split personality’ of the Indian 
Railways.  The conflicts in achieving multiple organizational goals—welfare and 
commercial—were to be blamed.  In the expert view, there were five essential 
contradictions that the Railways needed to resolve.  First, was the political mandate that 
led to conflicting priorities between the politician and the bureaucracy—the Minister 
and the Railway Board, Railways’ top management.  The experts argued that the Indian 
Railways was heading to bankruptcy because Ministers meddled with financial 
allocations, resulting in poor choices of investment in politically motivated un-
remunerative projects.  Further, the planned economy mindset saddled the railroads 
with social obligations like cross-subsidization of passenger fares through frequent 
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increases in freight tariffs which eroded the market share of this profitable segment of 
business.  This cross-subsidy is reflected in the fare to freight ratio31 in Indian Railways, 
as it is one of the lowest in the world.  For the intuition behind this ratio consider the 
following:  If the ratio tends to one, there is little or no cross subsidy, but as the ratio 
gets closer to zero, the subsidy from the cargo segment to the passengers becomes 
greater.  Furthermore, there was concern that even within the passenger segment, the 
potentially lucrative premium class passenger segments like the air-conditioned coach 
travelers were taxed—because they paid higher prices—in order to subsidize the 
ordinary sleeper classes.  And as these premium class fares were on the rise, the 
Railways was losing these customers to budget airlines.   
Second, since the policy making, oversight functions, railway ownership, and 
management are all organized in a monolithic organization, there is a lack of 
accountability. 
Third, the Railways indulged in a variety of non-core activities that ranged from 
in-house manufacturing and maintenance of engines, carriages, and even catering (for 
example, Rail-neer)32.  Additionally, it was burdened with social obligations like running 
                                                 
 
 
 
31 This is an indicator of the extent to which the cargo customer cross-subsidizes the passenger fare.  This 
indicator is arrived at by dividing the average passenger fare per kilometer by the average freight rate per 
ton per kilometer. 
32 Rail-neer, drinking water bottles produced and sold by Indian Railways, was introduced in 2002. 
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hospitals and schools, yatri niwas hotels, training institutions, and employee housing.  
These distracted Railway employees from focusing on the core business of running 
trains.  Operating such non-core businesses belonged to a bygone era, out of sync with 
contemporary practices.   
Fourth, was a fiscal crunch due to declining budgetary support33 through central 
government transfers.  Budgetary support has declined three fold from 75 percent in the 
fifth plan (1975–80) to 25 percent in the ninth plan (1997–2002).  To make-up the gap in 
investment needs, the Railways borrowed from the markets. 
Finally, there was an army of rail employees and their ever increasing salaries 
and pension liabilities.  To compound the burden of employees, staff costs accounted 
for about half of total costs; the implementation of the 5th pay commission would act as 
the final nail in the fiscal coffin.   
In sum, a combination of political interference, conflicting commercial and social 
objectives, fiscal crunch, lack of market incentives, and unproductive employees had 
hindered investment in track renewals and other safety measures, while the Railways 
was losing market share.   
                                                 
 
 
 
33 The Indian Railways pays a 7 percent return on this fiscal transfer to the public exchequer.  This is a 
loan in perpetuity. 
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In response, the Mohan committee and the international experts recommended 
institutional restructuring, stating that “At present, IR (Indian Railways) faces two 
possibilities: significant change through reform, or a financial and operational 
collapse.”(Sondhi, 2002, p.37).  Based on the above analysis, the experts had carefully 
crafted a reform package:  (1) Unbundle the institution into separate roles—policy 
making, regulation, management—by corporatizing the Railways, and establishing an 
independent regulator, especially for tariff setting; (2) Privatize non-core activities like 
healthcare, education, production and maintenance of trains; (3) Reduce the 1.6 million 
staff by 25 percent; (4) Reduce cross-subsidies, hike fares for second class passengers by 
8–10 percent every year—for five years; (5) And separate social and commercial 
obligations. 
These reform recommendations received an emotionally and intellectually 
charged response.  Labor unions held a dharna (sit in protest) and raised the red-flag in 
Kolkata (Frontline, 2001).  Among the top management of the Railways there was 
unease about the organizational restructuring.  As a reaction to the Mohan reform 
proposals, the Railways’ management responded with a status paper that recognized 
the need for change.  The status paper tabled the following five central measures of 
action to the parliament for consideration.  It proposed to corporatize non-core activities 
citing the past success with its consultancy, container, construction, catering, and 
telecommunication business subsidiaries.  Set clear targets to reduce staff numbers to 
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the ‘right-size’ for the organization, from 1.545 million to 1.18 million by 2010 through 
natural attrition.  Rationalization of freight and passenger fares was considered.  
Regarding cross-subsidies, a case for interest free transfers from the central government 
was made.  Finally, to address the fiscal gap it was proposed to consider loans from 
multilateral banks—World Bank and Asian Development Bank—as well as co-financing 
with state and local governments, and cautious leveraging of private equity.   
The status paper was mute on restructuring the vertically integrated monopoly 
structure of the Railways.  Instead it favored the devolution of more discretionary 
power to the zonal level for approval of capital investment projects.  Thus, general 
managers could make larger decisions about the priorities in their zones, but were not 
unbundled into autonomous competing units, as was envisaged by the Mohan report.  
Many of these efforts were implemented—tariff rationalization (simplification of the 
tariff structure), reduction in staff strength (by not filling two-thirds of job vacancies), 
and borrowing from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank..  While these 
efforts brought some respite from fiscal crisis, the condition of the Railways remained 
precarious. 
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A Contradiction—Privatization under Populism 
The international experts (Thompson, 2003 and Sondhi, 2002) and Mohan committee 
(2001) recommendations34 applied conventional wisdom, but many of them presented 
the anti-thesis of the populism for which the Minister stands.  Arriving at Rail Bhavan, 
headquarters of the Ministry of Railways, the Minister did not disappoint his 
supporters, or critics, by taking a populist stand.  His position on several policy issues 
was the converse of the recommendations proposed by the Mohan committee as well as 
other international expert groups.  This contrast is captured in the following significant 
steps taken by the Railways since he became the Minister of Railways.   
While the experts had recommended retrenchment, the Minister planned to use 
the Railways as a vehicle to generate employment, both within and outside the 
Ministry.  As a first step, he banned the use of plastic cups on railway stations and 
trains, replacing them with kulhads, clay pots.  Similarly, synthetic upholstery and linen 
for offices, trains, stations, and yatri niwas were to be replaced with khādī, which is a 
handspun yarn and hand-woven cotton cloth.  The purpose was to increase 
employment for the rural artisans and khādī handloom weavers through the use of 
                                                 
 
 
 
34While there is a debate on how infrastructure service providing state-owned enterprises reform should 
proceed, privatization and its variant, corporatization are a significant component of this reform 
program.  The success of these methods is uneven and varies by geographies as well as by sectors as seen 
Chapter 2.   
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handmade cups and cloth.  Finally, he hired 20,000 Coolies as railway staff for the post of 
gangmen—class four employees and frontline workers for railway track maintenance.   
The experts had recommended a fare hike in the loss-making passenger 
segments, and the establishment of a tariff regulator.  In contrast, the Railways did the 
opposite and reduced fares in each budget and in every travel class—from air-
conditioned coaches to unreserved passenger coaches—and at least by three rupees (7 
cents) for poor passengers.   
Further, the Minister was of the opinion that as an elected representative of the 
people, if he was in-charge of the Ministry of Railways and answerable to the people via 
the Parliament, then he could not devolve the role of determining tariffs to an 
autonomous entity—an independent tariff regulator.  Thus, he opposed independent 
regulation.   
The Mohan committee and the international experts had recommended 
corporatization and divesture from non-core businesses.  But the Minister had planned 
on building new production units to manufacture diesel and electric engines, wheels, 
and passenger coaches.  Three factories were to be built in his constituencies: the rail 
wheel factory in Chhapra, a diesel locomotive factory in Maruhara and an electric 
locomotive factory in Madhepura, Bihar, northeast India.  Fourth, a factory to 
manufacture rail coaches was to be built in Rae Bareli, the constituency of Sonia Gandhi, 
the chairperson of the United Progressive Alliance, the political party in power.  
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Moreover, the Railways acquired bankrupt freight wagon factories like the 
Mokama and Muzaffarpur units of the Bharat Wagon and Engineering Company in 
Bihar from the Ministry of Heavy Industries of the Government of India.  Additionally, 
the Railways acquired land and scrap material of the Dalmia-nagar industrial complex 
in Rohtas, Bihar to build factories for manufacturing essential components of wagons.  
While the expert group deemed such investments a distraction to the core business of 
transportation (Mohan, 2001, p. 9), the Minister saw them as a political necessity. 
The Mohan committee had criticized investments in unremunerative projects like 
the construction of new railway lines, urban rail transportation and the uni-gauge 
policy35.  However, the Railways announced that the entire 13,000 kilometers of track 
utilizing meter gauge would be converted to broad gauge and be completed by 2012.  
Between 2005–2008 twice the number of new railway lines were sanctioned as the 
preceding four years—41 new project approved at an expense of 10,500 crore rupees 
(US $2.4 billion).  Additionally, the experts expressed concerns about the Railways 
giving priority to loss-making passenger trains, as opposed to securing track space for 
profit-making freight trains.  However, fifteen hundred additional passenger train 
services were announced between 2005–2008, a ten percent increase over the previous 
                                                 
 
 
 
35 Gauge refers to the spacing between railway tracks and the Indian Railways inherited three track 
widths—narrow, meter, and broad.  Through a gigantic effort, the Railways is upgrading the narrower 
tracks to the broad gauge. 
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four years.  Finally, while the experts had recommended that the Railways should 
isolate its total social burden and seek central government subsidies for the same, the 
Railways had substantially added to its social obligations, even though the government 
lacked the fiscal space and willingness to offer subsidies.   
In conclusion, the expert group recommendations were text-book solutions for 
restructuring the Indian Railways, quite like the British Railways reform—unbundle 
and separate social and commercial functions, retrenchment, independent regulation, 
corporatization, and fare hikes.  Much of the costs of proposed reforms would be a 
burden to the common people and Railway staff, at least in the short-term; but this did 
not resonate with the Minister, a populist politician concerned about the masses—the 
300 million people in India that live on less than 18 rupees a day36.  Yet, the Minister 
announced that he wanted to make the Indian Railways the ‘world’s best’.  
Not surprisingly, the Minister’s announcement was met with contempt.  
Opinions expressed in the media, and within the Railways’ bureaucratic inner circle, 
                                                 
 
 
 
36Despite enormous progress in poverty reduction in India, there are millions of extremely poor people.  
Based on the 61st National Sample Survey the Planning Commission, Government of India, estimates the 
national poverty ratio of 27.5 percent for 2004.  These are substantially lower than the 36 percent in 1994.  
But in absolute numbers about 300 million people live below the national poverty line.  About 73 percent 
of the poor are in rural areas and the rural poverty line is defined as people living below rupees 356.30 for 
a 30 day month (measured by monthly per capita consumption).  These rural poor on average have 12 
rupees or less to spend each day.  The urban equivalent is rupees 538.60 for a 30 day month, or 18 rupees 
per day.  In sum, the economic benefits of a growing economy are unevenly distributed across a range of 
social sub-groups in India (Planning Commission, 2007).   
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were rife with skepticism about the Minister’s credentials, as well as his intentions.  The 
Minister was ridiculed because of his past performance in Bihar where he and his wife 
had been voted out of power after leading the state for a decade and a half.  In the first 
few months of the Minister’s arrival, these apprehensions seemed to crystallize in two 
incidents at Rail Bhavan, the Railways headquarters in Delhi. 
Soon after his arrival at Rail Bhavan, the Minister was visited by a Member of 
Parliament37 from the state of Uttar Pradesh in north India.  During the meeting the 
Minister called the Chairman of the Railway Board, the senior most bureaucrat in the 
Railways, and requested that he consider the petitions of this visitor.  Soon after the 
meeting was over the Minister left for the Parliament.  The visitor decided to pay a visit 
to the Chairman whose office was next door.  The visitor and the chairman had an 
unpleasant exchange.  The visitor accused the Chairman of being a political puppet of 
the previous government and ridiculed him.  Understandably, the Chairman was 
furious and  wanted to proceed on leave immediately.  In the Railway bureaucracy, 
leave of this nature implies an intent to resign.   
                                                 
 
 
 
37 While this visitor was not from Lalu’s political party they belonged to the same social sub-group, the 
yadavs.  They share the same caste.   
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Next, another Member of Parliament requested a car.  Even though he was not 
entitled to this, the Ministry of Railways sent an air-conditioned white Ambassador38.  
But, this influential politician was offended by the car he received.  He expressed his 
displeasure and stated that the use of such an old fashioned car was below his stature.  
He requested the vehicle to be replaced with a more elegant and comfortable Honda 
City.  The railway administration in-charge of cars complied.   
In sum, such events seemed to confirm the public fears of Rail Bhavan morphing 
into ‘Bihar Bhavan’ and jungle raj (jungle rule) displacing rail raj (rail rules).  It was a 
turbulent time in the railway headquarters, with rumors filling the corridors of power.  
The media followed suit and newspapers and news channels were generous in their 
daily reporting of pessimistic accounts of the Minister, his family or his political party—
as is well documented in the Railways media records. 
 
Earning Trust, a Challenge for a Tainted Minister 
Little did the Railways’ staff or the media realize that in his new assignment the 
Minister was going to dispel the image associated with his leadership in Bihar.  When 
                                                 
 
 
 
38 The curvatious car is manufactured by Hindustan Motors and is based on the Morris Oxford model of 
the 1950s.  It is a symbol of indigenously produced automobiles of the post-independence import 
substitution and industrialization policies.  This car is also know as the Amby and retains its popularity 
in the corridors of power.   
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the Minister learned of the developments with the chairman, he left the Parliamentary 
session and rushed back to Rail Bhavan.  In the meeting that followed, the Minister 
clarified his personal stance, declaring zero tolerance for political interference with 
Railways’ daily operations.  He encouraged the Chairman to take decisions based solely 
on the Railways’ rules and regulations and further assured the Chairman that he had 
complete confidence in him and assured him of his wholehearted support.  At this 
moment, the Chairman became the first and the most formidable ally that would 
champion the future rail reforms. 
Regarding the second incident, the Minister was briefed about the car request 
and to everyone’s surprise he was upset.  He inquired why such requests were 
entertained and took institutional action by issuing a memorandum.  In the memo, 
senior railway managers were instructed not to dole out favors to individuals who 
claim to seek these under the Minister’s patronage.  Additionally, any notes or 
telecommunications claiming to be Ministerial instructions must be clarified with the 
Railway Board, and instructions sought in writing.  These instructions were reiterated 
every few months for a period of two years because old habits die hard.  Thus, a zero 
tolerance towards rule breaking was enforced.  In the interim, many misdemeanors 
were registered against the Minister’s family members, party workers, and other 
political allies.  These violations ranged from travelling in a higher-class coach with an 
incorrect ticket, to requests to change the platform on which a train was scheduled to 
157 
 
arrive.  Despite stiff resistance from persuasive quarters, the Minister consistently 
backed the Railway staff, allowing railway personnel the room to implement the rules 
and regulations, charge fines, and take corrective action. 
By setting aside personal agendas the Minister earned the respect and trust of 
peers and colleagues.  For the Minister, this notion of self discipline was extended to 
include his family, party workers, and political allies. 
Further, the Minister demonstrated a nonpartisan ethic in his daily engagement 
with the Railway Board.  There are two types of responses from the Minister that are 
worth noting.  First, senior bureaucrats in the Railways were concerned that the 
Minister would favor candidates based on their social sub-groups (castes) as opposed to 
meritocracy.  But to their surprise, he adopted a hands-off approach, allowing the 
management to select their own teams based on merit.   
The second,  involved transparency in the approval of competitive tender bids.  
The Minister upheld and promptly approved the recommendations of the Board on the 
award of tenders for construction works and procurement contracts that ranged from 
few hundred to thousands of crore rupees. 
In this context, understanding of the distinct and complementary roles of the 
political leadership and the permanent civil service is essential to the functioning of a 
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Ministry.  These roles are well articulated in the Indian Constitution39.  The politician 
comes with a mandate from the people—such as no privatization, no retrenchment, and 
no fare hike— which sets the broad policy agenda.  The bureaucracy, within the limits 
of law, is the implementation agency.  However, in practice these roles tend to clash.  
Some politicians interfere with implementation, especially in transfers, posting, and 
new staff appointments, issuance of contracts, and other operational matters, where 
preferential treatment result in political gains.  And bureaucrats deploy their 
discretionary powers to stall the political mandate by avoiding or slowing down 
execution.  This mutual discontent between the political leadership and the civil service 
reinforces unproductive behavior.  Conversely, a politico-bureaucratic arrangement is 
productive when the politician does not meddle in the functioning of the executive, and 
in turn the bureaucracy accepts the political mandate.  In the Railway reforms, a 
prerequisite for this arrangement was making a distinction between the ‘political 
mandate’ from petty ‘political interference’ in routine administrative activities, and then 
developing complementary roles.   
Through routine engagement between the bureaucracy and the politician a sense 
of trust, respect for differences, and understanding emerged.  There were mutual 
                                                 
 
 
 
39 See Constitution of India, Article 74 and 75 on accountability to parliament and Article 309–312 on role 
of civil service (Government of India, 2003). 
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differences, and these persisted; but the bureaucracy learned to respect the political 
mandate, and in return the political leadership maintained a hands-off approach to 
Railways’ operations.  While the integrity of the leadership is a bed-rock for the 
transformation of the Railways, it is not a sufficient explanation.  To formulate and 
execute the reform strategy a core team of reformers was required, who had a deep 
sense of purpose, a sharp understanding of the political economy, and business 
acumen.  These were convened form within and outside the Railways through a 
Ministerial intervention.   
 
Analyzing the Political Economy 
The Minister challenged his staff with rustic references.  In the early days, he often 
asked the management to explain that if a cow herder like him can produce a profitable 
herd of five hundred from a few cows, then why would the Railways with its 200,000 
wagons, 40,000 coaches, and 8,000 engines run at a loss?  The contexts and constraints 
different in a number of respects; the Minister neither sells the cow’s milk at a loss nor 
does he over staff the barns.  The veterinary services for the cows, education, and health 
care for his staff are not provided in-house.  Besides, the milk produced is sold at 
competitive prices to a premier five star hotel in Patna.  The Minister acknowledged 
that the Railways’ challenge was a greater one because unlike his farm, the Railways 
has several social obligations.   
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Before proceeding with an analysis of these conflicting objectives and its 
implications for reform, what makes a profitable commercial organization is briefly 
reviewed here.  Consider a simple example of a firm that sells goods or services.  A firm 
is profitable if its costs are less than the selling price because the profit is the difference 
between the price and the costs (profit = price – cost)40.  But, if the costs are greater than 
the price then the firm makes a loss.   
To transform a loss making business into a profitable one, private firms respond 
in one of three ways.  Jack Welch, the Chairman and CEO of General Electric (1981–
2001), aptly summarized this strategy as the ‘fix, sell, or close’ options (Welch and 
Byrne, 2001, p. 111).  To ‘fix’ a loss making business, either the price of goods sold needs 
to be increased or the costs decreased41.  But, if the business cannot be fixed through 
these measures, then one should ‘sell’ those aspects of the business that are loss making.  
                                                 
 
 
 
40Price is what consumers will pay for the goods or service, and cost is the sum of the expenses associated 
with production stages up to the final sale.  Among other things, accounting rules about depreciation, 
amortization, taxes, subsidies, cost of capital, and risks, make the reality of a business more complex, but 
these simple principles remain relevant.   
41Increasing price, or the numerator approach is preferred when demand is inelastic—the decrease in 
demand for normal goods is much lesser than the increase in price, thus increasing total revenue and 
eventually profitability.  The cost-cutting measures, or reducing the denominator, by reducing costs of 
inputs, labor, capital and associated overheads.  This approach is preferred for elastic demand—where 
the consumption of normal goods is very sensitive to prices, especially when substitute goods are 
available (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994, p. 9).  Often a combination is deployed in mixed proportions.  
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Third, if fixing or selling is infeasible, the next step is to ‘close’ a business and sell the 
residual as scrap.   
In the private sector, this strategy works well—at it did for General Electric, IBM, 
and a host of others.  But, in the thick socio-political reality of the Railways, such a 
strategy is at best economically desirable but politically infeasible.  This infeasibility is 
deep-rooted because expense cutting is accompanied by high social costs associated 
with restructuring—retrenchment and disinvestment.  Thus, the challenge confronting 
the policymakers was to deliver inclusive reforms—cater to all the unremunerative 
social obligations and yet transform  the Railways into a commercially viable 
organization of global repute.  Transforming the Railways through inclusive reforms 
became the mission around which the Railways’ core strengths were garnered (Ministry 
of Railways, 2006, p. 1).  This called for a creative response.  Past assumptions and 
practices were to be reviewed.  Therefore, the core team of reformers began with 
analyzing the reform context.   
 
Crafting the Space for Reform 
The core team discovered that to diagnose the political economy and identify space for 
reforms within the Railways, all policy initiatives must be screened at two levels.  First, 
a market test, where considerations focus on commercial viability.  Second, a societal 
value test, where the evaluation of the issue is based on its political desirability and 
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feasibility.  Reforms that pass the first test but fail the second are commercially desirable 
but politically infeasible.  Reformers accepted the social considerations as integral to the 
political mandate and considered a step by step approach.  Each variable that affected 
the Railways functioning was split into its apolitical and political components, across 
scales and dimensions—from the macro to the micro and across facets.  The core team 
was adamant about looking beyond the obvious.  Their approach to traversing the 
complex political economy of the Railways involved a lot of learning by doing - an 
incremental approach that can best be described as muddling through.  But, the five 
step analysis presented here captures the essence of the strategy.  The primary objective 
of this experiment is to assess the true extent of the Railways ‘split personality’—
conflicting commercial and social goals  and seek to verify if these conflicts were the 
principal obstacles leading to the deteriorating condition of the Railways.  In the 
process, the space for reform was crafted.   
A macro analysis to separate the political aspects from apolitical ones is the first 
step. In each facet of the Railways’ functioning—pricing, commercial operations, 
investment policy, and labor management—every policy initiative was subjected to the 
twin test along commercial and social equations.  This has to do with discovering the 
proportion of investments and revenue that are considered politically sensitive due to 
their social implications on the poor (macro-level) from those with exclusively 
commercial implications.   
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As seen earlier in Chapter 4, only 20 percent of the total capital investment has 
political implications—the socially determined investments and the rest of the 80 
percent of investments had little in the way of political repercussions.  Instantaneously, 
an enormous apolitical space for leveraging investments was created.  These allocations 
can be market oriented and based on operational and commercial requirements, such as 
route-wise planning of congested high-density networks where demand far exceeds 
supply.  However, route-wise planning requires all departments to channel their efforts 
into getting all of the technical and operational details right—from tracks, stations, and 
signaling to scheduling and running trains.  Despite several discussions about this 
matter, the Railways was unable to act, not because of political interference, but because 
of widespread rifts between functional silos that are organized into departments.   
Further, total traffic earnings were disaggregated in a similar manner.  A quick 
glance suggests that 22 percent of the revenue is from market segments that are 
politically sensitive—largely second-class passenger trips in reserved and unreserved 
coaches used predominantly by poor people—an outcome again with exclusively social 
return.  The rest of the 78 percent of the revenue is earned from an apolitical segment of 
the customers— freight, parcel, high-end passenger segments, and other sundry 
earnings.  This business segment can (and should) be managed on commercial 
principles, but the Railways lacked a business orientation in the past.  As these variables 
are analyzed further, the space for reform continues to grow. 
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The social cost of retrenchment, divesting, and other cost cutting measures are 
high, they are politically infeasible.  Therefore, the railway management lacks control of 
many operating expenses.  However, there is no political constraint in distributing the 
same operating expenses over larger volumes to reduce unit costs.  For example, the 
number of employees cannot be reduced (except by natural attrition), but if trains carry 
more goods or more trains are run with the same number of employees, unit costs 
decline.  Similarly, while at macro-level passenger fares are politically sensitive, the 
yield per train is apolitical.  While, increasing revenues through passenger fare hikes 
and reducing unit costs through retrenchment were thought to be outcomes with 
exclusively economic returns, this analysis demonstrates how they have been converted 
to being commercially viable and socially desirable (win-win) outcomes.   
As a second step efforts were made to identify apolitical sub-components within 
the politically sensitive business segments.  Reformers had not given-up on the 
potential of the remaining 20 percent of investment spending and 22 percent in 
revenues that were assumed to be political at the macro-level.  This 20 percent of 
investments consists of 8.75 percent for new railway lines, 1.59 percent for urban 
transport, and 9.05 percent for gauge conversions for the fiscal year 2008.  Consider 
gauge conversion.  The experts branded these as unrenumerative investments; perhaps 
they were right.  However, despite being done in a piecemeal manner, more than half of 
the gauge conversion could be leveraged for remunerative activities.  While different 
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gauge conversion projects were at varying stages of completion, the reformers focused 
on projects that enhanced the capacity for the lucrative freight business.  Alternative 
routes for congested railway lines were discovered through route-wise planning of 
these gauge conversion works.  Nearly half of the gauge conversion works were helpful 
in capturing additional freight business and therefore were commercially viable.  
Examples of such alternative routes are links to ports, connectivity to cement plants, 
marble and granite quarries, and so forth.  Essentially, through such analysis, the initial 
80 percent of apolitical investment expanded to 85 percent because some components of 
the gauge conversion were included.   
Similarly, consider the 22 percent of revenues from passenger segment that was 
set aside as political.  While passenger fares for suburban rail service or second-class 
passenger, trains are politically sensitive, non-passenger revenue is apolitical.  Consider 
the Victoria Terminus and the slew of stations along the suburban railway network in 
Mumbai.  With seven million dedicated customers each day, the Railway’s stations have 
access to the gaze, the foot-fall, and refreshment needs of these hard working 
Mumbaikars.  Quite like the fabulous advertisements and sponsorship revenues that 
account for crore of rupees (millions of dollars) in the Indian Premier League cricket 
games or at Times Square in New York, Railways stations can leverage their strategic 
position to earn revenues without raising passenger fares.  Such strategies allow the 
Mumbai suburban service of the Western Railway zone to remain profitable despite 
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passengers being charged fares that are below cost.  As they segregated these apolitical 
aspects from political variables the space for reform was further expanded.   
Third, this space for reforms further widens when perceptions are reconciled 
with reality.  The Railways had a uniform policy to subsidize all customer segments, 
based on the principle of a customer’s perceived ability to pay—low value commodities 
were charged cheaper rates.  Emphasis is laid on the perception of affordability because 
in practice, there was no explanation for why the customers who transported low-value 
bulk commodities like iron and manganese ores were charged less in comparison to 
cement and steel customers.  Surprisingly, this was the practice at a time when 
commodity prices were booming and there was no pressing political rationale for 
keeping freight charges low.  Additionally, there was a firm belief among the Railways’ 
bureaucracy that the transportation of food grains and fertilizers needed to be under 
priced.  They assumed an increase in the freight costs would be politically undesirable 
because it would result in price increases for poor consumers like small farmers.  In 
reality, the price for the food grain and fertilizer is fixed by the Government of India, 
and the differential between the “cost” and the “fair price” is borne by the Government.  
When the Minister was briefed that increases in freight charges would not result in 
increased food or fertilizer prices for the consumer, he quickly agreed to revise the 
freight charges for these commodities.  This is an example of what was thought to be an 
exclusively social outcome turning out to be a win-win outcome as the Railways 
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increased its revenue while poor consumers were not affected.  In sum, such gaps 
between perception and reality were demolished, and were crucial in further crafting 
the space for reform. 
Table 8.  Disaggregating variables into political and not so political 
Policy Political Apolitical 
Pricing Passenger fares for non-air conditioned 
classes—reserved and unreserved second 
class. 
Passenger fares for air-conditioned classes. 
 
Freight charges for salt. All commodities other than salt which is 99 
percent of freight business. 
Parcel charges for fruits—banana, orange, 
mangoes. 
All commodities other than fruits which is 
90 percent of parcel business 
Commercial Affordability and honor-based 
concessional fares—for senior citizens, 
students, farmers, freedom fighters, army, 
and the like. 
Over 90 percent of non-passenger income 
from catering, parcel, land lease, and 
advertisement revenue. 
Operational Priority to less remunerative trains.  For 
example profitable freight trains give way to 
passenger trains. 
All other operational decisions. 
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Fourth, each policy initiative—pricing, commercial, and operational—were broken-
down into its nano constituents and reconfigured into the four outcomes.  Table 8 
illustrates how political variables for each policy issue in every business area are 
separated from apolitical ones.   
In conclusion, the spirit behind the analysis was to accept political engagement 
not as interference but as the democratic mandate, and work towards an inclusive 
transformation.  In return for the bureaucracy’s acceptance of the political mandate, the 
political leadership had to earn trust, as it did through self discipline.   
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Another crucial challenge that inhibited action was organizational constraints.  
As observed by the Tandon (1994) expert group, the organizational structure of 
functional silos routinely compromised institutional goals for departmental gains.  
Departmentalism, its all-pervading culture, is regarded a “bane and a curse” of the 
system in which each discipline or area becomes an “Island unto itself, no part of the 
main”.  Consequently, a hierarchicalised caste system prevails in which some 
departments are considered superior to others.  It weakens the organization, notably 
because in the absence of a team spirit, owing to departmental loyalties, the interests of 
the organization are subordinated to a department’s own narrow considerations.  In 
consequence the organization suffers while the “whole becomes less than the sum of the 
parts.”  This is particularly so when projects are perceived and pushed in the interest of a 
department even at the cost of the organization.  (p. 8) 
 
Therefore, the focus of the reforms graduated from no privatization, no retrenchment, 
and no fare hike to identifying, expanding, and multiplying mutually beneficial 
outcomes, and leveraging them to maximize financial returns without adding social 
costs.  How this was achieved is the subject of the following chapters that unpack the 
market response disaggregated into demand and supply side strategies (Chapters 6 and 
7 respectively) as well as a public sector management approaches.  As an immediate 
step, care was taken to minimize unproductive outcomes by inducing synergies 
between departments, establishing cross-functional teams, encouraging project focused 
co-ordination with well defined targets under the close-eye of the senior management.   
 
Political Economy Strategy 
Having identified the space for reforms, the core team needed to act by setting ground 
rules for engaging in the political economy.  In politics, perception often counts for 
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more than reality, the pace of reform (or the lack of it) matters, and form may precede 
substance.  Thus, the strategy had three elements—political stance and phraseology, 
incrementalism, and tact.   
In order to inspire confidence among interest groups—media, parliamentarians, 
bureaucracy, and labor unions, among others—the Minister had announced, “no 
privatization, no retrenchment, and no fare hike”.  It was a bold statement.  Here the 
choice of words was important.  Such a statist stand appealed across party lines, and 
received thumping applause in the Parliament.  The bureaucracy felt at ease with the no 
‘sell-out, fix, or fire’ stance.  As a next step, the Minister qualified his statement.  He was 
against privatization of core railway functions, but he was not against (meaning 
reluctantly in favor of) public-private-partnerships in non-core functions of the 
Railways.  This resonated with the Planning Commission, which had been 
recommending the introduction of private operators to run container trains for several 
years.  On the other hand, the left-front did not oppose this stance because of the 
Minister’s broader political image of being a staunch supporter of the public sector and 
the poor.  The Minister further qualified his stance on private participation.  The core 
operations of track maintenance, hauling, and coordinating movement of trains would 
remain in-house.  Private players were to participate in booking, aggregating, and 
delivering freight.  The private partners would act as a city cargo booking office.  
Without any pushback from labor unions, private players were introduced.  Similarly, 
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the Minister observed that the “core-business of the Railways is to run trains, not fry 
bhajiyas”.  Trivializing non-core activities and inviting private participants required a 
careful placing of ideas in carefully selected words.  Now, private firms are being 
engaged in a range of activities—from modernization of stations, setting hubs for 
logistics, and connectivity to ports. 
Further, the Railways experience revealed that introducing private firms for new 
manufacturing units received no opposition, but divesting existing factories infringed 
on interest groups that are difficult to manage—the employees, management, and the 
supply chains.  In the case of the Kapurthala coach factory in Punjab, corporatization 
was met with stiff resistance.  But, five new rolling-stock factories built as joint ventures 
experienced no resistance.  In this regard, having a ‘joint venture’ is crucial because it 
takes the sting out of the term privatization.  In practice, it is reassuring to the existing 
employees that the broader intent of the state is to stay responsible and engaged, even 
though in day to day management a 26 percent stake in the corporation makes them 
relatively autonomous private firms.  Such inclusive development efforts require 
striking a delicate balance between competing political and private interests and 
regional development needs.  In sum, the Minister’s left of center political position and 
his choice of words were a part of the strategy. 
In introducing change, the choice of when to act, is of the essence.  Here, for 
example, in the budget speech, it was a mistake to announce corporatization of the 
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Kapurthala rail coach factory just before the assembly elections, because the political 
climate was not conducive for change.  Likewise, increasing freight charges for a 
seemingly benign commodity like iron ore turned out to be a political hot potato.  The 
timing was wrong.  Due to the inflationary pressures the government was facing 
political flak.  The government lobbied steel producers to curtail soaring steel prices.  In 
response, the steel producers sought a price rollback for steel freight.  As a result, at the 
behest of the government, the Railways had to roll back the increase in freight rates.  In 
essence, what matters is ‘when’ actions associated with a reform strategy are 
implemented.   
Another aspect of the strategy was to concede battles to win the war.  In both the 
above examples, interventions were ill-timed.  Despite anticipated resistance, in the 
democratic spirit, room for consultation and negotiation with key stakeholders was 
built in.  But such a consultative process also provided ample room for an early exit.  
Since the unions were not confident of the benefits from corporatization of a particular 
factory, without escalating the differences, the decisions were reversed to avoid 
additional trouble.  Further, in the face of resistance from the affected workers, the 
decision to outsource toilet management at a major railway station was reversed.  
Finally, in the democratic context of India, an evolutionary approach to change was 
considered conducive.  The core team argued that change creates uncertainty and raises 
fears among the affected.  The pace at which change is introduced should be 
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manageable.  Because immediate concerns dominate political discourse, an incremental 
approach to change was preferable.  Accommodating such a range of interests amounts 
to funambulism, the balancing acts of a slack rope walker.  The implementation of an 
increase in axle load is an illustration of this approach.  Since increasing the load carried 
by each wagon has safety implications, and safety is a high priority in the Railways, a 
gradual approach was adopted.  First the load increase was tested on a non-passenger 
route, with an increase of just 2 tons per wagon.  Gradually, the load and the travel 
routes were increased.  Eventually on some non-passenger routes, an incremental load 
of 8 tons per wagon was introduced.  Similarly, freight and passenger tariffs were 
rationalized over a four year period.  And when loading and unloading increased from 
8 hour shifts to 24 hour, the change was introduced incrementally, starting in locations 
where unions, unorganized labor, or traders were more willing to negotiate.  The 
objective was to introduce change where resistance encountered was limited.   
 Thus, the political economy considerations had tempered the pace and methods 
of introducing change.  The political leadership and the management strategists had to 
consider political positioning, choice of words, timing, and gradualism while 
implementing a mega-transformation. 
Can good economics be good politics?  In the experience of the Railways the 
political space for populism increased with the commercial success.  A nearly bankrupt 
Railways could not have financed the five rolling-stock factories that the Minister 
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announced.  But, with the successful transformation of the Railways, demand for 
locomotives has more than doubled, from 200 in 2004 to 500 in 2009.  Therefore, 
building the factories was necessary, and it allowed for some political space to allocate 
them in constituencies of the Minister and other coalition partners.  Similarly, the issue 
of employing coolies or decreasing passenger fares would be absurd for a bankrupt 
Railways, but with a 25,000 crore rupees (US $6 billion) cash surplus in 2009, such a 
populist intervention received no criticism.  With the commercial success of the 
Railways the space to benefit the electoral constituency increased as did the stature and 
influence of the political leadership.  Yet, this success needed to be communicated to the 
electorate. 
Initially, the media was rife with skepticism because without a track record of 
performance of the Minister there was no positive news coverage.  In the initial year the 
strategy was to remain relatively inactive.  At the end of the first year in 2005, when the 
budget was presented, there had been substantive improvements—including a historic 
change in the tariff schedule, and incremental revenue of 5,000 crore rupees (over a 
billion dollars).  Despite this reasonable performance, India Today’s 2005 ranking (2006) 
of the performance of federal Ministers had ranked the Railway Minister at 33, nearly at 
the bottom of the list.  National newsapers like the Business Standard (Phadnis, 2005) 
had ascribed key attributes of the railway budget for fiscal year 2006 to the Prime 
Ministers Office (also known as the PMO).  Adding that the Railway Minister was busy 
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campaigning in Bihar.  Other newspapers were skeptical as well.  Therefore, after the 
first year’s performance, engaging with media required a proactive strategy.  First, 
ground rule was to consistently promise less and deliver more.  In each budget 5,000 
crore less was committed than what was eventually delivered at the end of the fiscal 
year.  Similarly, the other measures of efficiency were stated with moderation and the 
results were about 5 percentage points better.   
Second was to strategically select high impact events.  At the top of the rung was 
the railway budget around which the Railways gets the undivided attention of the 
media—newspapers and news channels devote their prime space to discuss the popular 
elements of the budget.  Similarly, the core team seized high impact events.  Finally, the 
third bit of the strategy involved fact-based information sharing with all willing news 
sources without preference for any particular media outlet.  In all, the media perception 
regarding the Minister and the Railways has been productive.  In a reversal of the past 
ranking, India Today (2006) ranked the Minister of Railways the second best Minister of 
the year in 2006.   
 
Conclusion 
Having established the political mandate and made the distinction between mandate 
and interference, identified the space for reform, the reformers designed ground rules 
for engagement in the political economy, which included a media strategy.  In the next 
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few chapters I move on to analyze the comparative advantage of the Railways in the 
context of the market (Chapter 6).  In particular, I explore the supply and demand -side 
constraints (Chapters 7 and 8 respectively) and entrepreneurial responses to win back 
market share and margins in a fiercely competitive environment.   
  
176 
 
Chapter 6:  The Market 
 
Introduction 
Cell phone service providers in India are an example of how the telecom industry 
leveraged economies of scale to make cellular phone calls affordable for the common 
people of India.  From 15 million customers in 1997 the telecom market has grown 
exponentially to 234 million customers in December 2007, to 791million customers in 
February 2011, with 20 million customers being added in the months of January and 
February 2011 (TRAI, 2011, p. 1, and TRAI, 2008, p. 19).  During the same period (1997–
2007) the call charges per minute dropped from 17 rupees (40 cents) to a rupee (2 cents) 
and costs continues to decline (p. 2, TRAI, 2007).  Meanwhile, private telecom firms 
have made billions of dollars in profits. 
Despite reducing passenger fares, when the railway generated a cash surplus of 
25,000 crore rupees (US $6 billion), why were people surprised?  If the railway network 
was to be rebuilt today, it would need a trillion dollar investment.  Once the network is 
laid, spreading the fixed costs over larger volumes substantially reduces the unit costs 
because variable costs are relatively small42.  Identifying the aspects of the business that 
                                                 
 
 
 
42 The railways total operational costs consist of fixed and variable costs.  Variable costs change with the 
amount of output produced.  Fixed cost do not vary when the amount of output changes. 
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are politically sensitive, distinguishing where market opportunities exist, leveraging the 
scope for economies of scale, deploying cutting edge technology, and finally seizing the 
opportunity offered by a booming economy were essential ingredients for this success.   
Prior to further discussions about how the railway transformed, there is a need to 
examine the nature of the business.  The railroads in India were considered to be a 
monopoly rail service provider (Mohan, 2001b, p. 69 and World Bank, 2002).  Yet, the 
same studies showed a rapidly declining market share in the cargo business (Mohan, 
2001b, p. 63).  Reconciling these facts requires an understanding of the business of 
railroads in India.  Here, an analysis of the business is presented along with its revenue 
streams, a diagnosis of its competitive strengths, and the demand elasticity of price and 
non-price factors.  Finally, the cost structure, its variability and sensitivity to load and 
length of train, as well as its manipulation are discussed.  In essence, the attributes that 
make the railway a competitive service provider are explored in depth. 
 
Puzzle, Monopoly Loosing Market Share 
What is the nature of the business of Indian Railways?  If the Railways is considered to 
be a provider of rail services, it is a monopoly supplier by definition because it is the 
only provider of rail services in the Indian market.  However, the Railways’ market 
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share43 in `land based transportation of goods’ eroded from about 89 percent in 1951 
(RITES, 1994, p. 1.1) to less than 40 percent in 2004 and from 69 percent to 20 percent in 
the passenger segment, over the same period (Agarwal, 2004, p. 175).  A look at the 
Indian transportation market reveals to whom the market share was lost.  The 
transportation of petroleum products migrated to pipelines.  Steel and cement 
transportation moved to trucks and, in coastal areas, to shipping lines.  Similarly, 
luxury travelers preferred air-conditioned buses and budget airlines to the Railways’ 
express trains.  The monopoly assumption hindered a competitive analysis grounded in 
empirics, and experts continued to define the Indian Railways as a monopoly, arguing 
for a tariff regulator (Mohan, 2001b, p. 69).  If the Railways is re-conceptualized as a 
transporter among many alternative modes—trucks, ships, pipelines, airlines, and 
luxury buses—it operates in a highly competitive market place for transportation 
services.   
For the Indian Railways this was the first step and a paradigmatic shift from 
thinking of itself as a monopoly, to recognizing the ground realities of being a 
transporter that faces stiff competition from alternative modes.  The Railways faced the 
classic competitiveness problem characterized by low growth, declining market share, 
                                                 
 
 
 
43 During this period 95 percent of total traffic in India was carried by either rail or road transport 
(Agarwal, 2004, p. 175).   
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low productivity, poor service, and eroding margins.  Solving this problem required 
offering customers superior and compelling value, not mere tariff regulation.  To win 
back the Railways’ competitive edge in the market required a dispassionate analysis of 
competitiveness blended with insight and pragmatism.  Here critical assumptions about 
the Railways’ business model, variability and sensitivity of cost structures, and 
elasticity of demand with respect to price and non-price factors, needed a rigorous 
analysis. 
 
Business Portfolio 
Overall Composition 
Freight transportation is central to the profitability of the Indian Railways.  Freight 
contributes to 64 percent of the Railways’ traffic earnings; passenger traffic contributes 
31 percent of earnings.  The remaining five percent is contributed by ‘other coaching 
and sundry earnings’.  Figure 11 unpacks the Railways traffic earnings by source for the 
fiscal year 2004, when total earnings were 42,842 crore rupees (US $10 billion). 
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Figure 12.  Where the rupee comes from 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways, Government of India, 2004. 
 
 
While each day, only one-third of the 13,000 trains operated by the Railways carry 
freight, they account for two-thirds of total earnings.  The remainder is from passenger 
trains, the majority of which run at a loss.  Railroads have a competitive edge in freight 
due to their ability to efficiently carry large loads over long distances.  Further, much of 
the freight business is apolitical in nature and can be managed on commercial 
principles.  Thus, the lynch-pin of Railways’ reform strategy was to optimize the freight 
business, reduce losses in the passenger segment, and deploy creative methods to 
improve the share of earnings from miscellaneous sources.  But, in keeping with the 
nuanced approach to analysis, the reformers refrained from making generalizations at 
this level and further disaggregated each market segment into its nano-constituents.  
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Freight 
In the early 1980s, because of the Gujral era decision to stop accepting piece-meal 
freight and focusing on hauling bulk commodities, the Railways’ share in piece-meal 
freight rapidly declined to minimal levels—except through containerized traffic and the 
parcel business segment.  As a corollary, 90 percent of goods carried by the railway 
consisted of eight bulk commodities—coal, iron ore, other minerals, food grains, 
petroleum products, fertilizers, iron and steel, and cement. 
The expert committee attributed the declining market share, even in bulk 
commodities, to cross-subsidization of passenger services by freight, poor quality of 
services, and the national highways expansion—the golden quadrilateral and its 
diagonals that made the road sector more competitive (Mohan, 2001a, p. 2).  But these 
factors affected all commodities equally, then why was there a dichotomous response in 
the transportation of finished products versus raw materials.  For instance, while the 
market share of finished products like steel and cement has been declining since the 
1990s, during the same period, the share of iron ore, coal, and other minerals remained 
stable (see Figure 12 and Table 9). 
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Figure 13.  Market share of steel and iron ore freight (1991–2004) 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways, Government of India, 2008. 
 
Both iron ore and steel are heavy commodities.  But there is a distinction as well.  To 
transport iron ore for a firm, like Tata Steel in Jamshedpur, the railway provides a door-
to-door service—from the mine-pithead to the factory.  The Railways picks the iron ore 
from Tata’s mine-pithead and empties it directly into the Tata Steel factory at 
Jamshedpur.  Thus for Tata Steel, the total logistics cost is equal to the rail freight 
charges as other incidental costs of rail transportation are negligible.  Furthermore, rail 
freight charges are substantially lower than truck transport charges. 
Therefore, the Railways has a competitive edge in transporting iron ore, even 
over distances as short as 100 kilometers.  As the distance increases, the Railways 
service becomes more competitive.  Moreover, Tata Steel produces five million tons of 
steel annually; for this production it requires eight to ten million tons of iron ore each 
year or 22,000 tons every day.  It would require over two thousand trucks to transport 
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this amount of iron ore.  Transportation by road is unviable because of the number of 
trucks required, poor road conditions, and the hilly terrain.  
On the other hand, for the transportation of steel, the railway provides station-to-
station service to Essar Steel, a private steel company.  This steel plant has no rail 
sidings at the factory or at the consumption centers.  Further, it does not maintain any 
warehouses.  If its factory in Hazira, Gujarat, needs to transport steel to a construction 
site near Mumbai, Essar has to transport the steel from the factory to the nearest railway 
station, and the railway hauls it to a railway station near the destination.  But no steel is 
consumed at railway stations.  Therefore, for the last leg of the freight—station to the 
consumer—the firm once again has to organize an alternate transporter.  As a result, in 
addition to the rail freight, incremental costs are incurred due to multiple transfers, 
bridging, warehouse fees, inventory, and so forth.  These additional costs add up to be a 
significant component of the total logistics cost and can exceed the cost of rail freight 
itself.  On the other hand, road transporters provide a door-to-door service.  Trucks 
collect the steel at the factory and take it directly to the consumption site.  Further, 
trucks can carry small quantities of freight, while the Railways does not accept anything 
less than a train load of 2,000 tons per consignment.  The incremental costs of bridge 
transportation at both ends outweigh the cost advantage of cheaper rail freight charges.  
Consequently, despite steel being a heavy commodity and rail freight charge being 
lower than those for trucks, the Railways is an uncompetitive transport service provider 
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for distances less than 750 kilometers; even for longer distances its competitiveness is 
limited.   
To compound the problem the Railways charged freight fares on an 
`affordability principle44’.  Cheaper commodities like iron ore were charged less, while 
higher value products like steel were charged more.  Such affordability based price 
discrimination was benign in the Fabian era, but post-liberalization the Railways 
rapidly lost market share in the transportation of steel, especially after the Government 
revoked the `freight equalization’ scheme for steel45.  Based on market principles, the 
freight charges should have been the converse, charging more for iron ore which 
                                                 
 
 
 
44  This refers to the railways past practice of price discrimination in freight charges based on the value of 
the commodity.  This practice was also applied in the passenger segments.  Such affordability based price 
discrimination was benign in the Fabian era because the cost of transportation was borne by the 
government under freight equalization policies.  But, post-liberalization the cost for freight was no longer 
pass onto the government, and producers sought to minimize costs of freight, further affecting the 
Railways that was already loosing market share in steel freight.   
45 However, this loss in market share in the steel freight was uneven.  For Steel Authority of India the 
Railways did not lose much of its share of freight transport, while with Tata Steel the loss in the freight 
market share was moderate.  In contrast, the recent steel plants of Essar Steel in Gujarat and Ispat 
Industries in Maharashtra, both in western India, chose to skip the railway services altogether.  This 
differential loss in market share was because of the duality in the type of transportation service the 
Railways provide.  To deal with the constraints associated with station-to-station freight services of the 
Railways, the old integrated steel plants of Tata Steel and Steel Authority India had developed rail 
sidings for loading at the factory and unloading at their warehouses in distribution centers.  And the 
Railways continued to provide them with a door-to-door service.  On the other hand, Steel plants like 
Essar Steel and Ispat Industries directly dispatch steel in trucks to distributors who redirect material to 
customers.  For these new generation steel plants the Railways is not competitive in the short or long 
distance traffic for three reasons. First, the factories dispatch steel in small quantities (less than 2,000 
tons).  Second, these steel producers predominantly serve regional markets (implying short distances, less 
than 500 kilometers).  Third, these steel producers do not have warehouses to receive large quantities, 
and the points of consumption are dispersed. 
185 
 
received a convenient door-to-door service and less for steel which received an 
inconvenient station-to-station service; requiring further non-rail transport to get to its 
final destination.  These flawed pricing decisions were not a result of political choices or 
broader societal (equity) considerations, but reflected a lack of understanding about the 
relative competitive strength of the Railways in transportation of the two commodities.   
Thus, the cross-subsidy and poor service argument proposed by the Mohan 
committee and other experts failed to explain why rail remained the preferred mode of 
transport for iron ore but not for steel.  The door-to-door concept helps clarify this 
differential preference of consumers.   
In conclusion, the Railways has a competitive advantage and pricing power in 
freight with the following four characteristics.  First, where transportation is door-to-
door (production-to-consumption) as opposed to station-to-station.  Second, when 
freight is in bulk quantities (greater than 2,000 tons) and not piece-meal.  Third, 
transportation is of heavy goods like iron ore as opposed to low-density goods like tea.  
Fourth, freight is transported over long-distances.  If the first three conditions are met, 
the Railway is competitive, even for distances less than 500 kilometers.  However, if the 
first condition is not met and the Railway is a station-to-station transporter, it is 
uncompetitive for short and medium distances—even for long haul trips its competitive 
edge is not guaranteed (see Table 9).  
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Table 9.  Attributes of freight competitiveness 
 Iron ore Steel Tea 
Service Door-to-door Station-to-station Station-to-station 
Weight Heavy (high density) Heavy (high density) Light (low density) 
Quantity More than 2,000 tons 1,000–2,000 tons Piece-meal 
Distance More than 100 kilometers More than 750 kilometers More than 1,000 kilometers 
Overall competitiveness High  Moderate  Negligible 
 
Source: Authors’ subjective assessment and Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways, Government of India. 
 
The commodities for which the Railways provides a door-to-door service are raw 
material, ores and minerals like coal, iron ore, gypsum, and manganese, while the 
station-to-station service—or door-to-station—is predominantly for finished products 
like steel and cement.  Over 63 percent of the Railways’ freight customers are provided 
a door-to-door service and the remaining 37 percent are provided a station-to-station 
service—or door-to-station, essentially involving additional logistical costs.  This 
distinction between door-to-door service versus station-to-station is summed up in 
Figure 13. 
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Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways, Government of India. 
 
Several underpriced door-to-door commodities like iron ore offered ample space for 
fare hikes without decreasing the Railways’ competitiveness in the freight market.  In 
contrast, overpriced station-to-station commodities like steel and cement had no room 
for fare hikes—instead, either the fares had to be maintained (with value-added 
services), or reduced.  On a note of caution, there is no standardized policy for pricing 
Railways’ freight services, except that there is a need to have a commodity and client 
specific strategy that responds to seasonal as well as spatial variations in demand.  For 
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Figure 14.  Composition of freight transported in 2004 
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example, wheat and fertilizer are provided a station-to-station service, yet freight 
charges for these  
commodities could be raised, as these services were underpriced in the past due to a 
misconception that freight charges for these commodities were politically sensitive. 
 
Passenger business 
The passenger business is central to the political aspects of the transport business of the 
Railways.  There are few business segments that offer both political and commercial 
flexibility.  In Figure 14, one observes that the suburban and ordinary passenger 
segments constitute 88 percent of the total number of 5.2 billion rail trips each year.  Yet, 
they contribute only 28 percent of the passenger earnings. 
This business segment that constitutes 88 percent can be split into two.  First 
suburban rail transport, essential for daily commuters in big cities.  Second,  the slow 
and frequently halting ordinary passenger trains46 often used by migrant labor, rural 
poor, vendors, farmers, and office personnel to commute between surrounding districts.  
The Railways remains competitive in both these low-price segments, but there is a lack 
of political will to endorse a fare hike. 
                                                 
 
 
 
46 These also include commuter trains known by their acronyms DEMU and MEMU (Diesel-Electric 
Multiple Units trains and Mainline-Electric Multiple Units).  These are engineless trains that can move in 
both directions. 
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Passengers in mail and express trains constitute 12 percent of the 5.2 billion 
annual train trips47, but contribute 72 percent of the total passenger earnings.  Of the 603 
million mail and express train trips in 2004, 411 million were in unreserved-class, 155 
million in non-air-conditioned sleeper-class, and 38 million in air-conditioned classes.  
Unreserved-class and sleeper-class travelers constitute over 93 percent of the 603 
                                                 
 
 
 
47 The reason for the vast difference in the proportion of revenues from this relatively small number of 
mail and express travelers is largely because they travel long distances while the suburban and ordinary 
passenger travelers travel short distances. This difference is captured in the passenger kilometers—pkm.  
In 2004, the 607 million mail and express train passengers accounted for 292 billion passenger kilometers, 
while the 4.4 billion suburban and ordinary-passenger train travelers account for 250 billion passenger 
kilometers. (2005–2006 Explanatory Memorandum: Railway Budget, Ministry of Railways, p. 6). And 
passenger fares of even unreserved class of mail and express trains are substantially higher than ordinary 
passenger trains. 
Figure 15.  Number of passengers and share of earnings 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways, Government of India. 
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million mail and express trips.  These segments also offer commercial opportunities 
because alternate modes are dearer, but politicians are reluctant to increase fares due to 
the associated political fall-outs. 
The 38 million air-conditioned class passenger trips constitute less than one 
percent of the total number of travelers but contribute 20 percent of the total passenger 
earnings.  This is the apolitical segment of the high-end travel-classes.  However, in the 
past, the Railways’ affordability based differential pricing strategy taxed these air-
conditioned class passengers by increasing their fares.  As a result, with the competition 
from budget airlines, the long distance passengers opted to fly, while the short distance 
travelers took to luxury buses and taxis.  But, the Railways staff were in a state of 
denial.  They argued that while airlines carry 37 million passengers each year, the Rail 
traffic was many folders higher at 14 million passenger trips each day.  But the 
competition with budget airlines was in the small first and second-class air-conditioned 
segment of rail travel and the Railways was rapidly losing this market share.  In sum, 
there was a sea of data, but either the policy makers did not draw the right inferences or 
did not act based on it. 
As of 2004, the Railways was incurring a total loss of 5,780 crore rupees (US $1.3 
billion) in its passenger and other coaching business segments on an income of 14,221 
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crore rupees (US $3.1 billion)48.  This posed an enormous challenge for the reformers 
because the loss was over 40 percent of revenues.  Of this loss, 20 percent, about 1,200 
crore rupees (US $280 million) was in parcel, luggage, and catering services49. 
Overall, 99 percent of the passenger business is politically sensitive.  However, 
the passenger segment offers several opportunities to increase earnings and reduce 
losses.  For instance, the yield per train depends not just on the passenger fare, but also 
on a host of other non-fare variable likes the number of coaches in a train, the 
combination of coaches that form a train, occupancy rates of a coach, and the number of 
seats in a coach(which in turn depends on the coach layout).  Results presented below 
in this regard (see Table 10) question the conventional wisdom that higher passenger 
fares invariably result in higher earnings. 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
48 These values include all passenger (13,298 crore rupees) and other coaching earnings (923 crore rupees), 
but exclude negligible sundry earnings. 
49 Data for catering and parcel losses in fiscal year 2003 has been used here because equivalent data for 
2004 was not available.  In 2004 these figures were likely to have increased. 
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Table 10.  Composition of earnings per coach kilometer by travel class for 2003 
Travel class Relative fare Earning/coach km Cost/coach km 
Suburban50 1 22 rupees 34 rupees 
Unreserved ordinary 1 22 rupees 41 rupees 
Mail and express unreserved 1.82 20 rupees 26 rupees 
Mail and express reserved-sleeper 
second-class 
2.91 16 rupees 24 rupees 
Air-conditioned three-tier 8.19 40 rupees 29 rupees 
Air-conditioned two-tier 13.1 37rupees 28 rupees 
Air-conditioned first-class 25.5 37 rupees 26 rupees 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways, Government of India, 2008. 
 
In Table 10 it is worth noting that despite air-conditioned first-class fares being 25.5 
times higher than suburban fares, earning per coach kilometer from the first-class air-
conditioned coach (37 rupees) is less than double of the suburban coach (22 rupees).  
This is because the suburban rail carries 300 passengers in a coach, while the air-
conditioned first-class has room for only 18 passengers.  Moreover, counter-intuitively, 
higher fares can, at times, result in lower earnings per coach kilometer.  Consider the 
mail and express reserved-sleeper second-class fare, which is about three times the 
unreserved ordinary fare (see Table 10).  Yet, the earnings per coach kilometer from the 
mail and express reserved-sleeper second-class is 16 rupees, which is 36 percent less 
than the unreserved ordinary coach, which  earns 22 rupees.  The yield per unreserved 
                                                 
 
 
 
50 For the purpose of this calculation it has been assumed that all passengers travel on tickets bought for a 
single trip.  In practice many of the suburban rail passengers use discounted monthly season tickets or 
quarterly season tickets. 
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coach is greater because it has seating capacity for 90 passengers (and in practice 
accommodates more travelers) as opposed to 72 in the reserved-sleeper second-class 
coach.  Once again the difference is due to the number of passengers occupying a coach.  
In sum, the earning per coach kilometer is not only a function of fare per passenger but 
also the number of passengers travelling in a coach.   
The popular conception of the perpetual and excessive demand for trains is 
derived from stereotypical images of thousands of passengers riding on the roof-tops of 
trains in India, clinging to every ledge, bar, bolt, and crevice on the engine, and between 
carriages.  But in practice, many trains are not so popular.  The occupancy rate for trains 
not only varies by type of train and among class of travel, but also by season.  
Occupancy rates matter because an empty seat is a lost opportunity in passenger-fare 
revenue.  For every one percent increase in occupancy rates, the Indian Railways earns 
an additional 100 crore rupees (US $23 million).  Trains heading towards hill stations 
(high altitude holiday destinations) are popular during the summer.  But various trains 
that head towards the desert regions of India have very low occupancy in this period; 
instead it is hard to find vacant seats on these trains during the winter—the tourist 
season in Rajasthan51.  Thus, demand modeling to maximize occupancy rates on all 
                                                 
 
 
 
51Located in the Thar Desert in India and popular tourist destination, particularly during the winter 
season. 
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trains across travel classes and seasons holds immense potential to enhance the 
Railways’ earnings from the passenger business.  Likewise, if an air-conditioned first-
class coach with a 20 percent occupancy rate on an unpopular train is added to a 
popular one with a wait-list, the occupancy rate will increase. 
The combination of coaches that constitute a train is yet another variable 
affecting the yield per train.  Consider a typical coach composition of a Rajdhani 
Express train.  Of the 17 coaches, one coach provides no fare revenues while another 
two offer little revenue; these are the one pantry car and two power-cars cum brake-
vans.  The remaining 14 coaches include seven three-tier, five two-tier, and two first-
class coaches.  These three air-conditioned travel-classes have varying degrees of 
profitability—three-tier being the most profitable in practice.  Thus, the profitability of a 
train can be improved by manipulating the combination in which these coaches are 
added and subtracted.  
Further, the layout of coaches affects the yield per coach because an arrangement 
that accommodates more passengers increases per coach kilometer earnings.  If the 
profitable air-conditioned three-tier coach layout is reorganized to accommodate 78 
seats instead of 64, its profitability improves52.  Moreover, Indian Railways 
                                                 
 
 
 
52Here it is assumed that these coaches have full occupancy.  Therefore, layout of the coach also 
determines the yield per train.   
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predominantly has broad gauge tracks, which offer opportunities to increase the seating 
capacity by leveraging the maximum moving dimensions.  
Another variable affecting profitability is the number of coaches in a train—the 
length of the train.  Consider Figure 15 where all other variables are kept constant—
fare, coach class, occupancy rates, distance travelled—and coaches are added.  These 
calculations are for a mail and express type of train that travels a distance of 1,385 
kilometers53.  
Figure 16.  Train lengths and its affect on profitability 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
53 For the purpose of this comparison it is assumed that all coaches accommodate passengers and have 
full occupancy. The above unit cost per train kilometer is based on the methods adopted by the Indian 
railway—where most cost components are treated as variable, although many of these costs are fixed in 
nature.  Therefore, the cost per train kilometer function increases in a linear manner (for a detailed 
breakup of fixed and variable costs see Annex 2). 
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The train with 16 coaches runs at a loss.  As coaches are added to the train, it breaks 
even at 20 coaches (Figure 15).  Without increasing passenger fares, this train becomes 
profitable as the length of the train is increased to 24 coaches.  Earnings increase in 
proportion to the addition of coaches, provided there is full occupancy.  Yet, costs 
associated with additional coaches are much lower.  Irrespective of the number of 
coaches in a train, several costs remain the same—rail-track, locomotive, guard, driver, 
platform space, and so forth.  Moreover, demand for several passenger trains far 
exceeds supply as reflected in long waiting lists and packed compartments.  Keeping all 
other factors constant, adding coaches to a train offers opportunities to increase the 
yield per train, as opposed to the politically infeasible task of increasing passenger fares.  
This offered a win-win solution.   
It would thus be seen that the passenger fare is only one among many variables 
affecting the profitability of trains.  Except for the passenger fare, all variables are 
apolitical and have a huge potential, especially if they are manipulated together to 
maximize profitability. 
One such untapped potential for the Railways is the air-conditioned travel 
segment of popular trains.  Many of the 155 million non-air-conditioned sleeper-class 
passengers that travel in mail and express trains aspire to travel in air-conditioned 
coaches.  In this regard, the Minister often narrated the experience of his friends who 
would try to stand near the door of the air-conditioned compartments at railway 
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stations.  This was to enjoy the little cool air that would waft out while they peeked a 
glimpse of what the coach looked like inside (because all air-conditioned coaches had 
tinted window glasses); the police would chase these curious farmers away.  Here was a 
distinct indication of an unmet demand that presented a significant opportunity to 
expand the air-conditioned travel segment six fold, from a paltry 38 million to include 
these 155 million sleeper-class passengers, with the caveat that fares needed to be 
affordable.  This approach is quite like Tata’s Nano54, the one-lakh car, priced at about 
US $2,326, or mobile phones that are cheap enough for the common people—from 
vegetable vendors, carpenters, to small farmers. 
 
Miscellany 
The footfalls and eyeballs of 14 million passengers who travel on trains each day, offer 
great opportunities for increasing non-passenger fare income in ‘sundry earnings’ and 
through brake-vans and parcel-vans for improving ‘other coaching earnings’.  Sundry 
earnings include license fees for renting of advertisement space, parking, catering, land 
lease and so forth. And coaching services include parcel and luggage transportation 
                                                 
 
 
 
54 Ratan Tata, the group chairman of Tata Motors, was inspired by the sight of a family of five that are 
seen riding on two-wheelers in India.  All five ride together, with the father on the front wheel, mother on 
the pillion, and with the children hanging off their parents, like a bunch of grapes.  This sparked the 
reinvention of the people’s car (Economist, January 10, 2008).   
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services, special trains for the use by the armed-forces, and pilgrimages.  But why had 
the share of miscellaneous earnings declined from eight percent of total passenger 
earnings in 1951 to four percent in 2004?  The Airport Authority of India has less than 
100 airports but earns a few hundred crore rupees through revenue from 
advertisements.  In contrast, the Railways had a paltry income of 39 crore rupees from 
its 7,000 Railways stations across India, with 9,000 passenger train services each day in 
2004.  Even the metro rail transport in Singapore, a city state, had more advertisement 
revenue than all of Indian Railways.  Cineplex chains in India have mastered the art of 
accruing non-fare revenues through catering, parking fees, auxiliary entertainment, and 
so forth.  On the contrary, the Railways’ land leases yielded a paltry 116 crore rupees in 
2004, and the total annual catering earning of the Railways was 29 crore rupees55.  
Likewise, the Railways had a host of untapped opportunities in this business segment.  
Moreover, twenty percent56 of passenger losses were from parcel and catering services 
despite the fact that the Railways did not sell subsidized meals, nor did it carry parcels 
at a discount.  Why were the Railways’ catering and parcel earnings so low at 620 crore 
rupees (US $144 million) and losses so high? 
                                                 
 
 
 
55Based on data from the Accounts Directorate, Ministry of Railways. 
56 This amounts to a loss of 1200 crore rupees (US $279 million).   
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The primary reason is that Indian Railways’ had acquired an institutional 
disinterest in commercial policies and non-passenger fare earnings.  This was not on 
account of political interference or compulsions, but due to a lack of commercial 
orientation and profit motive.  Moreover, the entire emphasis of management was on 
operating trains.  This was reflected in the preference for posting of senior officers that 
managed both the commercial and operational activities of the Railways.  The most 
coveted jobs for these officers were in operations.  Issues such as catering, 
advertisements, parking, and licenses for other commercial activities on platforms 
received little attention, if at all.  This is evident in the fact that for years on end, license 
fees had not been revised and arrears were not collected.  Additionally, there was little 
effort towards price discovery through competitive bidding for licenses and so forth.   
Furthermore, the commercial policy focused on retailing rather than wholesale 
outsourcing of non-core functions like catering, parcel, and luggage services.  Each 
signage and parcel contract was individually contracted.  This led to significant 
underutilization of assets.  For example, every train has two brake-vans57; each has the 
capacity to carry eight tons of cargo.  An empty van is forgone revenue, yet less than 30 
percent of the total parcel capacity was being utilized by the Railways.  Additionally, 
                                                 
 
 
 
57 These vans are a safety requirement because Indian Railways does not have anti-collision devices and 
thus needs these vans as a buffer in the front and the rear of the train. 
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underutilization was due to a uniform pricing policy.  To compete effectively in the 
parcel and courier market, time-bound delivery is of essence58.  But, the Railways’ 
uniform pricing did not reflect the demand variations for the service.  Parcel services 
were priced the same for both peak and lean seasons.  While the parcel rates differed 
between fast and slow trains59, the quality of service varies among the mail and express 
trains—some are more punctual and quicker than others.  While the quality of service 
provided by the Toofan express and Purva express vary significantly, they both are fast 
trains and usually tend to have the same parcel charges.  Further, the pricing policy 
charged the same rates for transportation, from production to consumption centers, like 
Delhi to Guwahati, and back.  Delhi to Guwahati is in the loaded-flow direction for 
                                                 
 
 
 
58 Long distance mail and express trains provide opportunities for earnings through parcel and courier 
services.  If a parcel is dispatched from Delhi and delivered in Mumbai in less than 24 hours (door-to-
door) the market rate for a kilogram is between eight and twelve rupees.  But if the courier time is 
between 24 and 48 hours, then the rates drop to a half.  For a courier time of 72 hours and more the rate is 
as little as 2 rupees a kilogram.  Since, mail and express trains are punctual and each train has four brake-
vans—two in front, two at the rear end, and there is flexibility to add a few more vans—these trains offer 
an opportunity to capture some of the high value courier service.  The Rajdhani express, depart at 5 pm in 
Delhi and reach Mumbai at 10 am (station-to-station), so a parcel couriered via these trains can be 
delivered in less than 24 hours (door-to-door).  Here the rail is more competitive than the roads because 
buses and trucks (that provide a similar service) take much longer to travel, and have the same additional 
costs (station-to-door, in their case booking office to customer).  On the other hand, for distances less than 
500 kilometers the Railways is not competitive for parcel courier because of the station-to-station issues 
discussed earlier.  Further, the Railways is not competitive on routes where trains are not punctual, 
because in the couriers market the value is of speed as well as reliability.  
59 The Railways parcel service had a three-tiered tariff structure in the increasing order for ordinary 
passenger trains, mail and express trains and for the `super-fast’ Rajdhani and Shatabdi trains.   
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which there is much greater demand, the return trip in the empty-flow direction has 
little demand. 
Finally, the Railways did not leverage its brand value in catering, parcel, courier, 
advertisement, or on its iconic trains like Rajdhani and Shatabdi.  Branding offers the 
win-win proposition of increasing revenue several fold while enhancing customer 
service and reinventing the rail travel experience.   
 
Cost Structures 
Many costs for the Indian Railways are beyond control of the management, being 
determined exogenously.  Employee salary and benefits are determined by the federal 
government’s pay commission, diesel prices by a combination of international crude 
prices and government subsidies, and general inflation by the market conditions.  
Moreover, as seen in earlier chapters, reducing the number of employees or selling or 
closing loss-making business segments is politically infeasible.  Thus, unlike private 
firms, the Railways is constrained in cutting total costs and determining the pace of the 
cost increases.  Under such constraints, the potential to transform the Railways’ finances 
appears grim, but in practice how formidable was this challenge? 
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The unit cost60 of freight has been continuously declining at real (constant) prices 
since 1991 due to gains in productivity and operational efficiency.  The unit costs had 
declined by more than half from 10 to 4.3 paise in 200461. This happened due to a 
combination of leveraging technology and scale.  With such long-term trends in the 
Railways, why was it heading towards bankruptcy in 2001?  While the Railways’ unit 
cost was declining in real terms,  operational expenses were incurred at nominal 
(current) prices.  As the unit cost was increasing at nominal (current) prices and since a 
corresponding increase in tariffs was politically infeasible, the Railways’ financial 
condition was deteriorating62.  In this regard the Mohan committee had emphasized 
that the ‘rate of growth in revenues has been outstripped by the rate of increase in costs’ 
(2001a, p. 4).  But this relationship between wage-hikes and productivity, expenses and 
revenue, could be reversed, requiring the increase in annual labor productivity to 
exceed the annual wage-hike.   
                                                 
 
 
 
60 (Unit cost = total cost / total output (GTKM) = (fixed cost + variable cost) / total output.  As total output 
(), fixed costs () and variable costs (), therefore unit cost (). 
61 In 1991 the unit cost per net ton kilometer of the Indian Railways was 10 paise which has reduced to 4.3 
paise in 2004 at constant prices (base year 1982).  While in 1981, the railway had 11,000 engines by 2004 
the railway had a fleet of 7,800 engines—predominantly diesel and electric powered.  Likewise, the 
227,000 wagons that are part of the Railways’ rolling stock are half of the past quantities.  But, the engines 
and the wagons are superior in technology and have substantially increased the railways productivity. In 
addition, from 1981 to 2004, the number of employees had declined from 15.5 million to 14.4 million. 
62 In nominal terms the Railways’ costs were increasing faster than their revenues, implying an inevitable 
financial crisis. 
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Railroads are network infrastructure that require lumpy initial investment with 
returns in the long-term.  Bigger is better because with an increase in the amount of load 
transported, the average cost of each ton transported falls as the fixed costs can be 
spread over a greater tonnage.  Therefore, marginal costs are substantially lower than 
average cost of operations.  Railroads embody strong economies of scale. 
Figure 17.  Operating expenses and gross ton kilometers 
 
 
Table 11.  Operating expenses and gross ton kilometers 
 1983 2004 
Gross Ton Kilometer (Billion) 518 1,176 
Operating expenses at nominal prices (Crore Rupees) 3,900 39,482 
Operating expenses at real prices (Crore Rupees) 3,400 3,323 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways, Government of India. 
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As observed in Table 11, between 1983 and 2004 the gross ton kilometer63, increased 
over two times—from 518 billion gross ton kilometers in 1983 to 1,176 in 2004.  During 
the same period, at nominal (current) prices, operating expenses increased 10 times, but 
in real terms—adjusted for inflation64 to the base year 1983— expenses marginally 
decreased (Figure 17).  To understand why the total costs do not vary much even with 
the substantial increase in the Railway’s throughput65, consider Figure 17 that provides 
the composition of operating expenses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
63 Also known as GTKM is a combine measure that captures the distance and weight of total traffic 
carried on the Railways. 
64Divided by a weighted input cost index for the Railways. Weighted Index of Inputs for Railways (WIIR) 
is prepared annually in order to measure change (increase or decrease) of Railways’ input costs over the 
time. The purpose of this index is to compute a single index from price indices of the inputs relevant to 
the Railways, taking into consideration their relative weights in order to produce a composite metric, (for 
details see Annex 3) 
65 Amount of traffic transported in a given time. 
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Figure 18.  Composition of operating expenses 
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Salary and pension expenses (49 percent) and financial and amortization charges (14 
percent) for lease charges and depreciation are fixed.  It seems intuitive that more trains 
imply more engines, drivers, guards, wagons, among others.  However, over the years 
the number of trains has grown, but the number of staff, engines, and wagons, all 
declined.  This is because the Indian Railways is a mega-enterprise with enormous slack 
in the system.  By leveraging scale, technology and operating strategy the same assets 
provided more output.   
What is more astounding is that despite an increase in throughput and the 
increase in the number of trains, energy and storage expenses do not vary much.  It is 
intuitive to assume that more trains imply a proportional increase in diesel 
consumption.  But in the case of the Railways this assumption falls apart.  Consider the 
consumption of diesel over the eight year period—2000 to 2007.  While the diesel gross 
ton kilometer66  increased by 37 percent, the consumption of diesel increased by a third, 
that is just 12 percent67.  Thus, costs do not vary as much with the increase in 
throughput.  Operating costs were on the rise, not because of an increase in the number 
of trains but because of an increase in the price of diesel, employee bonuses, and 
salaries.  In essence, the Railways has low variable costs and fixed costs dominate.  This 
                                                 
 
 
 
66A measure of the amount of load transported by diesel engines. 
67Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railway, Government of India. 
206 
 
is also referred to as a high operating leverage, implying that profits are elastic with 
respect to output or sales68.  To put it simply, given the rigidity in the cost structure, as 
output increases, operating profits increase at a rate much faster than the growth in 
volumes; thus the more freight transported, the more profitable the Railways is, and 
vice-versa.  If the Indian Railways system, with its 4,000 freight trains, completes the to-
and-fro journey faster and decreases the time between successive loadings, the 
Railways’ output can increase exponentially.  The turnaround time of freight trains was 
seven days in 2004.  If this time could be reduced to five days, then the Railways could 
load an additional 230 trains each day.  Given the high operating leverage, the increase 
in associated costs would be nominal and this offers a multi-billion dollar opportunity. 
Further, another crucial attribute of the Railways’ costs is its insensitivity to the 
length of the train.  As the length of a train is increased—by adding more coaches—the 
passenger capacity increases but, the incremental cost is proportionately smaller.  
Therefore, the unit cost per passenger declines.  Table 12 shows the difference in unit 
cost of a typical Rajdhani train with 17 coaches and a longer Rajdhani train as the well 
as the case study—modeled on the Garib Rath, a low cost air-conditioned passenger 
train service introduced by the Railways.  
                                                 
 
 
 
68 Operating leverage is the elasticity of profit with respect to output. 
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Table 12.  Cost per passenger kilometer, 2008 
Train  17 Coaches 20 Coaches 24 Coaches69 
Rajdhani Cost per train kilometer 649.20 rupees 749.03 rupees 882.55 rupees (+36%) 
 Revenue per train kilometer 993.44 rupees 1226.60 rupees 1537.93 rupees (+55%) 
 Cost per passenger kilometer 80 paise 73 paise 68 paise (-15%) 
 Number of passengers per 
train  
816 people  1032 1302 people (+60%) 
Case Study Cost per train kilometer 465.48 rupees 533.25 rupees 623.92 rupees (+34%) 
 Revenue per train kilometer 567.29 rupees 686.26 rupees 851.02 rupees (+50%) 
 Cost per passenger kilometer 38 paise 35 paise 32 paise (-16%)  
 Number of passengers per 
train 
1233 people 1512 1920 people (+56%) 
 
In the Rajdhani, as the number of coaches increases from 17 to 24, the cost of a 
passenger kilometer decreases by 15 percent—from 80 to 68 paise.  This is because cost 
per train kilometer increases by 36 percent, but the carrying capacity of the train 
increases at a greater rate of 60 percent.  Therefore, the unit cost per passenger falls by 
15 percent70.  This is because a longer train continues to use the same engine, tracks, 
driver, and crew.  In essence, longer trains have a lower unit cost per traveler. 
Another mechanism is the insensitivity of cost to the load hauled by a train.  
While freight trains carry five times the load of a passenger train, costs are not five 
times higher; instead they are less than double the cost of the passenger train because 
                                                 
 
 
 
69 In parenthesis is the percentage change in values with respect to the values under 17 coaches. 
70 Here the assumption is that additional coaches have full occupancy and the engines can haul these 
longer trains.  In response to such needs the Indian Railways had acquired high horsepower locomotives 
but could not increase the length of the trains because the platforms at railway stations where not long 
enough to accommodate longer trains.   
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both the trains use the same driver, tracks, signaling system, and so forth.  Additionally, 
energy efficiency in terms of fuel consumption per thousand gross ton kilometer of an 
engine hauling a heavier train is superior compared to hauling a lighter train.  
Therefore, per ton kilometer costs of a freight train is 51 paise while that of a passenger 
train is almost 14 times more at seven rupees71.  Table 13 summarizes some of these 
attributes.   
Table 13.  Insensitivity of costs to load, 2004 
 Gross train 
load 
Cost per Train 
kilometer 
(in Rupees) 
Cost per coach/wagon 
kilometer (in Rupees) 
Cost per net ton 
kilometer 
Passenger 1,000 ton 412 r s 36 rupees  697 paise 
Freight 4,000 ton 714 rupees 17 rupees 51 paise 
 
The passenger train is not comparable with the freight train on account of several 
factors.  But Table 13 demonstrates the relative insensitivity of cost to pay load.  
Additionally, this is borne out by an analysis of two freight trains, carrying different 
loads.  The unit cost of a train with a heavier payload of 5,600 tons is 10 percent lower 
than the unit cost of a relatively lighter train with a payload of 4,000 tons.  Moreover, 
(see Table 13) a relatively lighter Rajdhani with 17 coaches carrying 816 passengers has 
                                                 
 
 
 
71 The cost per passenger kilometer is 41 paise and the average weight of a passenger is assumed to be 60 
kilograms.  17 passengers x 60 kilograms = one ton.  Therefore, 17 traveler x 41 paise = 697 paise per ton 
kilometer). 
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a unit cost of 80 paise, while a heavier and longer case study train72 with 1,920 
passengers has a much lower unit cost of 32 paise.  In essence, heavier and longer trains 
have lower unit costs and thus are more profitable.  Given the insensitivity of cost to 
load and length, increasing the load and length of freight trains or the number of 
travelers per coach and number of coaches in a passenger train offers a significant 
opportunity.  While speaking to the Federal Open Market Committee, Alan Greenspan, 
the now retired chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of America, argued that a 
‘combination of rising capital efficiency and falling nominal unit labor costs’ has been 
fueling world economic growth in an era of uniquely low global inflation and interest 
rates (2007, p. 379).  What can the Railways learn from this observation?  At a macro 
level, given the rigidity in the cost structures, if the rate of growth in productivity 
outpaces the rate of inflation, then the unit cost of operations at nominal (current) prices 
is likely to fall.  During the period 1991–2004, the Railways’ input costs grew at 11 
percent while its volumes and asset productivity grew at five percent.  During the same 
period, its freight unit cost increased at six percent per annum at nominal (current) 
prices.  Although it would be inappropriate to assume a simple mathematical relation 
between the rates (11 – 5 = 6 percent), it is plausible to hypothesize that costs for the 
                                                 
 
 
 
72 This case study train accommodates more passengers in each coach (consider a chair-car coach instead 
of a sleeper-coach).  While the Rajdhani’s coach carries 47 travelers, each coach in the case study train 
carries about 80 passengers. 
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Railways are rising predominantly on account of inflationary pressures.  In this context, 
the macroeconomic stability of the 2000s, characterized by a benign inflation rate of four 
to five percent, provided a golden opportunity:  If volume growth was to exceed 
inflation rates, the unit cost was likely to decline at current prices, making the Railways 
profitable.   
 
Conclusion 
The narrow definition of the railroad as a monopoly missed out on the fact that the 
Railways operates in the fiercely competitive business of transportation.  A 
monopolistic mindset was doing much harm because it called on increasing prices in 
the segments that were apolitical but had no commercial space for price rises, further 
eroding the Railways’ competitiveness.  Rapid sustained economic growth in India and 
the upswing in the commodity cycle offered mega-opportunities in the transportation 
business.  Aversion to profitability and a lack of commercial orientation are 
incompatible with achieving institutional sustainability, and this frame of mind needed 
to change so as to face the threat from severe competition in the market place.  To 
deliver superior and compelling value, the Railways needed to manage both supply 
and demand side constraints and reorient its operations to be more market driven and 
address customer needs. 
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An important finding from this analysis is that the profitability of railroads is not 
simply a function of how much cross-subsidy the freight segment provides to the 
passengers, or air-conditioned class passengers provided in cross-subsidy to unreserved 
passenger segments.  Rather, profitability is a function of several variables over which 
the Railways functioning can be optimized.   
Profit (            ; instead Profit 
    
                                                                    
                                                                             
 
Railway expert groups and consultant reports attributed Indian Railways’ high 
fares to cross-subsidies between the Railways’ commercial and social obligations.  In 
contrast, the reformers discovered that the Railways’ fares, in the absence of cross-
subsidies and in comparison to other comparable Railways around the world, were 
very high.  This is because, in purchasing power parity terms, the Indian Railways unit 
costs were three times that of the Brazilian or Chinese Railways.  Thus, the fundamental 
problem was the high costs of operations and not cross-subsidies. The analysis of cost 
structures reveal that given the rigidity in the cost structures, the Railways could 
increase its profitability if it carried larger volumes.  To carry larger volumes the trains 
need to run faster, longer, and heavier.  And to achieve operational synergy the 
Railways requires a systematic approach.  Such a coordinated approach is at the core of 
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the supply-side constraints, if unmet demands are to be addressed.  How these insights 
were translated into billions of dollars will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 7:  Milking the Cow: Supply-side Strategy 
Introduction: Expanding Supply by Optimizing Asset Utilization 
The Minister was discussing the freight loading target for the forthcoming budget for 
the fiscal year 2005.  In 2004, the Railways had achieved a freight loading of 557 million 
tons.  The Railway Board was of the opinion that even a modest increase with a meager 
growth rate of 2.3 percent from the previous year to a target of 570 million tons would 
pose a challenge.  But, such a conservative proposal was not unusual because the 
compound annual growth rate of freight from 1992 to 1999 was 1.86 percent (Mohan, 
2001b, p. 16).  The Board members articulated their concern, “The railway assets are 
over utilized.  On some routes trains are running at 140 percent of capacity.”  
 Since the Board could not reach a consensus on the target for freight loading for 
the fiscal year in 2005, the Minister called for the concerned `file’.  The budgetary freight 
loading target for 2005 was set at 580 million tons, and an internal `mission 600 million 
tons’ was launched.  The Minister personally wrote to all General Managers in zonal 
Railways encouraging them to make every effort to honor the target.  With the very 
same people, network, and rolling stock, the Indian Railways not only achieved its 
stretched target but exceeded it by loading 602 million tons in 2005.  In Indian Railways’ 
150 year history, this 45 million ton of incremental loading was the highest ever in one 
fiscal year.  Since 2004, the Indian Railways has graduated from 557 million tons to 795 
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million tons in 2008.  This increment of 238 million tons in four years is significantly 
greater than the 155 million tons the Railways clocked over the entire 1990s.  Based on 
the present trend, the Railways is expected to record an additional loading of 300 
million73 tons during the five year period (2005–2009).  In comparison, this is more than 
the 280 million tons of incremental loading than that recorded over the previous two 
decades (1981–2001). 
What was it that enabled the Indian Railways to make this quantum leap from 10 
million tons to 60 million tons a year and from two to eight percent annual growth?  
Simply put, this is the result of a scale driven strategy of growth.  To generate larger 
volumes of throughput the Railways needed to manage both supply and demand-side 
constraints.  And the entire supply-side management can be attributed to three 
interventions—faster, longer, and heavier trains.  Each of these three elements is worth a 
billion dollars in profit.  Faster, longer, and heavier trains are economical.  They use the 
same resources—locomotives and crew, routes, wagons, and systems—and transport 
more freight.  Marginal costs are negligible, resulting in lower unit costs, but revenues 
increase substantially.  Efficiency is generally equated with heavy haul trains, led by the 
Rio Tinto in Western Australia. A typical Rio Tinto Pilbara train has a loaded weight of 
                                                 
 
 
 
73 The budgeted target for the fiscal year 2009 is 850 million tons and the internal target is of 870 million 
tons.  On achieving the budgetary target this year, the incremental loading over the five years (2005–2009) 
will be 293 million tons. 
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30,000 tons and length of over two kilometers (Railway Gazette, June 19, 2008).  In 
contrast, the Railways’ axle load74 was 20.32 tons, and a train with 58 wagons hauled a 
payload of over 3,364 tons75. 
The strategy was to improve yield per train because costs are sensitive to 
kilometers76 rather than passenger kilometers or ton kilometers.  This strategy 
amounted to refocusing the Railways’ comparative advantage to its basics.  
These attributes—namely, guiding (allowing faster speed), coupling (facilitates 
demand responsive lengths), and bearing (allowing heavy axle load)—were the 
motivations for inventing railroads in the mid-nineteenth century (Van der 
Meulen and Möller, 2006, p. 1). 
First, faster trains.  Here, faster does not refer to actual train speed  but to 
quicker turnaround—reduction in the time lapse between two successive 
loadings.  Indian Railways had 4,000 freight rakes in 2004.  With a seven day 
turnaround the Railways loaded 570 trains each day.  Reducing this turnaround 
                                                 
 
 
 
74 The design load bearing capacity of each of the four axles of a wagon 
75For several reasons Indian Railways’ freight trains are not comparable, yet there was a lot of scope for 
improvement.  Australia and Brazil were the front runners, carrying 44,000 tons and 30,000 tons 
respectively.  Chinese Railways were hauling trainloads of 20,0000 tons and railways in Russia, South 
Africa, and the United States, ran trainloads of 15,000 tons each (UIC, 2007). 
76 Train Kilometer is a ‘unit of measurement representing the movement’ of a train ‘over one kilometer’, 
adapted from United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Transport Division Database, 
www.unece.org. 
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time to five days enabled the Railways to run 800 trains a day, that is to say an 
additional 230 trains each day.  All else being constant, incremental revenue from these 
these trains alone amount to 10,000 crore rupees (US $2.3 billion). 
Second, run heavier trains.  In 2004, the railway was loading 30,000 wagons each 
day, which increased to 40,000 in 2008.  Adding an extra ton of load to each wagon 
translated to 40,000 additional tons or 15 million tons a year.  However, rather than just 
one ton, six tons were added to each wagon, which translated to 90 million tons of 
incremental load each year or 6,000 crore rupees (US $1.4 billion) in incremental 
revenue. 
Third, increasing the length of trains by attaching additional coaches in popular 
mail and express trains with long waitlists.  Each additional coach provided a crore in 
incremental revenue and 3,000 such coaches would translate into 3,000 crore rupees (US 
$0.7 billion) of additional revenue.  Similarly, extra wagons were added to covered and 
open freight trains—40 to 41 in the former and 58 to 59 in the latter.  
Three-fourths of the supply-side transformation of the Railways is explained by 
these three interventions.  If these interventions were so simple and intuitive, why were 
they not encashed earlier?  While all the strategic solutions emerged from within the 
bureaucracy of the Railways, and are in fact as old as the inception of railroads, they did 
not translate into action because of the lack of a system-wide approach and cross-
functional and spatial coordination.  Indian Railways is a mega-system, with several 
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sub-systems within systems.  Quite like a matryoshka, the Russian nested doll.  These 
systems are structured around various departments within the Railways and are 
interwoven and interdependent in complex ways.  Each technological intervention 
required collaboration across departments, zones, and divisions; and to expand the 
capacity of the system there was a need to work on several variables simultaneously so 
as to synergize policy initiatives.  To capture the complexity and the interrelationships 
between departments and with policies for each of the interventions consider the 
following.   
 
Faster Trains 
The turnaround time of a wagon is a function of several variables.  For reducing the 
turnaround time, either the speed of the trains had to be increased, or the non-travel 
time reduced, or both.  In 2004, the turnaround time was 7 days.  Of the seven days, two 
days were spent on travel77, and the remaining five days were spent on non-travel 
activities.  Among the three non-travel activities, handling—loading and unloading of 
goods—at terminals took two and a half days, train examination took another half day; 
and the residual two days were spent on miscellaneous tasks including maintenance, 
                                                 
 
 
 
77 Average distance travelled by a train—known as lead in rail parlance—was 660 kilometers in 2004.  As 
most trains returned empty and the average speed of a freight train was 24 kilometers per hour, of the 
seven days only 2.3 days, or 55 hours, were spent on the move. 
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asset failure, and so forth.  It was discovered that train speed had remained almost 
unchanged over the previous 30 years78.  After little success with increasing the speed of 
trains, an aggressive multi-pronged strategy was launched to reduce non-travel time 
spent on handling, train examination, and miscellaneous tasks. 
First, detention time was longer because of shorter platforms and restricted 
working hours at many terminals.  While the Railways ran trains day-and-night, at 
many goods sheds the handling was restricted to business hours—12 to 16 hours a day.  
The time allotted to customers for handling was nine hours, beyond which a penalty 
was charged.  Consider a typical terminal that operated between 6am and 6pm.  A train 
that arrived after 9am took nearly 24 hours to load, yet no penalty was applicable 
because the loading time could be computed only within working hours.  This problem 
was compounded by short loading lines and platforms—a legacy of the pre-Gujral 
practice of piecemeal loading.  Since several platforms were less than 685 meters long, 
trains had to be loaded in more than one installment, and each installment took up to 24 
hours. 
Therefore, it was decided to convert all goods terminals that handled more than 
ten rakes a month into round-the-clock working terminals with full-train-length 
                                                 
 
 
 
78 This is because increasing the speed of trains requires complex interventions, many of which could be 
achieved with massive investment in new tracks and signaling technology, that too in the long-term. 
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platforms.  Adequate funds were made available to carry out these works79.  The 
implementation was time bound and projects were to be completed within six 
These initiatives were coordinated with several operating and commercial 
interventions.  The preferential traffic schedule80 was modified to grant 
allotment of rakes to efficient customers—having full-length terminals, 
mechanized handling facilities, and round-the-clock working.  Demurrage and 
wharfage charges were increased, and with a few exceptions, the discretionary 
powers to waive these charges were revoked.  For efficient freight handling, 
incentives such as the engine-on-load scheme were introduced.  Unlike before, 
the engine would now wait if loading was completed quickly—3 to 6 hours.  In 
essence, efficiency was rewarded, and delays penalized. 
Second, a critical cause of delay was the examination of freight trains.  In a 
quest to reduce operational delays, Gujral had eliminated all en-route train 
examination.  Since then, most trains were examined prior to loading and the 
                                                 
 
 
 
79 The final decision was left to the zonal railways so as to consider local constraints.  Authority was 
devolved to general managers at zonal railways to make adjustments as per local conditions.  In some 
cases, land for extending platforms was not available, while in others, workers’ unions were resistant.  
Further, the extension of platforms was accompanied with improved illumination, construction of access 
roads, provision of electricity back-up generators, and provision of other infrastructure.   
80 This policy instrument sets the priority in which trains will be received at a terminal for loading and 
unloading or determines the right of way.  Customers are ranked into five categories in the following 
order—defense receives the first right of way, followed by relief and emergency freight services, 
programmed traffic for feeding power plants and steel factories, followed by cement and other 
customers.  
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validity of examination expired at the end of every trip—thus known as end-to-end 
examination.  Nonetheless, this examination was independent of the distance travelled 
by the train, be it 500 or 5,000 kilometers.  This contradiction in examination practices 
was pointed out by the Minister in his rustic humor.  In a meeting with the Railway 
Board he quipped, “Tumhari gadi ko toh steshan ka naam padhna aata hai.  Kyonki yeh toh 
station ka naam padh kar bimar padti hai” (your trains are literate; they seem to fall sick 
after reading the name of stations).  In contrast, for some trains, operating on a closed-
circuit with a home base, the validity expired after a specific number of kilometers were 
travelled.  These trains were examined after a couple of trips81.  Under this dualism 
nearly two thirds of trains were examined after every trip, while a third were under the 
efficient system based on distance travelled.  As a result, of the 600 trains loaded each 
day, over 300 of these were examined each day.  Conducting an examination along with 
delays in organizing locomotives absorbed about 15 hours.  Therefore, each day 4,500 
train hours or 188 train days—were spent examining and organizing trains.   
As part of the faster turnaround strategy, the train examination frequency was 
revised to reflect mileage and time lapse.  Examinations are conducted after every 4,500 
kilometers of travel or every 15 days, whichever is earlier.  This eliminated the need to 
examine trains at the end of every trip.  Further, the validity of the brake power 
                                                 
 
 
 
81 The examination was valid for 4,500 kilometers and the average round-trip was 1320 kilometers. 
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certificate—a service guarantee on braking efficiency for a specific braking 
distance of the train—for closed-circuit rakes has been increased from 4,500 to 
7,500 kilometers, or 35 days whichever is earlier.   
For the third category of non-travel time spent on miscellaneous 
activities—maintenance, locomotive breakdowns, traction change points, and so 
forth—constraints were mitigated. For example, there were several traction 
change points.  As early as the 1960s the links from Delhi to Kolkata had been 
upgraded to electric traction.  However, the feeder branch lines—the first and the 
last mile on the same route—were not electrified.  This resulted in 10 to 15 hour 
delays at the traction change points in organizing a diesel locomotive, crew, and 
other operational requirements.  In the past, the Railways neither had incentives 
for the customers to migrate to electric traction nor did the Railways electrify the 
last mile.  The transformation strategy identified this as a high priority 
intervention and the Railways electrified the last mile at its own expense, making 
large savings due to a reduction in delays.  The interval between two consecutive 
repair and maintenance activities was increased and delays were curtailed.  
These efficiency gains were made by reducing the delays in queuing for repairs, 
repairing sick (damaged) wagons, their release, and redeployment.  This further 
enhanced the supply of wagons and coaches.  Finally, information technology 
was deployed.  Through a freight operation information system, real-time rake 
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movements were monitored, resulting in efficient management of wagons.  Through a 
combination of these initiatives,82 deployed simultaneously, the wagon turnaround time 
reduced from seven to five days.  Similar efforts were made to reduce the turnaround 
time of coaches.  And rationalization of locomotive and crew linkages improved the 
availability of locomotives for freight trains. The reformers induced a sense of urgency, 
focus, aggressive chase (persistent follow-up), and swift execution of such high priority 
system improvements.  The entire intervention cost a few hundred crore rupees (about 
US $100 million), but it led to three billion dollars in incremental revenue.   
 
Longer Trains 
To run longer trains, of up to 24 coaches, during the 1990s the Railways procured higher 
horse-power locomotives at three times the cost of older and slower ones.  But, longer 
passenger trains required longer platforms.  However, the length of platforms was not 
increased to accommodate longer trains.  Thus, the Railways continued to run 
passenger trains with an average length of 14 coaches.  In a pithy statement, the 
Minister observed, “Indian Railways purchased a Jersey cow, but forgot to milk it.” 
                                                 
 
 
 
82 Many train examination points located at private terminals have been closed, validity of closed circuit 
brake power certificates (BPC) have been increased to 35 days and a new concept of premium end to end 
train examination with BPC validity of 15 days have been introduced.  Out turn from shops and sick lines 
have shown improvement on account of close and regular monitoring against specified target. 
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Therefore, platforms were lengthened on a priority basis, but here, demand 
followed supply.  Trains were lengthened first, followed by the decision and allocation 
of funds to extend all platforms along the route of the train, which were located in 
multiple zones requiring inter-zonal coordination.  As a result, while passengers did 
face inconvenience for a time, this induced imbalance created a sense of urgency for 
constructing the platform.   
Longer trains required more coaches; however, in the short-run producing more 
coaches to replace the existing stock was impossible.  Instead, more effective and 
efficient utilization of existing coaches seemed more promising.  This asset optimization 
was tackled through a three pronged strategy.  First, by reorganizing the allocation of 
coaches—detaching coaches from trains with less demand and adding them to trains 
with long waiting lists.  Second, like in the case of freight wagons discussed earlier, 
rationalization of examination and maintenance practices resulted in an enhanced 
availability of coaches—brake power certificates were issued for longer distances and 
intervals for routine maintenance were increased.  Third, the same rake composition 
was run more often.  While the former required responding to passenger demand on a 
seasonal basis, the latter required a standardization of coach compositions, so that the 
same train could be utilized for multiple trips within a day.  For example, consider an 
express train that arrives in Delhi at 9am and departs at 6pm; either this train is 
renamed and sets off as another express train or makes a short-distance interim trip.  
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Such changes required a standardization of the composition of coaches among a set of 
interchangeable trains.   
Once the coaches were available, their deployment was prioritized based on the 
potential yields.  A passenger profiling management system was developed that 
provided detailed demand information for each class of travel on each train.  All chief 
commercial managers in each zonal railway started compiling a daily status report of 
this demand model.  Profitable coaches, like the air-conditioned three-tier coaches and 
in-demand parcel vans on long distance trains, were given priority.  Similarly, the 
length of covered (BCN) and open (BOX-N) freight trains was increased from 40 to 41 
and from 58 to 59 wagons respectively.  This was achieved within the permissible 
moving dimension—namely, constraints imposed by the length of loop lines. 
 
Heavier Train Loads 
The Minister had been receiving complaints regarding overloading.  On September 27, 
2004, the Minister arrived at Muri where the entire train could be weighed on an in-
motion electronic-weighing bridge.  At the traffic control room in Rail Bhavan, the 
senior management coordinated a nation-wide weighing of trains.  Within four days 
(September 27–30, 2004) 101 freight trains had been weighed, and in most trains 
massive over loading—ranging between 2 to 15 tons per wagon—was discovered.  This 
revealed that the Railways was hauling the additional load anyway but was not getting 
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paid for it.  This practice was prevalent for years, but evidence of substantive damage to 
the tracks or rolling stock had hardly ever been reported. 
Apart from disciplinary action, the reformers sought to fix the problem in-
charge.  By increasing the axle load—that is to say load per wagon—they significantly 
reduced the room for overloading.  In the face of substantial skepticism, and some 
criticism, the Minister took a strong stand regarding the increase in axle load.  In the 
Minister’s words, “My mother has taught me to take the bull by the horns; catching it 
by the tail lands you with a kick in the face.”  Since safety issues are ‘political hot 
potatoes’ in the Railways, and increasing axle load raised the safety alarm, its 
implementation required a thorough assessment of risk and its mitigation.  This ability 
to take a calculated risk stemmed from the field inspection where the Minister had 
discovered the illegal overloading and the subsequent revelations of the extent of such 
practices across the Railways.  Moreover, over the 1990s, the Indian Railways invested 
six billion dollars in strengthening its track structure83.  During this period the Railways 
commissioned three independent assessments—CANAC Incorporated, a Savage 
                                                 
 
 
 
83The light-weight-weaker rails—90R 72 ultimate tensile strength —were replaced with heavier and 
stronger rails—60 kilograms with 90 ultimate tensile strength.  Further, the Railways had upgraded 
wooden and cast iron sleepers with higher quality pre-stressed concrete sleepers.  But upgrading of 
tracks was done in a piecemeal manner, requiring entire routes to operate on the basis of older track 
strength.  As recent as 2004, the high density Delhi-Mumbai and Delhi-Kolkata routes had its track 
segments built of the weaker and older rail, reconciling the trains on these routes to function once again 
on the lowest-common-denominator.   
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Company, experts from the Asian Development Bank, and an empirical assessment by 
the International Heavy Haul Association.  With some improvement84, these agencies 
certified the tracks fit for hauling 25 ton axle loads.  Yet, the Railways continued 
running trains based on an axle load of 20.30 tons.  What makes this intriguing is that as 
early as 1922, in some zonal Railways, on the older and weaker 90 pound rails, steam 
engines85 operated on axle loads of 22.5 and 23 tons.  The actual axle load was greater 
because of a hammer blow effect—emerging from a lack of wheel alignment 
(imbalances) that created greater stress on the tracks.  If weaker tracks could carry 
heavier loads why were the new and stronger tracks carrying only 20.3 ton axle loads86?  
Moreover, until the 1990s electrical locomotives of class WAG4 and WCG2, with 21.9 
and 22.5 ton axle loads respectively, were in operation. 
To operationalize the increased carrying capacity of wagons required an addition 
of four springs in each wagon; upgrading of tracks required improving the weaker 
segments that were built with the old rail and a revision of the stress calculations with 
                                                 
 
 
 
84As criteria for replacement of old tracks were based on the age of assets, several intermittent segments 
were waiting their time-out, however, due to this bottleneck; the entire new investment did not yield 
improved productivity. 
85 XE and XG class engines 
86This condition was compounded by the fact that the track modulus—the physics equations to calculate 
the permissible load on tracks—had not been revised despite significant improvements in the quality of 
tracks. 
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the track modulus87 to reflect the tensile strength of the new tracks.  Further, electronic 
weigh bridges and wagon impact load detectors (WILDs) were installed to monitor and 
prevent the over loading of trains.  Furthermore, higher horse power locomotives were 
assigned to haul heavier trains and specific commodities were identified and 
reclassified to allow heavier loading of wagons.  There were a host of complementary 
interventions.  Finally, a visit to the Safety Commissioner for approval was made. 
 
The Big Five—Supply-Side Management Strategy 
Five strategic themes emerge from the preceding discussion and constitute elements of 
radical incrementalism.  First, thinking beyond the resource constraint required 
leveraging resources such that the staff’s aspirations exceeded the resource endowment 
of the Railways.  Here innovation and asset optimization—as opposed to asset 
accumulation—were central.  The strategy was to fully utilize assets by running faster, 
longer, and heavier trains.  Secondly, coordination and cooperation required functional 
and spatial synergy as well as complementarities among various kinds of policy 
interventions, such that the sum of the parts was greater than the whole.  Third, filling 
operational gaps with strategic investments—low hanging fruits.  Low-cost, short-
                                                 
 
 
 
87 Track modulus, the physics equations used to calculate stress bearing capacity of tracks, had not been 
revised for decades. 
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gestation, high-return, and rapid-payback were the criteria for these investments.  
Fourth, aggressive chase and follow-up mechanisms built on monitoring systems, 
evaluation, and system feedback, facilitating swift implementation.  Fifth, a deliberative 
and calibrated approach where projects were first piloted to learn, revise, and then 
scale-up in a phased manner.  However, encompassing these themes was the 
organizational mission to champion inclusive reforms—the political mandate to 
transform the financial condition of the Indian Railways without burdening poor 
travelers and the Railways’ employees. 
 
Leveraging to Optimize 
Simply put, earlier, the Railways’ modest aspirations were dwarfed by its resources.  
Assets were underutilized and the system was slack, lumbering along like an old 
elephant.  The extent of slack in the Indian Railways is illustrated by a quick 
benchmarking with comparable Railways around the world.  All Class One freight 
railroads in the United States88 have about one-tenth the number of employees, but 
produce seven times the equivalent output of the Indian Railways (measured in ton-
kilometers).  Similarly, the Chinese Railways has the same length of network and only a 
                                                 
 
 
 
88 Association of American Railroads definition: U.S. Class I Railroads are line haul freight railroads with 
2006 operating revenue in excess of US $346.8 million. 
http://www.aar.org/~/media/AAR/Industry%20Info/Statistics.ashx 
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marginally larger proportion of double track compared to that of Indian Railway.  With 
twice the number of locomotives and wagons and the same passenger transportation 
output (measured in passenger kilometers), the Chinese Railways had five times the 
freight throughput of the Indian Railways (UIC, 2006).  While these Railways are not 
strictly comparable, the comparisons illustrate the extent of slack in the Indian 
Railways’ system. Moreover, the annual ritual of setting an output target was relaxed, if 
not sluggish, at two percent year-on-year growth.  This neither inspired action nor 
required significant efforts to achieve.  While the Railways consistently met targets, it 
simultaneously faced a financial crisis.   
 In 2005, when the annual targets were stretched from 2 percent to an ambitious 
yet realistic 8 percent, the options were limited.  Given the temporal and fiscal 
constraints, adding tracks and rolling-stock within the same year was practically 
impossible.  Thus, the central emphasis of the strategy gravitated towards getting more 
milk from the same cow, as opposed to buying more cows.  This approach to achieving 
stretched goals through resource leveraging is articulated by Hamel and Prahalad 
(1994, p. 172).  They characterize organizations based on the combination of ability to 
set stretched goals and leverage resources89. 
                                                 
 
 
 
89 Some illustrative ‘aspects of resource leveraging’ are summarized as converging, focusing, targeting, 
learning, borrowing, blending, balancing, recycling, co-opting, protecting, and expediting (p. 191). 
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Table 14.  Leverage and goals 
 Lack ability to leverage 
(unstrategic) 
Leverage resources  
(strategic) 
Slack goals 
(unambitious) 
Looser: Firm with neither 
ambition nor ability to 
leverage resources. 
Sleeper: Firm that has ‘nascent 
capacity’ to leverage resources but 
lacks ambition. 
Stretched goals 
(ambitious) 
Dreamer: Firm that thinks big 
but does not leverage its 
resources. 
Winner: Firm that stretches goals 
and achieves them through 
resource leveraging.  
 
In sum, the Indian Railway graduated from a low operational productivity to high 
productivity by deploying a combination of stretched targets, resource leverage to 
optimize existing assets, cross-functional team efforts, investing strategically, fostering 
strategic alliances, adopting a deliberative and calibrated approach, and finally chasing 
projects to swift completion to reap high returns.   
 
Functional and Spatial Coordination 
A prerequisite to operate faster, longer, and heavier trains was to adopt a systemic 
approach towards asset optimization.  As seen earlier, enhancing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the Railways required a complex multipronged approach because of the 
interdependent and interwoven structure of the Railways’ functioning.  For instance, 
consider decreasing the wagon turnaround time.  The single target of reducing wagon 
turnaround time from seven to five days required coordination among decisions 
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regarding investment, commercial, and operating policies as well as train maintenance, 
and examination practices. 
Mechanical and traffic departments had to collaborate for making train 
examination practices more efficient and less frequent.  Mechanical, electrical, and 
traffic departments had to collaborate to improve the availability of locomotives and 
crew by link rationalization, decreasing outage—that is the time spent on queuing, 
refurbishing in workshops, and release; and finally redeployment.  Civil and finance 
departments had to coordinate in order to determine cost effective investments for 
improving poor infrastructure, illumination, paving of access roads, equipment, and 
tools at the examination depots.  Finally, the traffic department had to modify the 
preferential traffic schedule and commercial policies concerning demurrage and 
wharfage charges.  In essence, mechanical, electrical, civil, finance, and traffic 
departments were required to work together as a cohesive team to reduce the 
turnaround time.  Further, spatial coordination and cooperation was required; beyond 
this various zonal Railways as well as divisions within zones had to cooperate and 
collaborate across spatial jurisdictions. 
The complexity and interdependence for a single initiative and the inherent 
tensions and conflicting departmental interests are captured in the case study of the 
taskforce on train examination, constituted on November 29, 2004.  This ‘Multi-
disciplinary Taskforce on Freight Train Examination Practices and Procedures’ was 
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composed of the directors of the mechanical and traffic departments, with the 
mechanical director as the convener.  The primary objective of the team was to 
‘reduce overall terminal detention for train examination’ without compromising 
safety.  After making field visits to some zonal Railways and seeking inputs from 
all zones, the taskforce submitted its report; however, the Railway Board got 
stuck in a stalemate.  Each department was concerned with its own perspective: 
while the traffic department wanted train examination practices revised so as to 
increase availability of rakes, the mechanical department’s primary concern was 
safety.  Some key requirements and concerns of the traffic and mechanical 
departments are summarized in Table 15.   
 
Table 15.  Requirements of the traffic department 
1. Increase operational flexibility and enhance availability of wagons. 
2. Replace the criteria for examination from trip based to mileage based. 
3. Increase validity of brake power certificates for close-circuit rakes from 4,500 to 6,000 
kilometers. 
4. Scrap the practice of post-tippling and loading train examination. 
  Concerns of the mechanical department 
1. Safety of trains is paramount. 
2. Lack of infrastructure and diagnostic facilities at examination and maintenance depots. 
3. Lack of operating discipline—close-circuit rakes get jumbled-up and trains run despite expired 
brake power certificates. 
4. Greater delays due to placement and release detentions (10 hours) rather than train examination 
per se (5 hours). 
 
Source: Taskforce on Train Examination Practices, Railway Board, Ministry of Railways, Government of India, 2008. 
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Yet, there was significant progress and both departments agreed on some central issues.  
First, wagons are the bread earning rolling-stock of the Railways, and therefore needed 
to be well maintained and optimally utilized.  Second, terminal detentions, both for 
train examination as well as loading and unloading, needed reduction.  Third, 
infrastructure facilities needed to be upgraded at maintenance and examination depots, 
plus goods sheds. 
 In order to break the gridlock and reconcile the differences the Minister issued 
the following memorandum to the Chairman Railway Board on March 18, 2005. 
“On account of difference of opinion between Traffic and Mechanical Directorates, the 
report of the Task Force on Train Examination has not yet been put up.  CRB (Chairman 
Railway Board) should try to resolve the differences keeping in view the following: 
 
(i) Train examination practices should aim at achieving the twin objectives of 
operational flexibility and enhanced availability of rakes without compromising safety 
of trains. 
(ii) The opportunity cost of these kinds of excessive detentions runs into hundreds 
of crore of rupees. 
(iii) The time spent on placement and release is two times more than the time spent 
on train examination per se.  This needs to be brought down by at least 50%. 
(iv) The validity of BPC (brake power certificate) in end to end rakes is decided not 
by quality of examination but by the distance travelled between two successive 
loadings.  This appears not only to be incongruous but also leads to examination of 
rakes after traveling very short distances in number of cases.  This needs to be 
examined and suitably addressed. 
(v) We should try to reap full benefits of massive investments made in procuring 
superior technology rolling stock.  We should also bench mark our train examination 
practices with the best in the world and make suitable investments in upgrading 
infrastructural facilities. 
We have achieved Mission 600 MT with excellent team effort and we should 
commit ourselves, rising above departmental considerations, to achieve Mission 
700 MT with the same team sprit.  This should be put up at the earliest and in any 
case not later than 11.04.2005.” 
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Source: Ministry of Railways, Government of India, 2008. 
 
Even after the above Memorandum, it took over two months to resolve differences 
between the departments.  Meanwhile, there was relentless follow-up, providing a 
sense of urgency.  In May 2005 the Railway Board decided to introduce a 
comprehensive premium end-to-end service wherein rakes were examined, not at the 
end of each trip but at a 12 day interval.  Decisions emerged through patient 
deliberation, diligent follow-up, and respect for mutual views in a democratic frame of 
mind, with the spirit of accommodation, as well as calibration leading to consensus, and 
eventually to action.  Funds were allocated for upgrading infrastructure facilities and 
the authority to procure spare parts was devolved to the field units.   
 Similar taskforces were constituted for increasing axle load, passenger 
amenities, leveraging information technology for productivity gains, tariff rationalization, 
freight incentive schemes, redesigning wagons and coaches, route-wise planning for high 
density networks, public-private partnership, and so on.  And in practice several initiatives 
were pursued at once, making the whole engagement a very intricate process.   
 The cross functional teams were constituted with members drawn from 
relevant departments. Each team had a convener appointed from a lead department 
whose expertise was directly aligned to the team’s objectives.  For example, the team on 
axle loads was convened by a civil engineering officer, tariff rationalization by a traffic 
officer, and train examination practices by a mechanical officer.  These task forces were 
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not new to the Railways.  However, the reformers upgraded these teams from merely 
deliberating on issues to decision making bodies.  The advisory reports produced by 
these teams were placed at the center of decision making and results were sought in a 
time-bound manner.  The teams pushed the Railways to question entrenched practices 
and initiate deep-rooted change. The experience of the Railways with cross-functional 
teams as a critical vehicle for leading change is not unique.  Similar experiences are 
shared by corporations as well.  
The cross-functional teams lie at the heart of what people call my method.  They were the key to 
the success of the Nissan Revival Plan, because they necessarily engaged those who would be 
charged with carrying out the plan. 
I knew that if I tried to impose change from the top down, I’d fail.  That’s why I decided to 
place a battery of cross-functional teams, or CFTs, at the center of the recovery effort.  I’d used 
CFTS on the other occasions when I was working to turn a company around, and I’d come to the 
conclusion that they were an extremely powerful tool for inducing executives to look beyond the 
functional and spatial boundaries of their direct responsibilities.  The idea was to tear down the 
walls, whether visible or invisible, that reduce a collective enterprise to a congregation of groups 
and tribes, each with their own language, their own values, their own interests (Ghosn and Ries, 
2005, p. 102–103). 
 
However, the distinction lies in the fact that while the Railways is a gigantic-
governmental organization, essentially a Ministry in the Government of India; while 
corporations like Nissan provide their management with the flexibility and autonomy 
associated with private corporations.   
 
Strategic Investments 
Various cross-functional teams on rolling stock identified and prioritized investments 
that were vital for ensuring effective utilization of rolling stock.  The recommended 
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inputs included increasing the length of the platform and goods terminals, upgrading 
and strengthening infrastructure at examination and maintenance depots, and 
deploying information technology for strengthening the freight and passenger 
operating information systems. 
All such investments are strategic in nature—short gestation (less than a 
year), low cost (few million dollars), rapid pay back (within a quarter), and high 
return (10 to 100 times initial investment).  By investing a few hundred crore 
rupees (a few million dollars) for increasing the length of the goods sheds and 
passenger platforms, illuminating and improving the access roads to goods 
sheds for round-the-clock operations, and upgrading and strengthening 
maintenance and examination depots, the Railways raked in manifold returns in 
the form of incremental income—a billion dollars in 2006 to three billion dollars 
in 2008. 
Likewise, the taskforce on throughput enhancement suggested the 
elimination of critical bottlenecks on high-density networks and congested 
junctions to augment network capacity.  All of this was achieved through route-
wise planning simulations, deploying information technology for optimization of 
the system.  The focus was to increase the overall capacity of critical routes by 
enhancing throughput per train, or augmenting the number of trains on a 
particular route, or both.  Consider the following four illustrations.  First, as 
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recently as 2004, the high density Delhi to Mumbai and Delhi to Kolkata routes—each 
stretching over 1,400 kilometers—had less than 100 kilometers of track built of the 
weaker-older track, requiring the trains on these routes to function once again on the 
lowest-common-denominator90 of 20.3 ton axle load.  However, due to this bottleneck, 
the overall investment could not yield results as axle load could not be increased due to 
these weak track segments.  When prioritized investments were made to upgrade these 
few miles of tracks it yielded enormous returns, because they unlocked billions of 
dollars in prior investment on track improvements.  Second, low-cost traffic facility 
works were pursued, namely improved signaling systems and so forth.  For instance, 
on all high density routes intermediate block signal systems are being installed at a cost 
of 250 crore rupees.  As a result the route capacity will improve by about ten percent.  
Third, time bound completion of ongoing doubling91 projects, and other throughput 
enhancing last mile projects were initiated on high-density networks.  Fourth, steps for 
decongesting busy junctions, by constructing bypasses, underpasses, flyovers, and 
                                                 
 
 
 
90Railway had upgraded cast-iron sleepers with higher quality pre-stressed concrete sleepers.  Further, 
the light-weight-weaker rails—90R 72 ultimate tensile strength—were replaced with heavier and stronger 
rails—60 kilograms with 90 ultimate tensile strength.  But upgrading of tracks was not done for the entire 
route. Some segments were waiting their time-out because replacements were made based on the age of 
assets.  This required entre routes to operate on the basis of older tracks.   
91Doubling refers to laying a second railway track along an existing route.  Likewise, a third track is 
referred to as tripling and so on. 
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crossovers, ameliorating constraints at goods sheds and coaching terminals were 
initiated.   
 In essence, the strategy made a clean departure from the past routine.  Earlier, 
the emphasis was on acquiring new rolling stock and building tracks as opposed to 
maintaining the existing half a trillion dollars worth of capital stock92, and utilizing it 
effectively. This obsession with allocation, expenditure, procurement, and construction, 
is not solely a public sector malady.  Hamel and Prahalad (1994) articulate this concern 
in the context of private corporations—IBM, General Motors, and Phillips—as well: 
[T]he resource allocation task of top management has received too much attention when 
compared to the task of resource leverage.  . . . [T]here has been relatively little emphasis put on 
top management’s role in accumulating and orchestrating a firm’s resources.  . . .[W]hatever the 
efficiency of resource allocation, sooner or later, in every industry, the battle revolves around the 
capacity to leverage resources rather than the capacity to outspend rivals (p. 174). 
In contrast, the primary focus of this investment strategy has been to get more from the 
existing assets by effective and efficient utilization.  This has been achieved through 
decongesting the network, reducing transit time, and enhancing the utilization of 
rolling stock to increase the throughput of traffic (Budget Speech, 2008, p. 3).  
Previously, there was an overall liquidity constraint, and the abovementioned works 
                                                 
 
 
 
92 The Railways’ total rolling stock is worth US $25 billion and the capital invested in wagons is a 
whopping 30,000 crore rupees (US $7 billion), locomotives worth 50,000 crore (US $12 billion) and 
coaches worth another 40,000 crore (US $9 billion).  But, in the past investment focused on acquiring new 
assets: it spent 11,000 crore rupees acquiring new assets in 2005.  While in the same year, Indian Railway 
spent a paltry 14 crore rupees (US $3.3 million) on capital works for upgrading infrastructure for 
maintaining these wagons.  
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were not granted adequate priority and resources.  The reformers ensured that there 
were no liquidity constraints for investments with the above characteristics, which were 
accorded high-priority.  Initially, priority was granted to low-cost projects and, as the 
Railways surplus increased, liquidity constraints were relaxed for all throughput 
enhancement projects.  Additionally, instead of an annual  ritual, such projects are 
sanctioned throughout the year, further facilitating timely improvements.  To facilitate 
swift action, the authority to sanction small works, award contracts, and finalize 
estimates was devolved to the front-line—Divisional Railway Managers and General 
Managers do not need to seek approval from the Railway Board. 
Fostering Strategic Alliances 
To meet soaring wagon demands, strategic alliances were forged.  Customers were 
invited to lend a helping hand.  Through the opening up of container trains to private 
players—other than the Railway-owned container corporation (CONCOR)—investment 
worth another 1,000 crore rupees (quarter of a billion dollars) poured in.  From 
February 2006 to mid-2008, when these concession agreements were signed, 15 new 
private firms entered the market and added 70 new container trains—this alone 
constitutes half of all the container trains added over the last 20 years by CONCOR.  
Moreover, several inland container depots that act as dry docks are under construction, 
of which two have been built and are in operation and another five were scheduled to 
resume operation in 2009, while a dozen are in various stages of completion. 
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Through a wagon investment scheme that guaranteed availability of rakes to 
wagon owners, 3,000 crore rupees (three-forth of a billion dollars) worth of rolling stock 
was leveraged from the market.  Not only did these augment supply, they also 
unleashed innovation where the private sector is experimenting with the production of 
more efficient models of wagons.  The role of the Railways’ research design and 
standard’s organization (RDSO) has evolved from the sole designer and certifier of 
standards to that of assessing and monitoring quality and safety.  Additional schemes, 
like a matching grant from the Railways for construction of private railway sidings and 
public-private partnerships for port connectivity—in some cases build-operate-and 
transfer arrangements—were contracted. 
Through strategic alliances with ancillary units the Railways ramped up 
production from 100 to 250 locomotives a year, for both diesel and electric engines.  In-
house production focused on core strengths—that is only those production aspects that 
could not be procured from sub-contractors in ancillary units.  This outsourcing was 
popular among the management and the labor unions alike because it was done only 
after maximizing the number of shifts for in-house production, as well as freeing up 
overtime rules to allow maximum employment for and complete participation of 
existing labor.  Further, production cost per unit declined as the same staff and 
overheads were distributed over more output.  In essence, the focus of strategic 
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arrangements was to fostering win-win alliances where in-house capabilities were 
insufficient to meet supply side constraints.   
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Deliberative and Calibrated Approach 
A first step towards reducing train examination time was reducing the frequency of 
examination.  Progress on this initiative was calibrated and deliberative as seen in Table 
16.   
Table 16.  Calibrated approach to reducing train examination time 
Timeline Incremental change in examination practice 
October 
2004 
Validity of 6,000 kilometers or 20 days close-circuit rakes introduced at ‘A’ category closed-
circuit bases. 
May 2005 Premium end-to-end rakes with 10+2 days validity introduced for BCN wagons. 
February 
2006 
7,500 kilometers or 30 days close-circuit rakes introduced at select 7 close-circuit bases. 
April 2006 Premium end-to-end rakes with validity of 12+3 days introduced at selected 40 examination 
points.  Premium pattern introduced for other wagons also like BOXN, BOST, BTPN, 
BOBRN, and the like. 
January 
2007 
Validity of 7,500 kilometers or 30 days close-circuit rakes extended to 35 days.  7,500 
kilometers or 35 days close-circuit rakes extended to 10 close-circuit bases.  Premium pattern 
permitted for all air-brake-stock except BRN, BTPGLN, BLC, BFN, and departmental stock. 
 
April 2007 Premium pattern extended to total 90 examination points.  Since then, further progress has 
been made. 
Source: Taskforce on Train Examination Practices, Railway Board, Ministry of Railways, Government of 
India, 2008. 
 
Similarly, the reformers adopted a calibrated and incremental approach towards 
increasing axle load.  Initially, heavier trains were run on non-passenger routes, with 
considerations given to safety, track structure, commodity hauled, and potential to 
scale-up the operations for a sub-set of high demand commodities like iron-ore and 
coal.  A more complex example of this approach is presented in Annex 5; the 45 rate 
circulars issued over four years are testament to the gradual increase in the axle load on 
selected routes for some bulk commodities. 
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This deliberative and calibrated approach focused on piloting initiatives to learn, 
revise, and finally scale-up.  This approach was adopted for several reasons.  First, 
making changes in small increments faced less resistance in a cautious and at times risk-
averse organization.  Second, early successes, as in the case of an improvement in train 
examination practice, gave the staff confidence allowing for a gradual scaling-up.  
Third, mistakes, when they occurred, like in the case when subcontracting the cleaning 
of a railway stations met with the disapproval of unions, had small fall-outs.  
Incrementalism allowed for hedging risks and taking immediate corrective measures, 
especially in politically contentious and institutionally critical issues like safety and 
labor.  Further, risk to return tradeoffs were considered.  Initiatives with low-risk and 
high-returns were accorded priority.  For instance, over a four year period only one-
third of the total route kilometers were gradually approved for CC+8 heavy axle load 
freight trains, but these routes carry two-third of the traffic.  Finally, incremental change 
needed small amounts of investment up-front, making it affordable for a fiscally 
constrained railway.  In sum, a calibrated and deliberative approach allowed for 
consistent change, ensuring broad based support because risks were minimized, reward 
were quick, and boosted staff confidence. 
 
Chase—Persistent Follow-up for Implementation 
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Chase, the mentality of a hungry tiger on the hunt is an essential ingredient of the 
supply side reforms.  Analogous to the tiger, the senior management identify new 
policy targets, chase, and grab them93.  The chase has several elements.  First, among 
these was setting stretched targets.  Once targets were set, the staff articulated the 
                                                 
 
 
 
93New policy initiatives—increasing axle load, rationalizing train examination practices, round-the-clock 
working at freight terminals, route-wise planning, traction change points, incremental revenue, and so 
forth—require a chase tool-kit.  In the case of axle load increase, first a stretched target was set—mission 
600 million ton, internal target for 2006.  However, the issue of enhancing axle load began with the 
Minister’s surprise inspection at Danapur where overloading was identified.  As a follow-up of that visit 
and the related fall-out, the Minister issued a memorandum.  This first note was personally signed by the 
‘MR’ as the Minister for Railways is known.  In the note, not only were priority issues identified, but the 
Board was also instructed to respond within a specific time period of 2 weeks.  Further, to chase the issue, 
as the Minister’s office sought past research on axle load and these were forwarded to the Railway Board, 
and each supplementary note acted as a reminder.  For instance, the office of the Minister forwarded, 
supplementary notes on the 22 and 23 ton axle load steam locomotives that operated in 1922 on weaker 
tracks.  This was followed with the CANAC Incorporated, Asian Development Bank, and International 
Heavy Haul Association’s assessments on clearance of the railway tracks for 29 and 30 ton axle load.  Still 
the file on axle load was not returned to the Minister.  Therefore, a follow-up meeting with the Minister 
was convened, where the agenda required an update on the progress made on increasing axle load.   
Each individual member of the taskforce on increasing axle load was contacted for 
routine updates on the progress.  Feedback from multiple members provided a sense of the 
debate and reasons for the delay.  Irrespective of the hierarchy staff inputs were solicited.  In 
many instances junior staff were most receptive to provide feedback on the obstacles and 
departmental concerns.  Keeping in mind the delicate relationships within the departmental 
hierarchy, this feedback was diploid to nag the departmental heads—an approach of 
management by nagging.  If the axle load issues were resolved by the time the meeting with the 
Minister was schedule, then the meeting would be cancelled.  However, in this case the meeting 
was necessary.  On the day of the meeting the Minister was provided a comprehensive multi-
departmental view on the obstacles to increasing axle load.  And the meeting with the Minister 
broke the gridlock and the first decision on increasing axle load by two tons on one route on one 
train was taken.  While the initial policy note had 34 routes under consideration, the approval of 
two routes was a success.  As soon as these two routes were approved, the next file chased the 
remaining 32 routes.  After relentless pursuit, and 45 circulars on axle load, most routes carrying 
heavy bulk commodities allow freight trains to carrying capacity plus six tons per wagon. 
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needed inputs to achieve the target.  Here stretch and leverage are complementary and 
the latter is inspired by the former. 
Second, pursue the set of strategic inputs simultaneously.  Increasing axle load 
load required collaborative inputs from several departments.  Here the principle 
driving chase was the spirit behind Robert Bruce and the spider, “Try, try, try again, till 
again, till you succeed.”  This management by nagging toolkit consisted of the 
following.  Memos with clear objectives were issued and directed to all relevant 
departmental heads, seeking a response in a pre-specified and realistic timeframe.  
timeframe.  Critical decision memos were stamped with “top priority” in red ink, 
adding to the sense of urgency.  Meanwhile, there was relentless follow-up over the 
the phone, chasing the file from one desk to another—from the Director, to his Joint 
Joint Secretary, further up to the Additional Secretary, then finally to the Board 
member.  While the file moves five levels down in the Railway Board, it then finds its 
finds its way up the same order, making it a ten-step and tedious process.  Further, this 
Further, this was done across the concerned departments of mechanical, electrical, civil, 
electrical, civil, traffic, and finance.  For each revision on axle load the files go through a 
through a similar process.  There were over 45 rate circulars issued on the matter, the 
the files on increasing axle load moved through ten desks in each of the five 
departments, thereby ultimately requiring inputs and approvals at 2,250 desks.  
Moreover, in many cases inputs were sought from all the 16 zonal Railways, and at 
247 
 
times this involved field visits.  Just one input of the axle load required chasing 
over 2,000 desks in four years, in addition to chasing all of the zonal Railways, 
which in turn chased hundreds of field units.  Likewise, to reduce wagon 
turnaround time, a gigantic coordination and follow-up effort was mounted so 
that over 20 inputs from several departments could be simultaneously solicited.  
On several occasions departments had differences and this resulted in gridlock.  
In response, the reformers organized meetings to facilitate exchange of views, 
meanwhile persistently following up with memos and supplementary 
information.  Then at a more personal level, the view points of all factions were 
heard, files where chased on the phone, attempts were made to solve issues 
informally over tea, or at the level of the Board, and finally if nothing worked, 
feedback and decisions were sought to meet the annual budget deadline.  The 
complexity associated in running faster, longer, and heavier trains with 
hundreds of cross-functional and spatial inputs across the bureaucratic web was 
enormous.  This was one of the primary constraints that had inhibited action in 
the past. 
Third, timing, because in this context when to act is of essence.  The most 
critical period among these is the annual railway budget that is recognized in the 
Railway as a rigid deadline.  There are also two or three supplementary budget 
deadlines, as well as general manager’s conferences, and monthly board 
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meetings.  Each such deadline was deployed to focus the attention of the senior 
management in order to resolve differences and make critical decisions.  Further, senior 
officers were the most receptive to new ideas and other inputs prior to their promotions 
and during the early days of their appointment.  Put simply, high priority events, 
entirely based on the institutional culture and psyche of the organization, were 
leveraged to meet deadlines for deliverables.  Thus, choosing when to raise the next 
generation of policy reforms was as important as identifying and prioritizing initiatives.   
Fourth, change was induced by demand.  By implementing decisions and 
following up with requisite inputs, a sense of urgency was created.  For example, first 
the train length was extended, then platforms were lengthened.  The interim imbalance 
created by the extra length of the train that did not have access to a platform 
encouraged divisional managers to act swiftly to extend the platforms.  Similarly, axle 
load was increased before the weaker segments of tracks were replaced.  In the interim 
the trains were operated with speed restrictions on the weaker track segment.  Not only 
did these demand responsive approaches create a sense of urgency and induce the 
system to play catch-up, they also allowed for incremental earnings to precede 
incremental investment.  
Finally, in contrast to the tedious process of decision making, implementation 
was surprisingly swift.  For certain decisions that translate directly into policy 
directives, not much follow-up was required.  Examples of such directives are the rate 
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circular on tariff changes, change in axle load, or the circular on revised train 
examination practices, which by default became effective from the date specified 
in the notification—as soon as the decision was communicated to the zonal 
Railways, it resulted in an instantaneous implementation of the new practices. 
Other decisions that required actual construction, like overcoming 
terminal constraints and removing network bottlenecks, were done in a timely 
manner, partially because funds were allocated, decision making authority 
devolved, and demand induced.  But more importantly speedy implementation 
resulted from the Railways’ strong execution capabilities that rest on the 
shoulders of its technological prowess and follow-up mechanisms.  Further, to 
leverage this sophisticated monitoring and evaluation system, the reformers 
integrated critical budgetary missions and reform targets into the existing 
system.  In this context, the reforms borrowed lessons from the experience of 
reforming Nissan, where the CEO, Carlos Ghosn observed that,  
. . . as long as management gives clear directions that everyone understands, as long as you’ve got 
a clear, thoroughly explained strategy, you don’t need to worry too much about how well and how 
fast it’s carried out.  Don’t get me wrong, you still have to expend a lot of time and energy, but it’s 
remarkable how execution falls into place (Ghosn and Ries, 2005, p. 210).   
 
Parsing Supply—Long-Term and the Interim 
The essence of the supply strategy’s temporal sequencing is captured in the Railway 
budget speech for fiscal year 2008 (Indian Railways, 2007).   
The growing demand for transportation can only be met through a harmonious blend of short-term 
and long-term policies.  Our short-term policy of investing in low-cost high-return projects has 
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been successful in eliminating network bottlenecks and in ensuring effective utilization of rolling 
stock.  Alongside a twin mid-term and long-term investment strategy will be adopted to enhance 
productivity through, modernization and technological upgradation on the one hand and 
enhancement of capacity of the network and rolling stock on the other (p. 12). 
As seen above, the emphasis of this strategy is to augment capacity by a combination of 
expanding the railway network and increasing productivity by deploying technology.  
Additionally, with the improved financial condition of the Railways, capital investment 
had increased from 11,000 crore rupees in 2004 to 28,000 in 2008, implying a compound 
annual growth rate of 30 percent.  In particular, the annual production of rolling stock 
has been ramped up from 6,300 to 14,000 wagons a year in 2008.  Equally, diesel as well 
as electric locomotive production had more than doubled from 116 to 222 and 86 to 200 
a year respectively. 
Increase in allocations and quantities were also accompanied by improvements 
in quality.  The new rolling stock is technologically superior and has been redesigned to 
enhance the capacity of each new wagon, locomotive, and coach.  The production of old 
low horse-power diesel and electric locomotives is being phased out over a five year 
period ending in 2011—this drawn-out phasing is not due to liquidity constraints but 
due to the need to test and develop a reliable and cost-effective supply-chain of vendors 
for the new technology.  Meanwhile, annual production of the new generation diesel 
locomotives has been ramped-up from 24 to 59 and electric engines from 16 to 55.  
Similarly, coaches have been redesigned to accommodate additional seats and better 
amenities for passengers; meanwhile the existing stock has been retrofitted to 
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incorporate these improvements, particularly in the air-conditioned classes.  The 
improved capacity of redesigned wagons is captured in the 2008–2009 railway budget 
speech (Ministry of Railways, 2008, February 26).  
With the objective of increasing the carrying capacity, from 2008–09 onwards manufacture of 20.3 
ton axle load BCN and BOXN wagons will be stopped and only 22.9 ton axle load stainless steel 
wagons will be manufactured.  The newly designed stainless steel BCN wagon has a lower tare 
weight.  Due to the shorter length of these wagons, instead of 40 wagons, the BCN wagon train 
will now accommodate 58 wagons, like BOXN wagons trains.  Thus, the payload of the BCN 
trains will increase by 78% from 2,300 tons to 4,100 tons.  Similarly, the payload of open wagon 
trains will increase by 22% to 4,100 tons.  We have achieved this by reducing the tare weight and 
increasing the width and height of the wagon (p. 18). 
See Table 17 and Figure 18 for a comparison between the old and new wagons and their 
payload capacities94.   
Table 17.  Carrying capacity of old and new covered wagons (BCN) 
 Old Wagon New wagon Old Rake New Rake 
Tare weight perwagon 24.55 tons 20.8 () tons   
Pay load per wagon 58.6 tons 70.6 () tons 2360 tons 4095 tons 
Volumetric capacity per wagon 103.4  92.5 ()m3 4550 m3 5365 m3 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
94Net result, the improved BCN and Box-N rakes will carry a payload of 4,100 tons, an increase of 78 
percent from the previous 2,300 tons.  Some cases, the train length has been extended from 40 to 58 
wagons, axle load has been increased from 20.3 tons to 22.9 tons and tare weight reduced by four tons.  
For BOX-N wagons the capacity had been enhanced by 22 percent to 4,100 tons.   
252 
 
Figure 19.  Old and new wagons 
 
 
 
Further details of redesigned wagons are provided in Annex 6.  Likewise in the 
passenger segment, the capacity of air-conditioned three-tier coaches has been increased 
from 64 to 72, air-conditioned-chair-car from 66 to 102, air-conditioned first-class from 
18 to 22, air-conditioned two-tier from 46 to 52, and for the second-class sleeper coach 
from 72 to 84.  Additionally, there is an effort to enhance throughput by route-wise 
planning and development of the track network, which were articulated in the railway 
budget 2008–2009 (Ministry of Railway, 2008, February 26). 
Sir, more than 75% of Railways’ goods traffic moves on about 20,000 kilometer of the Railways’ 
high density network, (namely) coal and iron ore routes, and port connectivity railway lines.  Many 
of these routes are fully saturated and capacity utilization is in excess of 100%.  . . . An investment 
of about rupees 75,000 crore (US $17.4 billion) will be made over the next seven years to augment 
line capacity on these routes.  Route-wise works will be undertaken in a phased manner including 
124 works of doubling, third and fourth-lines, bypasses, flyover, crossing stations, intermediate 
block signaling, automatic signaling works, and yard remodeling.  . . . 104 throughput 
enhancement works in progress would be completed over the next two years.  This entire network 
will be provided with IBS (intermediate block signaling) by March 2009 (p. 12–13). 
 
 
    
 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
` 
 
 
Old Wagon 
New Wagon with 
higher carrying 
capacity 
253 
 
Finally, through dedicated-freight corridors, multi-modal logistics parks, ‘world-class’ 
railway stations, and five rolling-stock factories, the long-term strategy is to anticipate 
and provide for future growth needs.  The process for enhancement of throughput has 
been simplified—both approval and execution of these projects will require less time 
than other projects. 
 
Conclusion 
Through this supply-side management, the Indian Railways has grown consistently at 
eight percent annually.  This growth is due less to an increase in the rolling-stock or 
railway network and more to productivity gains from higher efficiency and effective 
utilization.  Meanwhile, most of this period 2004–2008, has been characterized by 
macroeconomic stability with inflation hovering between 4 to 6 percent and relatively 
low interest rates95.  At real (constant) prices the Railways’ unit cost has been declining 
since Indian independence in 1947.  But in a historic first, even at nominal (current) 
prices the Railways’ unit cost declined due to productivity growth rates outpacing the 
rate of inflation.  Therefore the freight unit cost declined 12 percent from 61 paise a ton 
in 2001 to 54 paise at current prices in 2008.  The unit revenue from the freight business 
                                                 
 
 
 
95The recent spike in inflation and interest rates is a new trend and is affecting the unit costs this fiscal 
year.  This issue is discussed in substantial detail in chapter 7 where alleged and real threats to 
sustainability are addressed.  
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segment was 74 paise in 2001, and the profit margins were around 21 percent.  With a 
seven paise decline in unit costs the profit margin has nearly doubled from 21 percent 
in 2001 to 37 percent in 2008.  In the same period, the unit cost per passenger kilometer 
remained almost constant, increasing marginally from 38 paise to 39 paise.  This 
significant improvement resulted from a supply strategy to increase volumes to reduce 
unit cost.  As will be articulated in the following chapter, this provided substantial 
room for demand responsive pricing to increase market share and expand profit 
margins.  The discussion of the supply-side preceded demand-side analysis because 
several analysts have argued that a large proportion of the freight traffic has been lost, 
not because of lack of demand, but due to capacity constraints.  In this regard, the 
RITES Report (1998, p. 2.24) argues that matching capacity to requirements is critical, “In 
fact, wagons and locomotives are in short supply, most of the major routes are working 
to near saturation level of capacity and demand for rail movement is ahead of supply 
(p. 2.24).”  However, once supply-side management increased the availability of 
wagons and coaches and reduced other supply constraints, a dynamic and differential 
pricing policy, along with a market driven and customer centric response was required.  
The details of this demand-side strategy are the concerns of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8:  Service with a Smile: Demand-Side Strategy 
Introduction 
The essence of the demand-side strategy is best captured in Mahatma Gandhi’s observation on 
his visit to the Indian Merchant Chamber, Mumbai sometime in the early part of the 20th 
century.  
A customer is the most important visitor on our premises.  He is not dependent on us. We are 
dependent on him.  He is not an interruption of our work. He is the purpose of it.  He is not an 
outsider to our business. He is part of it.  We are not doing him a favour by serving him.  He is 
doing us a favour by giving us the opportunity to do so. 
 
Like many things in the Mahatma’s life, this too is hard to emulate, but the Railways has made a 
sincere attempt to reinvent itself as a customer centered organization.  This chapter provides 
insight into the Indian Railways’ struggle to transform from a statist and monopolistic approach 
to customers to that of a demand responsive—dynamic, differential, and market-driven—
customer-focused organization. 
 
Looking in the Wrong Place—Assessing Demand-Side Constraints 
In order to respond to customers’ needs, the Railways began simplification and rationalization 
of its pricing policy.  In steel, where the Railways had been losing market share, freight charges 
were reduced by about 22 percent from class 230 to 180.  Following this, the Railways 
introduced other incentives.  Incremental freight traffic earnings, in comparison to the previous 
year, received a 15 percent discount and authority to approve these discounts was devolved to 
the field-units.  Customers were offered loyalty discounts.  Loyalty towards the Railways was 
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measured by the rail coefficient—namely, Railways’ share of the total cargo of a given 
commodity with a particular customer.  Additionally, major customers were also rewarded 
with quantity based discounts.  On the pricing front, all conventional approaches had been 
exhausted.  Despite these efforts, the rail coefficient for steel kept declining from 67 percent in 
1991 to 35 percent in 2005.  Steel fright market share was lost mainly to trucks.  Counter-
intuitively, this decline occurred despite far lower rail fares in comparison to truckers.  With the 
objective of initiating dialogue, seeking customer feedback, and becoming demand responsive, 
the Minister constituted a committee of the major freight customers under his chairmanship.  In 
one such meeting the Minister expressed his frustration: “Hum kiraya aur kitna ghatayen?  Free kar 
den kya?” (By how much more should we reduce the fare?  Should we make it free-of-charge?) 
 The CEO of a mega-steel corporation retorted: “You are looking in the wrong place.”  He 
continued, “The Railways provides a station-to-station service for transportation of steel and the 
incidental costs associated with rail transport are very high due to multiple handling costs, 
truck transport costs at both ends, warehousing, increased inventory, and so forth.  And these 
costs outweigh the savings accruing from cheaper rail charges because rail freight is a fraction 
of the total door-to-door logistics costs for my steel company.  Therefore, for customers like me, 
to opt for Railways’ services will require you to offer small batch consignments.” 
 The Railway Board leapt in defense, “The Indian Railway cannot return to being a 
transporter of piecemeal traffic, carrying ten tons of cargo per customer like the truckers do.”  
The representatives of the steel industry were quick to reply, “No, we just need half-train loads 
instead of full train loads (that is 2,000 tons)”.  The Minister intervened in the affirmative, “We 
grant you that, now will you shift your freight to the Railways?”  “Not really”, came the reply, 
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“we also need to unload at multiple locations on the way.” “Granted”, responded the Minister.  
And other CEOs of the steel and cement companies chimed in, “How much will you charge for 
these services?”  The Minister replied, “Gratis, this is my gift to you.”  Once the Railways 
started accepting half train loads and providing the option to unload in a combination of 
stations en route96, the Railways succeeded in arresting and then reversing a 60 year old trend of 
a declining rail coefficient for steel.  Between 2005 and 2008, the rail coefficient for steel traffic 
increased from 35 to 45 percent and for cement from 41 to 45 percent.  This reversal was due to a 
combination of customer focused and market driven policies tailored to the customers’ 
requirements.  
 Quintessentially, through such client engagements, the Railways had learned a basic 
principle of the market:  Market share is to be fought and won in the market place.  To win this 
battle consistently, the customer should be offered superior and compelling value on a 
continuing basis.  The ultimate measure of value for the Railways’ services was customer 
satisfaction.  To create this value, the Railways has transformed from an introspective 
organization where the emphasis was on process and procedure, to one that is externally 
oriented with emphasis on the market and the customer.  But succeeding once does not mean 
that the customer can be taken for granted.  The Railways learned this lesson the hard way.  In 
the fiscal year 2007, the Railways was over confident after gaining market share in steel and 
                                                 
 
 
 
96 Both these services have certain temporal, spatial and other conditions that circumscribe the benefits of 
these new products to the customers that the Railways needs to offer added value in order to retain or 
regain. 
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cement.  In this exuberance they introduced a five percent peak-season surcharge for the above-
mentioned new services.  In response, the customers for steel and cement voted with their feet 
and the Railways recorded negative growth in the freight for these commodities97 in April 2007. 
However, the Railway Board was resistant to any hasty revision: “How can we change 
policies announced in the Budget without waiting for its approval”.  “There has to be some 
stability, uniformity, and consistency in our pricing policies.”  Their concerns were noted by the 
reformers who recognized that the Railway’s pricing policies cannot be as volatile as the 
marketplace; however, a degree of dynamism was essential.   
Soon after the budget was approved by the parliament on May 9, 2007, the Minister 
invited the customers for a meeting at the Railway museum, where the customers complained 
about the surcharge imposed on the mini-rakes and ‘two-point’ rakes as well as the incremental 
freight discount policy, “With respect to incremental freight, how can we provide a quantum 
increase year-on-year?  Why don't you assess the incremental freight discount from the base 
year of 2006?” 
In response98, the Minister announced the revocation of the surcharge and revised the 
incremental freight discount policy with a fixed base year of 2006. However, damage had been 
done.  The Railways lost traffic in May and then again in June, leading to poor freight loading in 
the first quarter.  This was followed by the lean-season.  There was a lag due to existing freight 
                                                 
 
 
 
97Since the Railways monitors the daily loading of cement and steel the decline was even more obvious.   
98The reformers had deliberated on these issues earlier, and the Railway Board had approved 
modifications in the policy.  Working with consensus was essential to functioning in a mega-bureaucracy.   
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agreements between customers and alternative service providers.  But with the introduction of 
a lean-season discount and a revision of the incentive policies the customers began trickling 
back. 
It would be misleading to draw the conclusion that all customer demands were 
addressed.  Accommodations were made only where demand was relatively elastic and the 
threat of losing the customer to alternate modes was real.  Thus, the Railways’ reformers were 
selective in their response.  For instance, in the above customer meeting, the corporate 
representatives complained about two things.  First, about fare-hikes, namely the 50 percent 
increase in freight rates for iron ore as well as other minerals, and 33 percent increase in food 
grains and fertilizer freight charges.  Second, termination of the minimum-weight condition.  
Now they had to pay for loads that they did not transport.  While wagons could carry only 60 
tons of urea, the customers were being charged the full carrying capacity of the wagon, which is 
64 tons.  But, these concerns were not addressed because despite hefty increases in freight 
charges and the problem of dead weight in urea, these customers had not opted out.  As seen in 
Chapter 6, the Railways is a door-to-door transporter in most of these market segments—like 
iron ore and coke—with negligible incidental costs.  And rail freight costs over 50 percent less 
than the comparable road freight.  Likewise, the customers demanded discounts on total load 
all year round, as opposed to the discounts being limited to incremental freight in the lean-
season.  But, these demands were also not met.  In the same vein, food grains and fertilizer 
corporations demanded mini-rakes and two point unloading facilities of gratis, but these 
demands were only partially addressed by offering these facilities at an additional surcharge of 
five to ten percent.  Thus, the reformers conscientiously leveraged the Railways’ relative 
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competitive strength in these door-to-door freight segments.  There was no political backlash in 
the case of food grains and fertilizers.  As seen earlier, this was a case of perceived political 
sensitivity, but it was not a real concern because the cost of freight was borne by the public 
exchequer and not the end consumer. 
In essence, the demand strategy had four critical elements: differential, dynamic, market 
driven, and customer centric policies and pricing.  The critical instrument was to respond with a 
combination of price and non-price initiatives where the Railways faced a real competitive 
threat and thus offer superior value at competitive prices.  As a first step the tariff structure was 
rationalized.  
 
Demand-Side Reforms: Rationalization of Tariffs 
Until 2005 the Railways had an encyclopedic and multi-volume tariff schedule; this ran to over 
500 pages containing over 4,000 entries across different commodities.  These entries included 
traditional Indian sweets like rasgoolla, balusahi, jalebi, laddoo; types of hair like camel and 
human; musical instruments and players like the tape recorder, gramophone records, 
gramophone needle cakes, pianos, and so forth.  The earlier tariff schedule not only specified 
the name of the commodity but further sub-classified them.  For instance, the tariff schedule 
had 261 sub-categories of cotton.  And the rate classification for these 261 subcategories of 
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cotton ranged from class 130 to 240, with 13 different classes in all99.  To further complicate 
matters, earlier freight was charged on the basis of the minimum weight condition—referred to 
as ‘W’ commodities in the schedule—or based on the actual carrying capacity of the wagon—
referred to as ‘CC’ commodities.  The various attributes regarding the nature of commodities—
processed or raw, hard or soft, powdered or granular, compact or loose, were relevant to 
determine the loadability of each commodity in different types of wagons.  For instance, coking 
coal is low in density and therefore was classified as ‘W’ which means it was charged based on 
the minimum weight condition, while ordinary coal is dense and therefore was classified as 
‘CC’.  Further, for coal there were 24 entries with seven types of differing ‘W’ weight conditions.  
The rate classification ranged between 130 to 165, with four different classes in all.  In sum, the 
permutation and combination of these categories created a rate matrix that was difficult to 
fathom.  These classifications were a cause of confusion, leading to mistakes in billing to 
customers as well as collusion to misclassify freight to benefit from lower rates for similar 
commodity types.  The Railways’ staff were not able to distinguish between the various 
categories, nor were the customers able to convince the Railways’ field staff of the precise sub-
category of the commodity prior to each loading.  This ambiguity created a cesspool of 
corruption.   
                                                 
 
 
 
99Further, commodities in class 200 had three different weight conditions and class 140 had four varying 
weight conditions.   
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All of these were inheritances of a past era when the Railways was in the business of 
transporting piecemeal traffic—referred to as smalls and wagon loads100.  In 1981 the Railways 
decided to end piecemeal traffic and accept mostly train loads101.  As a result, thousands of these 
categories became redundant, but the tariff schedule was not revised.  For the first time since 
1958, a comprehensive revision of tariff was undertaken in fiscal year 2005.  An ABC analysis102 
revealed that eight major commodities accounted for more than 85 percent of freight traffic; 
further, 71 commodities accounted for over 97 percent of the freight traffic.  Hence, all obsolete 
entries of the bygone era of small and piecemeal booking were deleted. 
Second, all commodities were categorized into 24 generic group heads, for instance all 
kinds of alloys and metals or all types of chemicals and fertilizers were classified under one 
head103.  While earlier, different alloys and metals could have varying freight rates, the revised 
                                                 
 
 
 
100 Post-independence, the Indian Railways carried most long-distance freight because the Indain road 
sector was in its nascent stage. 
101 In 1995, acceptance of smalls was formally terminated and almost all freight migrated to train loads.   
102 ABC analysis prioritizes items in a rank order based on their contribution to the total net-ton-
kilometer.  The results were grouped into three bands—namely A, B, and C—where category A consisted 
of 8 commodities that contributed to over 85 percent of total freight volumes, category B included an 
additional 63 commodities such that A and B categories combined accounted for 97 percent of total 
freight volumes, and category C accounted for the remaining three percent. 
103 Any other alloy and metal that has not been listed will be charged the same class freight rate as the 
generic class—metals and alloys.  In addition to the 24 group heads, four heads have been created for 
light-weight commodities and account for a negligible proportion of the total freight, but since they are in 
use they have been accommodated.  Because the objective of this tariff rationalization was to simplify the 
cumbersome routine, and not to increase revenue, four additional block classes below class 90, were 
introduced so as to have a minimize the increase in effective freight charges for these commodities. 
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tariff schedule provides uniform rates for all commodities within a major group heading, unless 
specified otherwise. 
Third, in the revised tariff schedule the minimum weight condition was scrapped.  The 
Railways decided to charge by load —the carrying capacity of a wagon—as opposed to the load 
that is actually being carried.  This method of charging for carrying capacity has been the norm 
in the freight industry.  For instance, cabs charge for the distance and duration of the trip, 
irrespective of the number of passengers travelling.  This rationalization of the tariff structure 
reduced the cumbersome red-tape, systemic corruption, and suboptimal use of the wagons.  
The hegemony of the goods-clerk over the customer due to the ‘plethora of imponderables’, that 
allowed enormous discretionary powers, was eliminated with the revised tariff schedule.  With 
increased transparency and it’s easy to use and enforce format, the new tariff schedule has 
reduced the harassment of the customer on one hand and tariff evasion on the other.   
 
Rate Rationalization 
While the goods tariff specifies the applicable rate class for the commodity to be 
transported, the rate table provides the applicable charge identified in the goods tariff 
for a specific distance.  In the past, the freight rate table104 had a class range of 40 to 300, 
and the ratio between the minimum and the maximum rate class was 1 is to 8.  Post-
rationalization and simplification, the ratio between the minimum and maximum 
                                                 
 
 
 
104 The rate table provides a matrix that varies prices by rate class and for a range of distances.   
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freight rates has been narrowed down to two, with the minimum class set at 100 (that is 
the breakeven price) and the maximum at 200 (which is twice the breakeven price).  
Further, the number of classes has been reduced from 27 to 11, and they now have a 
uniform increment in multiples of ten. In the pre-rationalization rate table, the class 
interval between 40 and 190 was in increments of five and beyond 190 was in 
increments of ten and the taper varied by classes.  Additionally, the taper for deriving 
the telescopic rates—decreasing block tariff—is now uniform across all classes; earlier it 
varied among classes.   
In the passenger business, while the Mohan committee (2001b, p. 72) had 
recommended decreasing the ratio between the highest and lowest passenger classes 
from 14 down to 10, largely by increasing the fares of the non-air-conditioned classes, 
the rail reformers achieved the same objective by decreasing the fares of the highest 
classes.  This was both commercially prudent and socially optimal, because the 
Railways gained market share in its high-end, high-margin segment while the poor 
customers were not burdened.  Such, a win-win solution faced no political resistance. 
Finally, essential services like defense and postal tariffs, which had traditionally 
been subsidized by the Railways, were revised upwards so as to cover costs of 
operations and obtain a reasonable profit.  Likewise, the fares for special trains 
operating for marriages and political rallies have been raised to reflect the cost of 
service. 
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Differential Pricing Policy 
In the socialist era, all pricing was affordability based—low-value commodities and 
poor passengers were charged less, while higher value commodities and travel 
segments were charged higher fares.  Despite liberalization of the Indian economy in 
1991, this pricing policy remained unchanged because fares were considered to be 
politically sensitive.  Since Ministers resisted fare hikes in politically sensitive 
segments—suburban, ordinary passenger, and second-class mail and express trains—
the brunt of rising costs, more often than not, was borne by high value finished goods 
and air-conditioned travel classes.  This eroded the Railways’ competitiveness.  In 
particular, steel and cement customers migrated to trucks, while air-conditioned class 
travelers used budget-airlines.  Yet, fares for these segments kept increasing, and the 
Railways was consistently pricing itself out of the market.   
There was a clean break from an affordability based pricing policy105 and a 
monopolistic approach to the market.  The policy of announcing across the board price-
hikes to make up for the budget deficits, irrespective of the Railways’ competitiveness, 
was scrapped.  The current pricing strategy is differential and customer centered.  The 
                                                 
 
 
 
105 In essence, dynamics of pricing are embedded in the micro-conditions and depend on the origin and 
the destination, seasons, fuel prices, the number of service providers, condition of the roads, and a host of 
other variables that affect demand and supply.  However, the Indian Railways was detached from this 
market dynamics.   
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pricing policy based on the socialist principle of affordability has been creatively 
modified.  While affordability based pricing continues to guide the politically sensitive 
second class travel segment, the pricing policy for the entire freight, parcel, and air-
conditioned business segments is now market driven.  Currently, in these segments 
fares are increased or decreased depending on the Railways’ competitive edge.  For 
instance, in order to regain competitiveness in the passenger business, air-conditioned 
first-class and two tier fares have been reduced by 28 and 20 percent respectively.  As 
seen in Chapter 6 the Railways lacks a competitive edge in station-to-station freight 
segments while it has a formidable edge in the door-to-door segment.  But in the 
affordability based pricing regime, station-to-station services—largely high value 
finished goods like steel and cement—were charged more while the door-to-door 
service—low value commodities like iron ore and other minerals—were charged less.  
This has now been revised. Freight charges for low value door-to-door commodities like 
iron ore have been increased by 50 percent.  On the other hand, with a view to solidify a 
competitive edge, station-to-station freight transportation rates have been reduced or 
kept constant.  For instance, over the last few years freight rates for petroleum products 
and steel have been decreased by 33 and 22 percent respectively.  And several non-price 
incentives are being offered to improve the quality of service—namely, mini-rake 
loading, multiple location unloading, and so forth.  In sum, the effort has been to 
strengthen the total value offered to the customer.  As a result, the Railways has been 
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gaining market share in freight for both door-to-door as well as station-to-station 
services. 
Yet, another example of differential pricing policy is the empty flow direction 
scheme. In the past pricing policy did not make a distinction between loaded and empty 
flow directions, and freight charges were the same for both directions.  Since a large 
proportion of the Railways’ trains return empty, the ‘empty flow direction freight 
discount scheme’ was outlined in the Railways budget (Budget Speech, 2007, February 
26) to capture some traffic in the empty returning freight trains. 
Sir, the truck rate for Delhi to Guwahati is considerably higher than the rate for the return trip 
where as the Railways charge the same rate in both directions.  It is seen that 40 out of 100 freight 
trains return empty.  The additional expenditure in loading freight in the empty flow direction 
trains is quite low.  Hence, I announce a heavy discount on incremental freight in the empty flow 
direction.  For distances beyond 700 kilometers, the discount will be 30 percent during non-peak 
season and 20 percent in the peak season.  The scheme will be applicable for all items loaded in 
covered wagons.  In the case of open wagons, the discount will be applicable for all commodities 
except coal, coke, and iron-ore for export.  In peak season, this discount will be applicable for open 
wagons for distances over 1000 kilometers only (p. 32). 
 
In the subsequent budgets, empty flow rebates were increased to 30 percent and made 
applicable all year round.  Authority was devolved to the General Managers of the 
zonal Railways to increase the discount up to 50 percent.  Incremental freight traffic 
requirements have also been relaxed for loading at goods sheds—but not from private 
sidings.  Now field-units offer discounts on total freight traffic, as opposed to 
incremental loading, in the empty-flow direction from loadings at goods sheds.  
Likewise, for the loading of food grains, fertilizer, and cement in open wagons (these 
commodities are usually transported in closed wagons), double discounts were 
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provided in the empty flow direction.  The customers were offered the usual empty 
flow discount as well as a compensatory discount to make-up for the decreased loading 
capacity of open wagons; the floor106 to this combined discount was set at class-70. 
Finally, the new tatkal seva, is a fee based service where passengers can buy 
tickets at the last minute.  In several trains, as soon as advance reservation services 
become available (that is 90 days prior to the travel date), all tickets get sold.  In the 
past, passengers had to approach touts to buy tickets at a premium.  Now the tatkal 
service, has been extended to 30 percent of the total seats on a train and is offered over a 
period of 5 days prior to the travel date.  The service has differential prices for higher 
and lower travel classes, and the prices differ between lean and peak seasons and 
popular and less-popular trains.  Not only has the tatkal seva stymied the role of touts 
and served the needs of last minute travelers, but it also takes in 300 crore rupees (US 
$70 million) a year for the Railways, another classic case of a win-win outcome.   
 
Dynamic Pricing 
After the initial success of the Railways’ reforms with rationalization of the tariff 
structure, the reformers turned towards market oriented freight rates and passenger 
                                                 
 
 
 
106 The floor price was set because loading and unloading take a day each and there is an incremental cost 
to hauling loaded trains as they travel slower and consumer more energy and these costs need to be 
recovered.  
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fares.  Dynamic aspects of the pricing policy are illustrated through a variability 
introduced by the reformers between peak and lean season.  This is summarized in the 
budget for the fiscal year 2006 (Budget Speech, 2006, February 24). 
 
Railways’ passenger fares and freight rates remain unvarying for all seasons and for all routes, 
whereas tariffs in the airline and road sectors vary depending upon the demand and the season.  In 
order to be able to effectively face the challenges posed by stiff competition, in the current year we 
had started a discount scheme for non-peak season and empty flow direction for freight rate, which 
has been successful.  As an extension of this policy, I propose to introduce a Dynamic Pricing 
Policy for freight as well as passenger, for peak and non-peak seasons, premium and non-premium 
services, and for busy and non-busy routes.  As per this policy the rates for non-peak season, non-
premium service and empty flow directions will be less than the general rates and the rates for 
peak season and premium services could be higher than normal.  For the freight the non-peak 
season would be 1st July to 31st October.  For the passenger segment this period would be 15th 
January to 15th April and 15th July to 15th September (p. 31). 
 
In the lean season demand declines and truckers lower their freight charges.  The 
Railways also responded with a decrease in prices, particularly in the station-to-station 
segments107 during the lean season.  The Railway Budget (Budget Speech, 2005, 
February 24) outlines the modalities of ‘the non-peak season incremental freight 
discount scheme.’  
The demand for freight transportation dips from 1st July to 31st October on account of monsoon.  
Hence, during this period, under non-peak season incremental freight discount scheme, freight 
rebate of 15 percent will be offered for incremental freight revenues of over rupees five crore in a 
month and ten percent if the incremental earning is less than rupees five crore.  This rebate will be 
applicable for all commodities except coal, minerals, and items with classification below 120 (p. 32). 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
107 While in the monsoon season, which is the lean season, freight trains are stranded as tracks and mines 
get flooded, less coal is consumed by power plants because hydroelectric power plants come online, and 
drop in construction activity, dampens demand for steel and cement. 
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Conversely, in the peak season, when demand exceeds supply, 5 to 7 percent ‘busy 
season’ surcharges were levied.  Likewise, in the passenger segment, pricing for the air-
conditioned segment became dynamic—reduced during the lean season and in 
unpopular trains.  Since there was no political space to increase passenger fares in the 
peak season or for popular trains, even in the air-conditioned classes, dynamic pricing 
was achieved by lowering fares in the lean season and for unpopular trains. 
In the past, in classes where occupancy rates were low, seats were left vacant and 
the Railways lost revenue.  In an effort to have customer centric and market driven 
passenger services, an automatic upgrading scheme was introduced and now travelers 
in lower classes are upgraded to the next higher-class—an empty seat in air-conditioned 
first-class is filled by a air-conditioned two tier passenger and so on.  The Railways’ staff 
do not have discretionary powers to choose whom to upgrade; four hours before the 
departure of the train upgrading is done by software that randomly selects travelers.  
As a result the Railways not only has higher occupancy per train, but also gets revenue 
for an otherwise lost seat.  On the other hand, customers are delighted at the possibility 
of an upgrade in their travel class.  Here too, there are some exceptions.  For instance, 
on Shatabdi trains most sales are last minute and over the counter prior to the departure 
of the train.  Thus, these trains do not have an upgrading scheme.  In essence, the 
reformers focused on macro responses to demand like seasonal variations or to and fro 
variations. Some micro-management related issues like time of day convenience pricing 
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and auctioning of vacant seats and births in passenger trains, as well as empty 
returning freight trains, were in the process of being implemented through a 
commercial portal in 2009.  Auctioning will be done at scheduled prices or lower 
because the objective is to increase utilization and occupancy rates and not profit from 
scarcity.   
 
Price Discovery 
Each passenger train, with the exception of short distance commuter services, has two 
brake-vans—one van in the front and one at the end—with a total parcel-luggage 
carrying capacity of 16 tons per train.  Further, the Railways has about 800 parcel vans 
which are attached to passenger trains as per demand.  For all this parcel service, the 
Railways’ rates are set in three brackets—highest for Rajdhani and Shatabdi, followed 
by Mail and Express, and then ordinary passenger trains. These are denoted by R, P, 
and S classes, in that order. 
However, in the parcel business the Railways is a station-to-station transporter.  
Therefore, in the short-lead (that is over short distances) the Railways is uncompetitive.  
There is hardly any demand for parcel booking in the frequently-stopping, short-
distance, ordinary passenger trains, and over 50 percent of mail and express trains that 
travel a distance less than 750 kilometers.  Overall, the Railways’ competitive edge 
increases with distance and service reliability—punctuality, time of service, and so 
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forth.  Further, brake-and-parcel-vans going from production to consumption centers 
were in demand, but on the return trip these vans were empty.  As a result, only 20 
percent of the total parcel capacity was being utilized. 
Despite two years of trial and error, the reformers were unsuccessful in 
improving the parcel business.  Through a process of learning by doing the reformers 
discovered that in the parcel segment, speed and reliability, not price, are critical.  
Parcel charges per kilogram of cargo between Delhi and Mumbai vary between two and 
12 rupees, depending on how consistent and quick the service is.  The business 
improved as soon as the Railways aligned its price with the industry norms of speed 
and reliability.  A critical element of the parcel business revival strategy was initiating a 
wholesale leasing of the brake-and-parcel-vans through open competitive bidding.  
However, the parcel operations of the Railways had deep rooted vested interests that 
were resistant to wholesale leasing, citing concerns around redundancy of porters and 
parcel clerks.  Thus, initially, outsourcing was introduced in one brake-van per train.  
Gradually, these price discovery mechanisms were extended to include a second brake-
van.  The rest of the parcel segment continued the past practice of routine piece by piece 
booking of parcels. 
Once the freight forwarders’ willingness to pay was assessed through 
competitive bidding, all attributes affecting demand—time, speed, reliability, 
directional flow, and so forth—were built into the price.  Several long distance trains 
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were leased at rates substantially higher than the scheduled parcel rates, but piecemeal 
booking continued at much lower scheduled rates for the remaining brake-vans.  In 
response, the pricing policy was revised such that if brake-vans of a passenger train 
were leased out at more than the scheduled rates, piecemeal booking by the Railways 
should be done at the immediately higher class, provided leasing operators honor the 
lease agreement for at least a period of one year.  For example, if a train is leased at 
higher than P, the intermediate rate, after a year piecemeal booking will be done at R, 
the highest rate band.  With this decision, earnings from piecemeal booking increased 
significantly—in some cases earnings doubled and the hold of vested interests 
weakened.   
On the other hand, there was no response to scheduled parcel rates for several 
trains.  In such cases, field units were authorized to progressively reduce the reserve 
price from 100 to 75, 50, and even 25 percent of scheduled parcel rates, subject to a 
minimum of the previous year’s earnings.  This process led to an increase in capacity 
utilization of the brake-and-parcel-vans.  As a result, the Railways’ parcel and luggage 
earnings more than doubled between 2004 and 2008 from 476 to 1,008 crore rupees (US 
$110 million to US $ 234 million). 
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Alliances for Value Creation 
As in the case of the parcel business, other alliances for value creation were also sought 
where the sum of the parts was greater than the whole.  In this regard there were three 
underlying principles that guided the partnerships.  First, co-option of competition was 
sought in sectors where the Railways was a minority or declining transporter.  Second, 
alliances were sought to align the long-term interests of existing customers with that of 
the Railways.  Third, alliances were also forged to improve the quality of service and 
enhance the overall value proposition for clients.  For instance, to co-opt competition, 
fifteen container train licenses have been issued to firms from the logistics industry—
shipping, road transport, as well as warehousing.  These players have added over 70 
additional trains to the existing 140 container trains operated by Container Corporation 
of Indian—known as CONCOR and a public sector undertaking of the Indian Railways.  
While CONCOR built this fleet of trains over two decades, the private players have 
added half as large a fleet in two years.  The container business is now growing at twice 
the earlier rate at 24 percent annually.  These new players have been incentivized to 
focus on adding new customers rather than diverting the existing freight customers of 
the Railways, thus creating an expanding pie scenario.  The concessions are for 22 years 
and thus foster long-term partnerships. 
To foster additional long-term alliances the Railways initiated investment 
schemes for wagons, rail sidings, and incentivized engine-on-load. Under these 
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schemes the initial investments are made by customers—to build sidings or produce 
wagons—and a portion of the cost is reimbursed by the Railways through discounts in 
total freight billing over a ten to fifteen year period.  Under the wagon investment 
scheme, clients were invited to invest in their own wagons.  Depending on the type of 
wagon, discounts in freight charges are granted—these range between 10 to 15 percent 
for a period of 10 to 15 years.  This is to reimburse the customer investment in wagons 
along with interest.  As a result, not only is the customer committed to using the 
Railways freight service for the long-term, but the Railways also gets additional 
investments in wagons (Budget Speech, 2008, February 26). 
Further, with the objective of tying in the customers for the long-term and 
providing railway connectivity within the customers’ premises, the Railways revised its 
policy for construction of sidings.  Unlike the past, where all capital costs were borne by 
the customer, now half the cost is borne by the Railways and reimbursed to the 
customers via a discount in the freight over a period of ten years or more.  Further, 
salaries of Railways’ staff posted at the sidings were previously borne by the customers.  
Now, except for one commercial staff member per shift, all other costs are borne by the 
Railways (Budget Speech, 2006, February 24).  As a result, the Railways provide 
customers with a door-to-station service instead of a station-to-station service. 
Under the engine-on-load schemes, to enable quicker release of wagons, the 
engine stands by during loading and unloading operations.  In the past, the engine 
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would place the rake and return after the loading was over.  While loading and 
unloading took up to a day or more, the engine also lost time commuting back and 
forth.  Under this new scheme, the permissible time for free-of-charge loading and 
unloading has been reduced to four hours for open wagons and six hours for covered 
wagons, as opposed to nine hours in the past.  The reduction in time spent on loading 
and unloading requires investment in modernization and mechanization of handling 
equipment and infrastructure which is being reimbursed to the customer.  This scheme 
is outlined in the Railway Budget for fiscal year 2007 (2006, February 24).   
Customers who fulfill the conditions laid down in the scheme and invest in their terminals so as to 
bring down the loading and unloading time, and complete loading or unloading in lesser time, will 
qualify for five percent rebate in the first year.  Over the next ten years the rebate will be given at a 
diminishing rate and would be one percent from the fifth year onwards (p. 33). 
 
 
Innovation 
To complement the above tariff rationalization, reformulation of the product mix, and 
improvements in the quality of service, the Railways introduced several innovative 
products and services.  As seen earlier, mini-rakes, two-point unloading, tatkal seva, and 
automatic upgrading of passengers are some examples of recent innovations.  However, 
by far, the most popular novel product is the Garib Rath, the poor people’s chariot.  This 
is the Nano of Indian Railways.  Quite like the Nano car launched by Tata Motors, the 
Garib Rath has four integrated attributes:  Affordability, scale, aspiration, and efficiency.  
The Garib Rath provides air-conditioned travel at affordable prices—about half the 
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passenger fare of a Delhi-Mumbai three tier air-conditioned class travel.  The following 
illustrations (see Figures 19 and 20) captures the essence of a strategy to decrease the 
unit costs by increasing the number of coaches per train, as well as efficiently using 
space within each coach to accommodate more passengers in the Garib Rath as opposed 
to the normal Rajdhani train. As against 17 coaches in a normal train, the Garib Rath has 
24 coaches.  Further, unlike the air-conditioned three tier coach in a normal Rajdhani 
train that accommodates 64 passengers per coach, the Garib Rath accommodates 75 
passengers per coach.  Likewise, the chair-car of a Rajdhani has space for 70 passengers; 
its equivalent in the Garib Rath has space for 102 passengers (Figure 20).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways, Government of India. 
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Figure 20.  Affect of train length and coach layout on unit cost 
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Note: Each circle represents a passenger in the above coach layout plan.  
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from Ministry of Railways, Government of India. 
 
Table 18.  Economics of a Garib Rath train compared with a normal Rajdhani 
 Normal Rajdhani Train Garib Rath 
Seating capacity three-tier 64 75 
Chair-car 70 102 
17 coach train 816 1,233 
24 coach train 1,302 1,920 
Cost per passenger kilometer 80 paise (17 coaches long) 32 paise (24 coaches long) 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways. 
Therefore, while a standard train carries 816 passengers, the Garib Rath accommodates 
more than twice the number of passengers with a capacity of 1,920.  Further, as most 
costs are fixed, and thus insensitive to the number of passengers, the unit cost per 
travelers decreases substantially from 80 paise in a Rajdhani Express train to 32 paise in 
the Garib Rath as summarized in Table 18.  Through a combination of the above 
attributes and removal of various paraphernalia—non-paying coaches like the pantry 
cars—the Garib Rath tickets are priced at about half of the air-conditioned three tier fare.  
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
Figure 21.  Affect of coach layout on seating capacity 
 
Rajdhani chair-car coach has seating capacity to accommodate 70 passengers. 
Garib Rath chair-car coach has seating capacity to accomodate 102 passengers. 
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Further, there are no concessional tickets and no discounts, even for rail pass holders.  
Thus, it meets the aspirations of the common people of India who until now travelled in 
much higher densities and congested coaches and could not afford air-conditioned 
travel.  These mutually reinforcing attributes make the Garib Rath not only affordable to 
the poor, but they also hold the potential to revolutionize the generally loss making 
segments of the passenger business and thus is an exemplar of the win-win outcome 
that was discussed in Chapter 5 on the political economy of reforms. 
 
Profit Margins and Product Mix 
Profit margins in the freight business have improved from 20 percent in 2001 to 80 
percent in 2008.  A simplistic assumption would imply the misuse of monopoly power 
to price gouge.  However, this is not the case.  Freight rates of coal and cement, which 
account for nearly half of freight earnings, have increased marginally, while those of 
steel and petroleum products, accounting for another 15 percent of freight earnings, 
have been reduced.  Thus, 65 percent of commodity freight prices, barring busy season 
and the development surcharge, have been reduced or remain constant.  The radical 
improvement in profit margins is attributed to the triple combination of a reduction in 
unit costs, selective fare hikes, and transformation of low margin business segments 
into very high margin ones.   
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First, declining unit costs.  In 2001, the Railways’ unit freight cost was 61 paise 
per net-ton-kilometer with a unit realization of 74 paise.  Thus, even during the worst of 
times the Railways enjoyed a profit margin108 of 21 percent in the freight business.  
During the seven year period between 2001 and 2008, even after absorbing inflationary 
pressures, the unit cost fell by over 11 percent from 61 to 54 paise at current prices.  
Even at the past level of unit revenue, profit margins would have expanded from 21 to 
37 percent solely by virtue of declining unit costs.  Conversely, if costs had continued to 
increase as per the past trend growth rate of 8 percent (the compound annual growth 
rate between 1991 and 2001), the unit costs would have increased to 103 paise in 2008.  
The Railways would have had to increase freight rates by 40 percent to breakeven and 
by 70 percent to retain the 20 percent profit margin.  This illustrates the importance of 
declining unit costs in fueling significant growth in profit margins.  The decline in unit 
cost is a function of macro economic stability characterized by low inflation—hovering 
between 4 and 6 percent as opposed to 10 and 12 percent over the 1990s—as well as 
double the growth rate of eight percent in freight loading. 
                                                 
 
 
 
108 Profit margin is the difference between unit price and unit cost.  In the context of the railway price as 
well as costs differ by product segments—based on quality and quantity of service provided and the 
demand in the market.  To increase margins either price needs to increased, or cost needs to be decreased, 
or both. 
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Second, between 2001 and 2008 unit revenue increased from 74 to 93 paise.  This 
was partly due to selective increases in freight rates of door-to-door commodities—
namely, iron-ore and minerals by about 50 percent, where the Railways has a 
formidable competitive edge, and of low rated commodities like food grains and 
fertilizers by 33 percent, which had been underpriced in the past.  Moreover, levying 
the development and busy season surcharges at the rate of 2 and 5–7 percent 
respectively, led to further increases in revenues. 
Third, transforming low value, low margin iron ore for the export business 
segment, to a high value high margin one.  Success in business is about spotting an 
opportunity, seizing, and encashing it.  Booming prices of iron ore from US $20 per ton 
in 2004 to over US $100 in 2008 in global markets offered such an opportunity for the 
Railways.  Iron ore is mined in the central plateau regions of India where trucks are 
unviable—the road conditions are poor, the slopes are steep, and the commodity is 
bulky in nature—and therefore price elasticity of demand is low.  Taking this into 
consideration freight rates for iron ore for export have been quadrupled109.  Even at four 
                                                 
 
 
 
109 Another paradox is that while freight earnings from seven main commodities other than iron-ore 
increased by 9 percent the over all earnings in freight increased by 23 percent.  While the freight volume, 
transported as measured in net-ton-kilometers, iron-ore for export is six percent of the total freight 
volume in the fiscal year 2008, but it accounted for nine percent of the total freight revenue.  In the 
current fiscal year, that is 2009, while the iron-ore for export retains its share of total freight volume at six 
percent its share of total revenue is 20 percent.  While last year’s margin was 100 percent this years 
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times previous prices there is little dearth of demand—over 10,000 indents are pending 
in South Eastern Railways—and transport volumes have increased from 36 to 53 million 
tons.  These fare hikes have neither societal implications because the commodity is for 
export and prices are determined by global demand, nor are the customers opting out 
because of the high profit margins they enjoy resulting from the sudden increase in 
global iron ore prices. This is a classic example of revamping a low-margin and low-
value business into a very high margin and high-value one.  As a result, freight earnings 
from iron ore for export are estimated to have increased from 900 in 2004 to 9,000 crore 
rupees in 2009, and its contribution to overall freight earnings is expected to increase 
from three to 13 percent in this period (see Table 19).  
Table 19.  Contribution of iron ore for export in total freight traffic. 
 2004 2008 2009110 
Iron ore for export’s share of total freight earnings 3 percent 9 percent 13 percent 
Growth in earnings of iron ore for export 52 percent 63 percent 115 percent 
Revenue from iron ore for export 900 crore 4,400 crore 9,000 crore 
Growth in freight earnings without iron ore for export 3 percent 10 percent 13 percent 
Growth in freight earnings with iron ore for export 4 percent 14 percent 21 percent 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
margin has leaped to a whopping 250 percent.  This year iron ore accounts for 13 percent growth in the 
first four months.   
110Based on data up to July. 
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In fiscal year 2009, freight rates of all commodities other than iron ore for export were 
not increased.  Yet, growth in freight earnings substantially exceeded growth in 
volumes in the first five months of 2009.  This is because 115 percent growth in earnings 
from the freight of this one commodity alone increased the overall growth in earnings 
by eight percent—from 13 to 21 percent.  
Further, the passenger business offers yet another illustration of leveraging the 
varying growth rates in different business sub-segments to accelerate growth of 
earnings at a pace that exceeds the growth in volumes.  Over the last four years, the 
passenger volume recorded a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of more than six 
percent while earnings had a much higher compound annual growth rate of 12 percent.  
This was achieved despite a reduction in passenger fares for most classes.  A simplistic 
explanation offered by skeptics is that there has been a clandestine increase in fares.  
But the counter-intuitive differential growth rates of revenue and volumes are 
explained by the differential growth in high-margin and high-value services versus 
low-margin and low-value service segments (see Table 20).  
Table 20.  Contribution of types of passenger services to revenue. 
 
Distribution of  
Travelers 
CAGR (2004–08) 
of 
number of 
travelers 
Revenue 
per passenger 
Share of  
Total Revenue 
Air-conditioned service 1 %  10.5 % 638 rupees 20 % 
Mail and Express sleeper 
service 
3 %  9.6 % 215  rupees 26 % 
Suburban service 57 %  5.4 % 4  rupees 8 % 
Total  100 % 6.4 % 28 rupees 100 % 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways.  
Note: all figures are for fiscal year 2007, unless mentioned otherwise. 
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As seen in Chapter 6, suburban services account for 57 percent of the total number of 
passengers but contribute only eight percent of total passenger earnings.  On the other 
hand, air-conditioned plus mail and express non-air-conditioned sleeper segments 
account for four percent of the total number of passengers, but account for 46 percent of 
total revenue.  This paradox of differential growth in volumes and earnings is explained 
by a 10 percent growth in the volume of high-value segments with a five percent 
growth in the low-value segments.  For the former, namely air-conditioned and mail 
and express sleeper, each passenger on average pays 638 rupees (US $14.8) and 215 
rupees (US $5.0) respectively while for the latter, namely the suburban segment, each 
passenger on average pays four rupees (US 9 cents).  In essence, price is only one 
variable, among many, that affects growth in earnings; product mix is another critical 
variable.   
 
Improving Quality of Service 
To improve the quality of customer service, several complementary efforts—namely, 
improving operation efficiency through investments in new technological and human 
resources, investments in amenities, systemic changes through deployment of 
information technology, and strategic partnerships—were made. 
Reliability, punctuality, safety, productivity, operational efficiency, and 
profitability are organically interdependent.  These are complements not substitutes.  
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Improvement in reliability and safety not only reduces the damage to assets but limits 
the disruption of the Railways’ operations, thus increasing punctuality, which in turn 
improves productivity and profitability.  For instance, the recent reduction in the 
turnaround time, a key gain in productivity, is a result of significant improvements in 
reliability, punctuality, and safety.  With this faster turnaround of wagons, not only are 
customers demands met more quickly—as seen in shorter-wait-lists for indents111—but 
the Railways’ assets are being better utilized and thus profitability has increased.  
Therefore, quality of service and productivity are inherently interdependent, and the 
following five vectors were central to the strategy.  Furthermore, to address client 
grievances, regular meetings are conducted at various levels of the system. 
First, the Railways is making massive investments to upgrade its technology and 
modernize the rolling stock, signaling and telecommunication, tracks, and other assets 
for improving reliability, safety, and operating efficiency.  For example, the Railways 
has more than tripled its allocations for the depreciation reserve fund from 2,300 to 
7,000 crore rupees between 2001 and 2008.  These investments have been complemented 
by investing in human resource development and leveraging information technology.  
As a result, the number of accidents have declined to less than a half—from 320 in 2004 
                                                 
 
 
 
111Unlike the past, where up to 40,000 indents would stack up waiting for the rakes because demand far 
exceeded supply, through supply-side management, demand for rakes is met year round except during 
the peak season where a congestion charge has been introduced in the from of a peak season surcharge.   
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to 194 in 2008, and asset productivity and a operating efficiency have made significant 
gains.  The freight customer benefits from the reduction in inventory during transit, 
timely delivery, improve reliability of the service, and reduced damage and pilferage.  
This is a win-win outcome with customer satisfaction rising as well as achieving 
improved utilization of the Railways’ assets.  However, there is much more that can be 
done and to this end the Railways is investing in initiatives that will bear fruit in the 
near future. 
Second, the Railways has made significant improvements in passenger 
conveniences through investments in amenities.  The height of most platforms has been 
modified to match the height of trains. Covered shelters have been provided in 
hundreds of small stations and there are no constraints on funding improvements in 
passenger amenities—namely, better illumination, drinking water facilities, the general 
ambiance of stations, among others.  Likewise, major goods sheds are being renovated 
and access roads and other facilities are being improved.  
Third, the customer interface is being improved through systemic changes.  For 
instance, through a revision of the tariff schedule and scrapping of the minimum weight 
condition, the procedure for freight transportation as well as its documentation has 
been simplified.  Likewise, information technology has been deployed.  In the past 
customers had to either deposit cash or demand drafts.  This led to a lot of last minute 
stress at the customers’ end.  Now, sitting in the ‘comfort of their office’, freight 
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customers can avail of the e-payment facility.  And the Railways is in the process of 
installing its online freight operating information system for all major customers so that 
they can track their trains in real time.  
To improve the customer interface in the passenger segment—across the value 
chain from ticketing to travel—internet ticketing services have been developed by the 
Railways’ own Indian Railways Catering and Tourism Corporation.  Twenty percent of 
all reserved ticketing is done by these portals and online bookings have doubled since 
the last year (as of 2009), albeit from a small base.  Further, e-tickets are available at over 
40,000 outlets across the country from petrol pumps to ATMs, bank counters, and 
several chain stores and small shops.  This not only reduced the queues at ticket 
counters, but also improved the customer’s experience in buying the tickets.   
In the past, customers were either unable to reach the train enquiry service, or 
when their call was answered, their experience was often unsatisfactory.  Now, 
customers dial 139 for the Rail Sampark service, a year old nationwide Railway enquiry 
system.  The service is provided in eleven languages by a joint venture between a 
business process outsourcing firm and a telecom firm.  From anywhere in India, 
telephone enquiries can be made for the cost of a local call.  Among other things, this 
service provider responds to queries pertaining to arrival and departure of trains, 
reservation status, fares, and passenger name record (PNR).  The service is provided 
through four call centers and has recorded exponential growth, with over half a million 
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calls being answered each day.  Further, the world over, call centers are cost centers; but 
in this innovative and perhaps unique arrangement, the call center operator is not only 
paying for the capital and operational expenses but also pays a small annual fee to the 
Railways.  The operator recovers the capital and return on investment by sharing 
revenue with the telecom operator as well as earnings from the provision of several 
value added services like SMS alerts, hotel and cab reservation and so forth.  
Fourth, in an effort to further deepen improvements in the quality of service the 
Railways sought external partnerships from private as well as public enterprises.  
Introduction of catering kiosks and food plazas managed by national and multinational 
corporations including Haldiram’s and Mc Donald’s, to improve the quality of food 
served at stations, is an example.  Further, to improve transit accommodation at major 
railway stations, the Railways’Yatri Niwas, previous loss-making outfits, have been 
contracted out to The Taj Group’s Ginger hotel chain and other such private firms.  
Train toilets have an improved ambience because private firms like Airtel, a telecom 
service provider, have been given advertisement rights along with the responsibility of 
improving ambience and maintenance of the coaches.  The cleaning of toilets on trains 
has been contracted to Eureka Forbes, a private firm.  This was done without displacing 
the existing cleaning staff who now play the role of cleaning inspectors and thus are 
happy with the introduction of the new service.  On stations, the Railways has been 
leveraging ‘eyeballs and footfalls’ to enhance non-fare passenger incomes as well as 
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improve the quality of the transit experience.  Through these alliances, the Railways’ 
sundry earnings have more than doubled from 1,000 to 2,600 crore rupees in the last 
four years.  This is another example of a win-win outcome because on the one hand the 
Railways has enhanced its profitability, and on the other customers receive an 
improved service. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the entire inclusive reform strategy and efforts to transform the Railways 
were tested in the market place as customer satisfaction was the final measure of the 
total value of the Railway’s service.  To strengthen the total value offered to the 
customer, the reformers have deployed a combination of price and non-price policy 
initiatives that are dynamic, differential, market driven, and customer centric.  As a 
result, a 60 year trend of declining market share has been reversed because the value 
provided to the customer has been enhanced.  As long as the Railways continue to 
innovate and add value that results in customer satisfaction, this transformation will 
sustain.  However, there are several threats to sustainability as well as lessons to be 
learned for replication that are examined in the next chapter.    
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Chapter 9:  Towards a New Theory for Infrastructure Economics: 
Outcomes, Sustainability, and Replication 
Introduction 
In this chapter a number of aspects of the Railways’ achievements are summarized.  
These outcomes relate not just to improvements in the Railways’ finances, but tangible 
gains in capital and labor productivity, an increase in market share and profit margins, 
better quality of services, as well as an enhanced stature of the Minister.  Further, a 
critical assessment of the perceived and real concerns to sustain this transformation is 
presented.  While most critics have raised concerns of passenger safety, short-term 
gains at the cost of long-term ones, and cashing in on a booming economy, the critical 
threats to sustainability appear to lie elsewhere.  Next, some potentially transferable 
attributes of the Railways’ approach are summarized and for illustrative purposes these 
are applied to the electricity sector in brief.  Finally, based on the lessons of the 
Railways’ reform a new framework for inclusive infrastructure reforms is presented 
and areas for future research are outlined.  
 
Outcomes of Indian Railways Reforms 
The scale of the financial transformation of the Indian Railways is best captured in the 
following.  In 2008, the Railways had a cash surplus before dividend of 25,006 crore 
rupees (US $6 billion), an operating ratio of 75.9 percent, and a fund balance (or bank 
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balance) of 22,279 crore rupees (US $5.2 billion).  Moreover, the ratio of net revenue to 
capital-at-charge (return on net worth) had improved from 2.5 percent in 2001 to 20.7 
percent in 2008, a relatively high return on equity for a capital intensive infrastructure 
industry like the Railways.  The Railways has improved its debt-service-cash-coverage 
ratio over three times from 1.74 in 2001 to 6.53 in 2008.  In the financial sector, after the 
American sub-prime, crisis there is a global credit squeeze and lenders are risk averse, 
especially when it comes to lending to emerging markets like India.  Despite these 
developments, in November 2008, based on a much improved balance sheet, the Indian 
Railway Finance Corporation placed dollar denominated bonds with the Bank of 
Tokyo, Mitsubishi for US $100 million at 4.01 percent (LIBOR (2.56) + 1.45 percent), an 
interest rate which is lower than the cheapest rate offered to many Fortune 500 firms.  
Table 21 contrasts the Railways’ performance on several financial indicators 
summarizing the scale of change (see Annex 4, 7, 8, and 9 for detailed financial results). 
Table 21.  Financial indicators 
 2001 2008 Change 
Cash surplus before dividend 4,790 25,006  5 fold increase 
Investible surplus 4,204 19,972 Over 4 fold increase 
Capital expenditure  9,395 28,680 3 fold increase 
Fund Balance (bank balance) 359 22,279 62 fold increase 
Operating Ratio 98.3% 75.9% 22 % improvement 
Ratio of net revenue to capital-at-charge and investment 
from capital fund (return on net worth) 
2.5% 20.7% 18 % improvement 
Debt-service-cash-coverage ratio 1.74 6.53 Over 3 fold increase 
 
Source: Finance (Budget) Directorate, Ministry of Railways 
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During the 1990s the Railways’ expenses grew one percent faster than its earnings, 
leading it towards bankruptcy.  However, between 2001 and 2008, the Railways became 
‘super-solvent’ by inverting this relationship—in this period earnings grew four percent 
faster than expenses (see Table 22).  This resulted from a combination of factors.  
Earnings have grown on account of the growth in freight volumes, selective fare-hikes 
in previously underpriced freight business segments, as well as the change in product 
mix in favor of high-value high-margin segments.  Meanwhile, working expenses grew 
at a lower rate primarily on account of low inflation and the Railways’ relatively 
inelastic cost structure with respect to volumes transported.  While such gains in freight 
have been the backbone of this transformation, the outcome for the Railways as a whole 
is similar.  Table 22 compares the growth in earnings and expenses over 1990s that led 
to the financial crisis in 2001 and the transformation thereafter. 
Table 22.  Compounded annual growth rate of expenses and earnings 
 
 
1991 
Crore rupees 
2001 
Crore rupees 
2008 (2004) 
Crore rupees 
1991–2001 
CAGR % 
2001–2008 
CAGR % 
Total Working Expenses  
(Rs. in cr. ) 
11,154 34,667 54,462 
(39,482) 
12.01 6.67 
Gross T affic Receipts  12,096 34,880 71,720 
(42,905) 
11.17 10.85 
Passenger Earnings 3,148 10,515 19,844 
(13,298) 
12.82 9.50 
Goods Earnings 8,408 23,305 47,434 
(27,618) 
10.73 10.69 
Other Coaching Earnings 336 764 1,800 8.56 13.02 
Sundry Earnings 242 703 2,565 (1,004) 11.25 20.31 
 
Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways 
 
Moreover, the growth in earnings has doubled during the last four years—from seven 
percent in 2001–2004 to 14 percent in 2005–2008.  And on average, the gap between the 
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growth rates of earnings and expenses doubled—this was two and a half percent 
between 2001 and 2004 while it increased to five percent in the following four years (see 
Figure 21). 
 
Figure 22.  Growth in traffic earnings verses working expenses 
 
 
 
 
In the same vein, the gains in the recent four years (2005–2008) exceeded the gains in the 
four years that preceded them.  Between 2001 and 2004, traffic earnings recorded seven 
percent growth, while working expenses grew at four percent, and as a result the 
investible surplus grew by about 40 percent from 4,200 to 5,800 crore rupees (US $1.4 
billion).  However, between 2005 and 2008 these gains multiplied three times to 20,000 
crore rupees (US $4.7 billion).  In sum, a few years after a predicted financial crisis, the 
Indian Railways became one of India’s most profitable enterprises with US $4.7 billion 
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in profits—namely, investible surplus (see Figure 22).  While the Railways’ profitability 
is not directly comparable with privately owned corporations, the scale of its 
achievement is significant. 
Figure 23.  Growth in investible surplus 
 
 
There were modest gains in the investible surplus between 2001 and 2004 as freight unit 
revenue fell from 74 paise in 2001 to 72 paise in 2004 (see Figure 23).  This was largely 
on account of a reduction in freight rates for petroleum products and steel to curtail the 
Railways’ declining market share in these commodities.  However, the reformers 
discovered that this was insufficient to regain market share because these commodities, 
as seen in earlier Chapters, are more sensitive to non-price factors such as quality of 
service—like options to transport less than train loads through mini-rakes as well as 
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introduce selective fare hikes in underpriced commodities like iron ore, food grains, 
and fertilizers because of the misplaced conception that these were politically sensitive.  
Hence, despite a reduction in unit costs from 61 paise in 2001 to 57 in 2004, the 
Railways’ freight operating margins made moderate gains.  Likewise, gains in 
passenger earnings lagged in 2001–2004, compared to 2005–2008 because passenger unit 
costs increased from 38 paise to 41 paise and business strategies such as reconfiguring 
the product mix in favor of high-value high-margin air-conditioned and long distance 
passenger segments were yet to be explored (see Figure 23). 
Figure 24.  Freight and passenger unit revenue and cost 
   
  
Investible surplus during 2005–2008 has grown exponentially because of growth in 
freight volumes, declining unit costs (from 57 to 54 paise), and increasing unit revenue 
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curtailed by virtue of two factors.  First, the marginal fall in unit costs (41 to 39 piase).  
Second, an increase in unit revenue due to a change in product-mix in favor of high-
value and high-margin air-conditioned, and long distance travel segments (25 to 26 
paise, see Figure 23).  Further, the growth rate of ‘other coaching’ as well as ‘sundry 
earnings’ have increased from around 10 percent on average from 1991 to 2001 to about 
15 percent on average from 2001 to 2008.  This results from enhancing non-passenger 
fare income through leveraging ‘eyeballs and footfalls’ of travelers in addition to a 
reduction in unutilized parcel capacity. 
In the same vein, the growth rate of freight and passenger traffic volumes nearly 
doubled during the period from 2001  to 2008 as compared to the 1990s. (1991–2001)  
Likewise, from 2001 to 2008 the number of passenger trips grew at over twice the rate of 
increase of the 1990s.  And the freight transported, as measured in net ton kilometers, 
grew at 2.6 times the rate of the preceding period (Table 23).   
 
Table 23.  Compounded annual growth rate of output 
 
 
1991 
Millions 
2001 
Millions 
2008 
Millions 
1991–2001 
CAGR % 
2001–2008 
CAGR % 
Passenger trips 3,858 4,833 6,558 2.28 4.46 
Passenger kilometers 295,644 457,022 767,519 
(541,208) 
4.45 7.69 
Freight loaded in tons 318.4 473.5 794.21 (557.4) 4.05 7.67 
Freight transported in net ton 
kilometers 
235,785 312,371 511,801 
(381,241) 
2.85 7.31 
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This substantial growth in traffic volumes has been achieved with the same network, 
rolling stock, and employees—implying a significant gain in capital and labor 
productivity as summarized in Table 24.   
Table 24.  Gains in productivity 
Indicators 1991 2001 2008 1991–
2001 
CAGR % 
2001–
2008  
CAGR % 
Wagon Utilization 
(NTKM/wagon/day) 
1,407 2042 3,566 3.79 8.29 
Track Utilization (NTKM/route 
kilometers in million) 
3.78 5.01 8.09 2.86 7.09 
Track Utilization (PKM/route 
kilometers in million) 
4.74 7.25 10.99  4.34 6.12 
Labor Productivity (NTKM/employee 
in millions)  
0.15 0.22 0.37 3.90 7.71 
Labor Productivity (PKM/employee in 
millions) 
0.19 0.32 0.55 5.35 8.04 
 
What is surprising is that this financial transformation did not resort to textbook 
solutions of shrinking the denominator—that is cost cutting through retrenchment and 
privatization.  Instead, the focus was on growing the numerator—namely increasing 
revenue by expanding volumes and earnings.  As a result, while the proportion of staff 
costs to expenses remained stable, their share as a percentage of revenue declined 
sharply.  Staff costs were 54 percent of operating expenses in 2001 and 52 percent in 
2008.  However, the share of staff costs to gross traffic receipts declined from 51 percent 
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in 2001 to about 36 percent in 2008 (see Table 25).  This is primarily on account of 
rapidly rising volumes and earnings, and the associated reduction in unit costs.  
Table 25.  Break-up of Ordinary Working Expenses (Gross) 
All amounts in crore rupees 2001 2008 
Gross Traffic Receipts  
(staff cost as percentage of GTR) 
34,880  
(51.21%) 
71,720  
(36.33%) 
Ordinary Working Expenses  
(staff cost as percentage of OWE) 
33,161  
(53.86%) 
49,924  
(52.20%) 
Staff Cost 17,861 26,059 
 
Further, the Railways’ market share in the freight transport of finished goods like steel 
and cement has expanded—the Railways measured this through the rail coefficient, a 
measure that monitors the Railways’ freight market share in each of the eight major 
commodities it transports.  This is an important outcome because the Railways had 
been losing its market share in these segments for a decade and a half—market share for 
steel and cement in 1991 was 67 and 59 percent respectively, while in 2004 it had 
declined to 36 and 40 percent respectively.  In a historic reversal, the Railways increased 
its market share in the freight of both of these commodities (see Figure 24).  While the 
steel and cement industries grew by 8–10 percent in 2007–2008, rail freight grew by 25 
percent, resulting in an increase in the market share from two to five percent.  
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Figure 25.  Railways’ market share in steel and cement 
 
 
Another critical outcome is improvements in customer orientation as measured by 
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reduction of passenger fares in several travel classes, freight fares for several station-to-
station commodities like petroleum products were lower in 2008 when compared to 
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ambience of railway stations through private participation, e-billing for freight 
customers, and a host of other service improvement initiatives discussed in earlier 
chapters.  Finally, the transit time for travelers and freight customers has declined, and 
field units of the Railways have greater autonomy to resolve customer grievances and 
respond to meet rising expectations.  
Despite all these positive outcomes what did the Minister and the Railways’ staff 
gain?  Based on a performance ranking of all the federal Ministers, by a leading news 
magazine in 2005 the Minister was at the bottom of the list, at number 33 (India Today, 
2006).  In 2006 the same publication ranked him as the second best performing Minister 
of the coalition government.  Over his tenure as the Minister of the Railways, he has 
been able to transform his image as well.  In sum, the Minister has enhanced his stature.  
Likewise, breaking away from the fear of retrenchment and uncertainty associated with 
the financial crisis, the success of the Railways’ transformation has given a boost to the 
morale of the Railways’ staff.  In 2007, NDTV, a leading national news media service 
provider, ranked public sector organizations in India; the Railways stood second, just 
below the Indian Army. This is a significant achievement for an organization that was 
close to bankruptcy in 2001.  In essence, the outcomes of the Railways’ transformation 
have been multifaceted—improvement in the functioning of the Railways by gains in 
productivity, generating a substantial cash surplus, benefiting customers, and 
strengthening the political leadership as well as boosting staff morale, without 
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burdening the common people of India.  However, this is not to say that the Railways 
has surpassed its own potential or that the expectations of policy makers and customers 
have been met.  There is a lot more scope for further improvements, making the 
sustainability of this transformation a central concern going forward. 
 
Sustainability—Perceived and Real Longer-term Challenges to Indian Railway 
Reforms 
Policymakers and academics have raised five major concerns regarding the future of 
this transformation; these are discussed in turn.  First, the Railways’ improved 
performance is a result of creative accounting.  Second, financial gains are at the cost of 
safety.  Third, growth in revenues is the result of a rapidly growing economy.  Fourth, 
transformation of the Railways is a result of plucking the low hanging fruit, as in easy 
fixes that will soon be exhausted and thus short lived, particularly, when the Railways 
face severe capacity constraints—saturated high-density networks, terminal constraints, 
an energy shortage, and lack of wagons and coaches.  Fifth, the fate of the 
transformation, after the present political leadership departs, is bleak. 
These concerns are substantially misplaced.  Concerns about creative accounting 
stem from mainly two factors.  First, the pace and scale of the financial gains the 
Railways has made—from bankruptcy to a annual cash surplus of over US $5 billion in 
a few years.  Second, concerns regarding changes in the Railways’ accounting practices 
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introduced between 2005 and 2008.  Regarding the first concern, the Railways’ accounts 
and financial statements are verifiable like any other public enterprise and open to 
public scrutiny.  The Railways’ cash surplus is deposited with the Reserve Bank of India 
and is open to verification.  The second concern is about modification in accounting 
practices with respect to the allocation of leasing charges, interest on fund balances, and 
reimbursement of losses by the public exchequer stemming from operation and 
maintenance of strategic railway lines.  Earlier, all leasing charges were recorded in 
accounts as revenue expenditure.  But in the revised procedure, the interest component 
of the leasing charges is recorded in operating expenses (2,153 crore rupees) while the 
principal component (1,677 crore rupees) is recorded as capital expenditure.  This 
accounting change amounts to a difference of 1,677 crore rupees or US $390 million in 
2008.  Likewise, earlier reimbursement of losses on account of strategic lines (637 crore 
rupees or US $148 million) was recorded in accounts as a reduction in the dividend 
liability.  Now it is included in sundry earnings.  In the same vein, interest on fund 
balances (1,175 crore rupees or US $273 million), which was not recorded as earnings 
earlier, is now included in total earnings for calculation of cash surplus before dividend.  
These changes are in sync with corporate accounting practices and are based on the 
recommendations made by the external experts on the Railways’ accounting reforms.  
As a result of these accounting changes, the Railways’ cash surplus records an 
incremental 3,489 crore rupees (US $810 million) in 2008.  However, to eliminate 
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ambiguity, all past and present cash and investible surplus data used in this research 
are computed based on the current accounting practices and are thus comparable.  
Hence, modifications in accounting practice do not account for the financial 
transformation. 
Regarding the safety-profitability trade-offs, in contrast to popular perception, 
safety, productivity, and profitability are complexly interdependent and are arguably 
complements not substitutes.  Thus, it should not be a surprise that the number of train 
accidents has declined from 473 in 2001 to 194 in 2008, while the Railways’ profitability 
has soared.  Further, during the run up to the financial crisis in 2001, the Railways had a 
cash crunch and was unable to afford replacement of particularly aged assets.  In 
contrast, for the fiscal year 2009, assets, internal generation, and non-budgetary 
resources are contributing 78 percent of an annual plan outlay of 37,500 crore rupees 
(US $8.7 billion) that not only covers the cost of replacing aging assets but also 
investment needs to meet future demand.  Moreover, all major operational changes 
having safety implications in the Railways are strictly scrutinized by the Railways’ 
Research, Designs, and Standards Organization (RDSO) as well as an independent 
Commissioner of Railway Safety, administered by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, 
Government of India. 
Third, while the Railways’ freight business benefits from surging demand in a 
rapidly growing economy, it is not sufficient to yield higher earnings and profits.  
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Between 1987 and 2001 the Indian economy grew by over six percent, but rail freight 
grew at about two percent.  In contrast, between 2005 and 2008 the Indian economy 
grew at eight percent, and the Railways, through a series of interventions discussed 
earlier, encashed this surging demand by expanding its freight business at nine percent 
per annum. To recapitulate, encashing this demand required structural improvements 
in the functioning of the Railways to alleviate supply-side constraints so that the 
Railways could respond.  Further, between 2001 and 2008, both local and global 
macroeconomic stability, characterized by low inflation and interest rates, greatly 
enhanced the Railways’ ability to reduce its unit costs at current prices.  A combination 
of high inflation and high interest rates could disrupt this virtuous cycle of growing 
volumes and falling unit costs.  Moreover, commodity cycle upturns have benefited the 
Railways.  While the spike in petroleum prices (particularly in 2008) imposed an 
additional burden of about a billion dollars on the Railways, surging demand for 
commodities like steel, cement, and iron ore provided manifold benefits to the 
Railways’ freight business segment.  As discussed earlier, high international prices of 
iron ore contributed a few billion dollars of additional earnings to the Railways through 
increase in freight charges on exports.  However, the volatility of the commodity market 
and its impact on the Railways’ freight business is seen in potential outcomes of the 
recent global financial crisis and credit crunch.  As the commodity cycle unwinds, the 
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Railways’ freight volumes may decline and freight earnings from iron ore for export 
alone may wipe out a billion dollars in expected earnings. 
Fourth, the quick fix argument, or gains from low hanging fruit, does not stand 
to scrutiny either.  A back-of-the-envelope calculation to benchmark the Indian 
Railways with Chinese and American railroads provides a glimpse into how 
underutilized the Railways’ existing assets are.  An equally large state-owned Chinese 
Railways undertakes the same number of passenger kilometers but transports four 
times more freight than its Indian counterpart.  Likewise, the freight only, class-one 
American Railroads have one-tenth the number of employees when compared to the 
Indian Railways, while transporting three times the amount of freight.  In essence, the 
scope to improve productivity in the Indian Railways remains significant. 
Moreover, to meet future demand, targets are set for the Eleventh Five Year Plan 
(2008–2012), namely a 50 percent growth in passenger and freight volumes.  This will 
require an increase in investments to extend the network and expand the rolling stock, 
adopt new technology, plus improve the quality of rolling stock, signaling, and other 
systems (see Table 26).  
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Table 26.  Comparison of traffic volumes in past and present Five Year Plan 
 10th Plan  
2003–2007 
11th Plan 
2008–2012 (projected) 
Percent  
increase 
Freight Traffic (million tons at origin) 728 1,100 51  
Net Ton Kilometers (billion) 481 702 46 
Passenger Trips(billion at origin) 6.3 8.4 33 
Passenger Kilometers (billion) 696 942 35 
 
Source: Planning Commission, Government of India, 2008 
 
Table 27 provides a comparison of past as well as planned investments for capital 
expenditure based on the five year plans.  There is a concerted effort to increase reliance 
on internal generation, market borrowings (extra-budgetary resources) as well as 
public-private partnerships (not listed in the table but expected to raise four billion 
dollars) as opposed to relying largely on budgetary support from the public exchequer. 
Table 27.  Comparison of investment sources in Five Year Plans 
Source of investment funds 10th Plan  
2003–2007 
11th Plan  
2008–2012 (projected) 
Percent 
increase 
Gross Budget Support (%  of total) 37,516 (45%) 63,635 (27%) 70 
Internal Generation 29,567 (35%) 90,000 (39%) 204 
Extra-Budgetary Resources 16,981(20%) 79,654 (34%) 369 
Total 84,064 (100%) 233,289 (100%) 178 
 
Source: Planning Commission, Government of India, 2008 
Note: in the 11th plan additional investments through public-private partnerships are anticipated. 
 
In an effort to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of investments, the construction 
works, as well as the acquisition of rolling stock, have been conceptualized with a 
commercial orientation to meet the demand of the logistics market.  The investment 
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strategy has been temporally parsed.  Short and medium term reforms have been 
discussed in the preceding chapters.  For instance, the Railways strategically invested in 
short-gestation high-return projects, like increasing axle load on one hand, and 
lengthening platforms to accommodate longer trains on the other.  Further, several 
operational and procedural constraints were alleviated by the modernization of loading 
practices and conditions on goods sheds as well as fixing network bottlenecks.  
Likewise, in the medium-term, a three to five year period, several transit junctions were 
decongested by constructing flyovers and bypasses, goods sheds were provided with 
additional loading and unloading lines, gauge conversion on some congested routes to 
serve as alternate paths, and so forth.  Yet, these measures are not sufficient to meet the 
anticipated demand for traffic.  For the long haul, along with the introduction of 
capacity and efficiency enhancing technology, systems, and procedures, the Railways 
will be investing tens of billions of dollars during the next five years to enhance 
capacity. The Railway Budget has allocated resources for eliminating network 
bottlenecks, developing multi-modal logistic parks, and improving railway stations.  
These investments are being financed through a combination of internal generation, 
borrowings from the market, and public-private partnerships, including outsourcing 
though long-term contracts (see Table 27).  All of this investment is being strategically 
channeled to projects that have a commercial orientation.  For instance, through route-
wise planning the entire high-density network’s capacity will be augmented on a 
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priority basis over the next five years at a cost of 75,000 crore rupees (US $17.4 billion).  
Likewise, priority is being given to strengthening iron ore and coal routes so as to carry 
25 ton axle-load.  Finally, to enhance capacity in the long-term, dedicated freight 
corridors are being developed along the length and breadth of the country to match the 
golden quadrilateral and its diagonals, a national highway building program.  To meet 
the surge in demand, factories are being built to manufacture engines, wagons, coaches, 
and their parts.  Simultaneously, through public-private partnerships, billions of dollars 
will be invested in information technology.  The central objectives of the information 
technology projects are to better inform senior management as they plan for the long-
term for effective and efficient utilization of human and physical capital, reducing 
operating cost, increasing passenger and freight earnings, enhancing customer 
satisfaction and further building brand value.  In essence, the Indian Railways is 
investing through a multi-pronged strategy to sustain its growth trajectory (see Annex 
10).   
 Finally, sustaining the management impetus after the Minister and his team 
leave office is less of a concern as the policy reforms have been embedded in the 
institutional DNA by instating systemic and procedural reforms. These have become 
part of the organizational routine, manuals, and to some extent norms.  This can largely 
be attributed to change management approach that respects and strengthens the 
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organizational identity and morale of employees.  Through a consensus based approach 
the reforms have induced change with deep roots within the institution. 
 However, several challenges lie ahead on the organizational front.  Chief 
among these are attracting and retaining talented staff, creating a culture of cross-
functional collaboration, increasing accountability throughout the hierarchy of the 
organization, and spurring innovation.  First, in a reversal of past trends, when the 
Indian Railways was a sought after employer for highly qualified young professionals 
including IIT and IIM graduates, with a rapid expansion of the economy the Railways is 
increasingly facing competition from private employers.  
 In an ever evolving business environment, recent efforts by the Railways to 
train officers in institutions outside the Railways, both in premier universities in India 
and around the world, is a first step in strengthening the capacity of existing staff.  But 
it is not sufficient to meet the Railways’ future needs and such capacity enhancing 
collaborations should be further developed.  There have been efforts to decentralize 
decision making in the Railways’ zones and within zones to divisions so as to increase 
the level of accountability at the field units but there is a lot more that could be 
accomplished on this front as well.  In this vein, other institutional changes, like 
reorganizing the Railway Board based on the Railways’ business segments, as opposed 
to the present functional silos, hold the potential to help break departmental divisions 
and bring a cohesive business orientation to the organization as a whole.  Additional 
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efforts towards increased accountability throughout the hierarchy of the organization as 
well as enhancing the quality of work for the staff are goals that need further work.  
Finally, to sustain these financial gains the Railways needs to continue to foster 
innovation in commercial, operational, and pricing policies.  Further, there is a need to 
promote synergy across zones and system optimization through cross-functional 
cooperation and spatial coordination. To encourage creative and nimble responses to an 
ever shifting market dynamic, an innovation promotion group has been constituted in 
the Railway Board, but this is still in its infancy and needs further strengthening.   
 On the business front, it is essential to continue the focus on market and 
business segmentation, respond to firms’ supply chains as well as distribution networks 
and client needs through tailor made strategies.  For example, a steel plant on the one 
hand needs to transport raw materials from the mines to the factory and on the other 
hand transport finished products to the consumers.  These are two distinct 
transportation needs of firms, and the Railways needs to align its freight business in 
order to directly respond to these diverse business needs within the supply chain of 
firms and tailored to specific commodities like steel, cement, fertilizer, and so forth.  For 
instance, to achieve the Mission 200 million tons for the cement industry, a goal set in 
the Railway Budget (2008), the management needs to focus on articulating specific 
responses to the logistical needs of the specific supply chain.  This includes, but is not 
limited to, developing tailor made wagons for fly-ash, clinker, and bulk cement, and to 
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expand as well as strengthen the rail network and terminals in new cement producing 
geographies.  This industry specific response is increasingly becoming the modus 
operandi and needs further development. Moreover, there is a need to anticipate 
capacity expansion by firms, especially as several commodity producers, like steel and 
cement plants, plan on doubling capacity over the next few years. 
Production of cement is expected to increase from 170 MT to 280 MT by the end of the 11th Plan. 
Railways receive more than 100 MT traffic every year from the cement industry and we are 
targeting a loading of 200 MT from cement industry in 2011–12. There are more than 10 big clusters 
of cement production in the country. Work is in progress on Nandyal-Yerraguntla, Jaggayyapet-
Mallacheruvu and Vishnupuram-Janpahad new lines and these will be completed in a time bound 
manner. The work of Bhanupali- Bilaspur-Beri new line in Himachal Pradesh has been proposed in 
the budget. The work of Daund-Gulbarga doubling and electrification of Pune-Guntakal line is 
proposed to be taken up to meet the demand of cement manufacturers in Wadi cluster. Gauge 
conversion and extension of Bhuj-Nalia line will be taken up after obtaining necessary approvals.  
More than 50 big terminals are being upgraded to increase their capacity, prominent among which 
are Mumbai, Pune, Chandigarh, Ghaziabad etc (Budget speech, 2008, p. 47). 
 
To respond to the rapidly expanding steel industry the Railways in its most recent 
budget articulated its own response to this anticipated demand.  
Steel production is expected to increase from 55 MT (million tons) to 110 MT by the end of the 11th 
Plan. The Railways receives 120 MT traffic from the steel industry every year and we have targeted 
traffic of 200 MT from the steel industry by 2011–12. Most of the new dedicated iron ore routes will 
be constructed or upgraded for 25-ton axle load and some routes will be made suitable for running 
30-ton axle load trains (Budget speech, 2008, p. 46). 
 
In essence, the Railways not only needs to improve services to the existing commodity 
freight market by expanding its market share, but it needs to preempt the needs of 
future customers and lock in business through contractual arrangements that create 
long term relationships, for example as has been initiated through schemes like the 
wagon-investment scheme and engine-on-load scheme, as well as incentives for 
building new sidings and rewards for incremental freight.  Dynamic, differential, and 
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customer oriented policies by their very nature need constant revision and refinement 
to match the market dynamics.  For example, recently the Railways has introduced 
distance based, also known as lead based, differential pricing for cement and iron ore.  
Such strategies need to be adopted for other business sub-segments as well.  Distance 
based pricing responds to the Railways relative competitiveness.  For instance, long 
lead traffic of iron ore for export, that is involving a distance of greater than 400 
kilometers, is presently offered a discount of up to 50 percent because international 
commodity prices have plummeted.  Conversely, short lead traffic for cement, 
involving a distance of less than 300 kilometers, is being offered discounts of up to 40 
percent because of stiff competition from truckers.  Such commodity specific pricing 
strategies need to be dynamic and differential, but increasingly tailored to specific 
commodity and geographic regions so as to reflect market conditions—including 
demand for commodities and credible threats from alternative modes of transport, and 
the like.  Another instance of a critical business segment that requires tailor made 
responses by the Railways is freight transported to and from the ports, which accounts 
for a quarter of the Railways’ freight business.  Thus, there is a need to invest in 
eliminating bottlenecks along the freight corridors that carry this freight to increase the 
productivity of these high density networks. This was planned for in the Railways 
budget for 2009 under mission 300 million tons for port traffic. 
Indian Railways receives about 25% of the total traffic from various ports. India’s foreign trade is 
likely to increase from 650 MT to 1100 MT by 2011–12. Thus, Railways is giving top priority to port 
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rail connectivity projects (Budget speech, 2008, p. 43) . . . Under the present scheme, during the 
concession period of 30 years, the Special Purpose Vehicle is eligible for proportionate net income 
or a return of 14% on equity whichever is less. The cost of investment in the construction of the 
project is based on actual expenditure incurred. To prevent time and cost over runs and facilitate 
real price discovery, it has been decided that on a pilot basis implementation of some projects will 
be explored on BOT (build-operate-and-transfer) basis through open tenders. The beneficiaries of 
the new line will give traffic guarantees (Budget speech, 2008, p. 45). 
 
The threats to sustainability stem from macroeconomic volatility more than any other 
factor because it is beyond the scope of the Railways to adequately hedge for inflation 
and interest rate fluctuations.  On the other hand, the Railways is relatively better 
geared to tackle issues such as attracting and retaining talented staff and investing to 
meet future needs as well as innovating  to compete effectively in the market for 
transportation services.  However, for an organization as large and complex as the 
Indian Railways it would to be too simplistic to assume that all issues concerning the 
future of the Railways have been addressed here or indeed can be anticipated.  Thus, 
like other large organizations the Railways viability will be a function of its ability to 
learn from its past as well as constantly innovate to meet new challenges posed by a 
rapidly changing logistics marketplace. For instance, the increasing role of 
containerization and multi-modal logistics that is seamlessly integrate into global 
supply chains requires attention. At the same time it must continue to meet the needs of 
poor commuters.   
  
Towards a New Theory for Infrastructure Reforms in a Market Economy 
Inclusive Reform Framework 
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The traditional approach to infrastructure reforms focuses predominantly on 
privatization for efficiency gains—unbundling, transfer from public to private 
ownership, retrenchment, and fare-hikes for cost recovery.  In contrast, I propose a new 
inclusive reform framework that discards the assumptions of the traditional approach112.  
In the new framework, it is assumed that privatization is not a prerequisite for 
efficiency gains and equity and efficiency objectives can be complementary. 
Successful transformation of the Indian Railways consists of some transferable 
lessons that may be considered in the context of reforming other public utilities in 
market economies.  The conventional prescriptions of corporatization, privatization, 
retrenchment, hikes in user fees, and independent regulation have been effective in 
sectors where charging and recovering the user fee is not politically contentious, as in 
the case of ports, telecom, and aviation.  The gains from private competition in the 
telecom industry in India113 are a classic case.  However, there is a need to rethink this 
                                                 
 
 
 
112 The traditional approach assumes that public utilities are monopolies and inefficient because they lack 
competition, charge below cost recovery tariffs, and are over staffed.  Inefficiency results from political 
interference aimed at balancing social and commercial objectives.  Privatization is a pre-requisite for 
efficiency gains where equity needs to be compromised for efficiency gains, at least in the short-run. 
 
113But similar efforts have been less successful in other contexts, like Mexico for instance.  Further, in recent 
developments, according to an audit report by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, misallocation of 2G 
spectrum in 2008 by the Department of Telecommunications resulted in a loss of an estimated US $40 Billion in 
revenue to the Government of India (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2010, p. ix). 
315 
 
text-book approach to reforms in sectors like energy, water supply, irrigation, urban bus 
transport, and railways where charging and recovery of user fees, such that operation 
and maintenance costs are recovered, are often politically infeasible.  For such sectors, 
some ingredients for reinventing a reform strategy are identified and a new inclusive 
reform framework is articulated (Figure 25). 
The three key ingredients of this inclusive reform framework—diagnosis, 
invention, and agency—are drawn from the replicable attributes of the Indian Railway’s 
transformation.  First, diagnosis, focuses on crafting a space for reform such that reform 
interventions by policymakers target gains that enhance efficiency as well as equity.  
This is achieved through unpacking nano-market and nano-political economy 
conditions to identify constraints and opportunities for reform.   
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Figure 26.  Inclusive reform framework 
 
 
 
Second, invention, which seeks to depart from the conventional focus on cost cutting 
through retrenchment and revenue enhancement through fare hikes.  Instead the focus 
is on supply optimization and demand responsiveness.  Supply-side mechanism focus 
on  business viability, by optimizing all apolitical variables, particularly leveraging 
existing underutilized assets of public utilities to jointly maximize social (equity) and 
commercial (efficiency) goals.  This approach requires a shift from a singular focus on 
asset accumulation and to asset utilization.  Demand-side mechanisms require customer 
centered services with a focus on quality and prices that are dynamic and differential. 
1. Diagnostic: 
Crafting a reform space—(1) 
Positive politico-bureaucratic 
engagement; (2) Commercially 
viable (efficient) and social 
desirable (equitable). 
3. Agency: 
Radical 
incrementalism—(1) 
Management innovation 
(big 5); (2) Economic, 
normative, and coercive 
incentives within the 
political economy. 
2. Invention: 
Every variable counts— 
(1) Supply-side asset 
optimizing; (2) Demand-
side customer 
responsiveness. 
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Third, agency, which focuses on a spectrum of management initiatives—particularly 
radical incrementalism that combines issues of profit orientation, coordination, strategic 
investments and partnerships, deliberative and calibrated approaches, with rigorous 
follow-up.  Additionally the focus on economic incentives, such as performance based 
wage discrimination, that is difficult to implement in public sector, creative alternatives 
such as including non-economic incentives, like normative and administratively 
coercive incentives, need consideration.  
 
Replication of Reforms 
There is no ‘silver bullet’ for reforms because they are always context specific, and in 
order to be effective a detailed analysis pertaining to the sectoral, temporal, and spatial 
contexts in addition to the usual economic, political, and social contexts is required.  
These are not meant to be prescriptions; instead, they are offered as possible ingredients 
of a strategy to tackle efforts to improve public service delivery in other network 
infrastructure sectors and, to a lesser extent, in non-infrastructure sectors such as health 
and education, where public service delivery persists.  In this regard, key aspects of the 
inclusive reform framework are outlined. 
First, diagnostic requires crafting space for a productive politico-bureaucratic interface 
where the bureaucracy respects the political mandate, and in return the political 
leadership refrains from interfering with the routine functioning of the bureaucracy.  It 
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is not uncommon for the bureaucracy and politicians to disagree as they confuse the 
democratic mandate—in the case of the Railways no privatization, no user fee hike, no 
retrenchment—with political interference, namely meddling with day-to-day 
management of the organization.  Mutual contempt, or at best skepticism, needs to be 
replaced by mutual trust and understanding of roles and responsibilities.  This can be 
achieved by delineating the political domain of crafting the democratic mandate as 
distinct from the bureaucratic realm.  The bureaucrats accept the mandate and channel 
its functioning to achieve the organization’s objectives—providing quality service while 
having a profit motive—without compromising the political mandate—of meeting the 
service obligations and needs of the marginal population. 
Second, diagnostics crafts space for commercial objectives and social obligations to be 
reconciled.  Counter-intuitive as it may be, the experience of the Railways’ 
transformation demonstrates this.  The Railways achieved this balance between equity 
and efficiency by first dissecting business segments into political and apolitical 
components; followed by further disaggregating it into nano-constituents so as to 
identify apolitical variables that could be manipulated to improve profitability without 
compromising the interests of the political constituencies—in the case of the Railways it 
was the poor consumers and the Railways’ employees.  In another sector this may 
differ.  For instance, in the electricity sector in India, if consumer segments are 
disaggregated, it is quite likely that in most states electricity for industries, affluent 
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neighborhoods, and shops can be market driven, while electricity for rural and urban 
poor will require social considerations.  And the subsidy can be targeted to these poor 
consumers alone.  While the tariff structure attempts to make these distinctions, in 
practice there is ample scope to seek nano-constituents of the consumer base that can be 
priced dynamically and differentially without burdening the poor.  To translate such 
insight into action requires working across departmental silos, introducing a 
commercial orientation to the organization, and breaking free of a monopoly-mindset.  
For instance, efforts to build cross-subsidies within the tariff, accompanied by 
increasingly unreliable quality and quantity of electricity supplied, has led to the 
migration of consumers who then pay their bills to independent power providers (small 
scale private intermediaries) or install self-generation through captive power plants, 
both big and small, for industry as well as large residential enclaves.  This opting out of 
the system in favor of alternatives is quite like the Railways customers in that, instead of 
paying high freight charges or air-conditioned travel fares, they chose alternatives that 
offered better value.  This has not been due to political interference, but due to a lack of 
commercial orientation and a monopoly mindset within the state electricity boards. 
Further, on the investment front, wheeling power to far flung villages is a small 
fraction of the total capital expenditure of the sector where political considerations 
dominate.  The rest of the power sector investments can and should be commercially 
managed.  For instance, there is vast scope in the electricity sector for improving the 
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utilization of existing capacity in generation, transmission, and distribution through 
low cost, short gestation, rapid payback, and high return investments.  Bulk metering of 
electricity along the primary, secondary and tertiary distribution network requires 
small investments but promises quick and high returns.  Separating technical losses in 
transmission and distribution from theft, and making strategic investments to reduce 
unaccounted for power which goes to large consumers like urban households and 
industrial areas, could yield results quite like that of increasing axle load and 
lengthening platforms as the Indian Railways did.  Furthermore, there are exceptions 
for rural power supply as well: state-of-the-art off-grid pre-paid systems for rural 
households developed by the Modi Research Group (Modi, 2011).  Further, the 
widespread obsession with construction, procurement, and expenditure needs to give 
way to effective and efficient utilization of existing assets for enhancing productivity.  
In essence, an in-depth business and political analysis is a prerequisite for crafting an 
effective strategy such that apolitical variables are identified and managed on market-
principles. This example is only to provoke progressive scholars and policy makers to 
explore such issues in other sectors and is in no way prescriptive; what such analysis 
reveals is that there is immense scope for expanding desirable win-win outcomes where 
social and commercial objectives are met simultaneously.   
Third, invention to improve supply-side efficiency by optimizing an underutilized 
system.  Across sectors there is enormous room to fix loopholes and reduce revenue 
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losses. Several components of electricity generation, transmission, most of the 
distribution, as well as billing and collection, can be market driven, yet publicly 
managed, assuming that there is a will to override narrow interest groups who benefit 
from inefficient and inequitable arrangements.  As mentioned earlier, state electricity 
boards in India can substantially reduce aggregate technical and commercial losses that 
stand at 35 percent, which is three times the global industry average, by improving 
billing efficiency that stands at 70 percent and collection efficiency of 94 percent. 
Fourth, invention to improve demand-side customer responsive dynamic and differential 
policies.  While this may sound rather obvious from an enterprise perspective, many 
public utilities are grounded by inertia.  In a fast changing external environment it is 
critical for public utilities to question past assumptions about the nature of the business, 
its cost structures, pricing, and respond appropriately.  It is reasonable to assume that 
maximizing profits is not one of the central objectives of a public utility. On the 
contrary, in the Indian context, there is an aversion to profit.  As the experience of the 
Railways transformation demonstrates, public utilities have to be re-oriented to pursue 
profits by responding to customer needs and competition from substitute services.  This 
is because a viable and financially sound utility is a prerequisite to meeting social 
obligations and objectives.  This requires not only a new mind set, but business savvy—
the ability to spot, seize, and encash business opportunities. Such opportunities abound 
in the power sector. For example, real time metering, as well as dynamic and 
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differential power tariffs for bulk consumers, have the potential to improve earnings 
substantially. 
Fifth, agency through radical incrementalism approaches for implementation: namely, 
setting stretched goals, cross functional and spatial coordination, strategic investments, 
fostering alliances, deploying a deliberative and calibrated approach, and chasing  (or 
aggressively following up) for results.   
Sixth, agency through some ground rules for navigating the political economy.  In the 
democratic context, perceptions of the electorate matter as much as reality (if not more) 
and gradualism in reform is essential to mitigate political and social risk, along with 
economic prudence.  A tripartite strategy has elements of replicability.  In implementing 
a mega-transformation, management strategists should carefully consider political 
positioning, choice of words (phraseology), timing, and a gradual pace for reforms.  
Incrementalism hedges against risk, as reforms are introduced and modified through 
negotiations with interest groups.  In this democratic spirit some battles will be 
conceded to win the war. And finally, to garner acceptability and credibility for the 
reforms, deft media management is required. 
In conclusion, the Railways transformation is an exemplar for how state-owned 
enterprises can improve services despite the odds of balancing commercial and social 
objectives to achieve inclusive reforms.  While the preceding chapters have unpacked 
the various attributes of the transformation strategy in substantial depth, this 
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dissertation does not aim to derive prescriptions for reforms.  Instead, it aims to 
provoke the readers by demonstrating that state-owned enterprises that provide 
infrastructure services can transform quite like private corporations have, and that there 
may be transferable lessons in the inclusive reform framework, although these may 
require substantial transformation if applied to alternate sectors, governance structures 
and economies because one size never fits all. 
 
Research findings and lessons learned 
Seven key findings and associated lessons from this research are summarized.  First, 
privatization of inefficient public utilities is not a prerequisite for efficiency again.  This 
discovery is in stark contrast with the prevailing theoretical assumptions and policy 
prescriptions.  Second, efficiency and equity gains can be jointly optimized in 
infrastructure sectors that are publicly managed because the utilities are well-within the 
production frontier and thus resources applied for improving services to the poor can 
simultaneously improve efficiency.  This allows for rethinking the conventional wisdom 
on utility reform that assumed commercial and social objectives to be strict substitutes.  
Third, profitability of utilities is a function of very many variables.  For instance, 
increasing the volume of a wagon can significantly enhance profits without changing 
user-fee per ton of freight transported.  This lesson is a departure from the traditional 
approach of focus on cost reduction through retrenchment and revenue enhancement 
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through increase in user-fees.  Fourth, lack of profit orientation and interdepartmental 
fragmentation (and conflicts) are primary constraints to improve utility performance, 
not lack of integrity and accountability of frontline workers or lack of talented technical 
personnel.  Thus, institutional systems that prioritize and reward organizational goals 
should be balanced with performance incentive—normative, coercive, and economic—
for individuals.  Fifth, favorable macroeconomic conditions—rapid economic growth 
and associated commodity demand, low interest rates and other costs of accessing 
capital, as well as low inflation rates—offer opportunities for decreasing the unit cost of 
utility services through expansion of utility (freight) services that leverage economies of 
scale.  However, leveraging these opportunities requires conceited effort by agents in 
the business, political, and policy, domains.  Sixth, in public utilities, political mandates 
(distinct from political interference in routine technical choices) can offer desirable 
outcomes when the preferences of the electorate are expressed through political visions 
that are implemented through technically qualified bureaucrats.  This observation is a 
departure from the school of thought that prescribes independent regulation as a 
prerequisite to eliminating political interference.  Seventh, each year, at least two trillion 
dollars are needed to finance infrastructure construction and renewal around the world.  
Reference classing the forecast of the role of private and public sources of finance 
suggests the dominant role of public sector financing will persist.  For private sector 
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finance to increase its share of financing infrastructure, in the risk averse capital 
markets prevalent after the financial crisis of 2008, private innovation will be put to test.  
 
Future Research 
Over the next two decades, the OECD estimates that about US $40 trillion will be spent 
on building infrastructure around the world.  Governments will remain significant 
actors in enabling, regulating, as well as providing these services.  This dissertation has 
aimed to provide insight into alternative mechanisms of improving the performance of 
infrastructure providing state-owned enterprises, which continue to account for up to 
80% of all infrastructure investments and management in developing countries.  
Building on the theoretical exploration and empirical substantiation of this research, 
two complementary areas for future research emerge. 
 
Typology of Positive Utility Reform Case Studies 
There is a need to analyze additional positive case studies of successful public utility 
transformations that balanced commercial and social goals through a variety of 
approaches ranging from public sector innovation to privatization.  The case selection 
should focus on range of infrastructure sectors—water, transport, energy, 
telecommunications—as well as a variety of socioeconomic conditions in which they 
exist.  The goal of such research is to develop a typology of contextualized possibilities 
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of improving infrastructure services, to inform the next generation of reforms through 
grounded theory. 
 
Empirical Analysis of Climate Change on Infrastructure  
The next generation of infrastructure investments is being made to replace aging capital 
stock in developed countries, and build new infrastructure to close the gap in 
developing countries.  There is an urgent need to study impacts of climate change on 
existing and future infrastructure investment and management.  There are few initial 
efforts in this direction where climate risk, adaptation, mitigation, and policy options 
for infrastructure sectors are explored.  For example, Mehrotra, et al., (2011) assess the 
state-of-the-knowledge on climate change and urban transport.  For a policy oriented 
application in the context of New York City, the research by the New York Panel on 
Climate Change is illustrative (Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2010) as are technical 
assessments by the Transport Research Board (2008).  However, a comprehensive 
assessment of the state-of-the-knowledge on climate change and infrastructure is much 
needed. 
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All details on the Indian Railways are based on Ministry of Railways, Government of 
India statistics and documents, unless stated otherwise. 
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Glossary 
 
Hindi Words 
 
Aam admi common man 
Bhajiya deep fried snacks 
Coolie a porter 
Khādī hand spun and hand woven cotton cloth 
Kulhads clay pots 
Mumbaikars the people of Mumbai 
Rail Bhavan headquarters of the Ministry of Railways, Government of India 
Raj rule 
Yatri niwas hotels 
 
 
Technical Terms   
Zonal Railways Indian Railways is divided into sixteen zonal Railways.  Each zone 
has a territorial jurisdiction ranging from 2,400 to 6,500 route 
kilometers.  Each zone is led by a General Manager (GM). 
Divisions Each zonal railway is divided into three to six operational units called 
divisions.  There are 68 divisions in Indian Railways each led by a 
Divisional Railway Manager (DRM). 
Production Units Indian Railways has six production units for manufacture of coaches, 
locomotives, and the like. 
Passenger Earnings Earnings from all classes ofpassenger traffic. 
Other Coaching 
Earnings 
Earnings from luggage, parcel, postal, defense, and other 
miscellaneous coaching services.   
Goods Earnings Earnings from all kinds of goods traffic. 
Sundry Earnings Earnings from leasing of land, advertising, catering, right of way, 
dividend from public sector undertakings, reimbursement of 
operating loss on strategic lines, rents, and tolls, and the like. 
Total Earnings Total earnings from goods, passenger, other coaching, and sundries. 
Suspense Traffic earnings which have accrued but not yet realized.  
Gross Traffic Receipts Earnings realized, namely total earnings +/- suspense. 
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Miscellaneous 
Receipts 
Receipts from subsidy received from general revenues towards 
dividend relief, receipts from railway recruitment boards, and the 
like. 
Total Receipts Sum of gross traffic receipts and miscellaneous receipts. 
Ordinary Working 
Expenses 
Expenses incurred for operation of the railway system including 
general superintendence and services; repairs and maintenance of 
permanent way and works, motive power and rolling stock, plant 
and equipments; traffic expenses, fuel, staff welfare, and the like.   
Appropriation to 
Pension Fund 
Amount appropriated from total receipts to the pension fund. 
Appropriation to 
Depreciation   Reserve 
Fund 
Amount appropriated from total receipts to depreciation reserve 
fund. 
Total Working 
Expenses 
Ordinary working expenses (+) appropriation to pension fund (+) 
appropriation to depreciation reserve fund. 
Open Line Works 
Revenue 
Small works charged to miscellaneous expenditure. 
Miscellaneous 
Expenditure 
Expenditure on Railway Board and other offices like RDSO, training 
institutes, open line works revenue, and the like. 
Total Expenditure Total working expenses (+) miscellaneous expenditure. 
Net Revenue Total receipts (-) total expenditure. 
Dividend Payment It is the amount of dividend paid by the Ministry of Railways to 
Ministry of Finance for the capital investment made by it in the 
Railways. 
Surplus Net revenues (-) dividend payment. 
Cash Surplus before 
Dividend 
Total receipts (+) interest on railway fund balances (+) appropriation 
to depreciation reserve fund (+) open line works revenue. 
Investible Surplus Cash surplus before dividend (-) dividend payment (-) interest on 
pension fund. 
Appropriation to 
Development Fund 
Amount appropriated to development fund from surplus. 
Appropriation to 
Capital Fund 
Amount appropriated to capital fund from surplus after 
appropriation to development fund. 
Depreciation Reserve 
Fund 
This fund provides for expenditure on replacement and renewal of 
assets including improvement element. 
Pension Fund This Fund provides for the expenditure on pensionary charges of 
Railway employees.   
Development Fund This fund provides for expenditure on providing amenities for 
passengers and other railway users, labor welfare works, un-
remunerative operating improvements, and the like.  
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Capital Fund Provides for capital expenditure. 
Budgetary Support Funds received from General Exchequer for capital expenditure. 
Capital-at-Charge Book value of railway assets created from budgetary support. 
Return on Capital 
Investment 
Rate of return on capital investment made on the Railways. Ratio = 
(net revenue)/(capital-at-charge (+) investment from capital fund).  
Operating Ratio Ratio of total working expenses excluding suspense to gross traffic 
earnings. 
Traffic Revenue-
Earning  
Traffic which is paid for by the consignor or the consignee. 
Gauge Indian Railway is a multi-gauge system, comprising of broad 
gauge(1676 millimeter), meter gauge(1000 millimeter), and narrow 
gauge (762 or 610 millimeter). 
Key-men Railway employee who inspects their designated stretch of rail 
network by foot, both track and bridges, once a day.  
Private Sidings Refers to the length of line from the take off point on the main railway 
system to the siding holder’s premises. 
Piecemeal or Smalls Goods consignments whose weight and dimensions do not require 
the exclusive use of a wagon. 
Gross Ton Kilometer A ton, including payload, tare and weight of engine, carried over one 
kilometer.  
Net Ton Kilometer Payload of one ton carried over one kilometer. 
Wagon Turn-round Interval of time between two successive loadings of a wagon. 
Passenger Kilometer A passenger transported over one kilometer. 
Train Kilometer Movement of a train over one kilometer. 
Lead Average haul of a passenger or a ton of freight. 
Output The volume of traffic moving between any two points on the  railway 
expressed in terms of passenger  kilometers (PKM) or  net  ton   
kilometers  (NTKM)  or train  kilometers  per  running  track 
kilometer. 
Sick Line A portion of the yard where carriage and wagon repairs are 
undertaken. 
Pit Line A maintenance line for under-frame examination of rolling stock. 
Yard A portion of the railway system where trains are dealt with. 
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Workshop A facility for repairs of rolling stock. 
Wagon A freight truck used for carrying goods in Railways. 
SandT Signalling and telecommunication used for controlling the movement 
of trains. 
Free Time Time limit prescribed for free of charge loading/unloading and 
removal of consignments from railway premises. 
Train Examination  Examination of rolling stock at fixed intervals. 
Rake A formation consisting of a set of coaches/wagons to be hauled as a 
train. 
Close-circuit Rake To and fro movement of goods trains over a pre-defined route with a 
base depot for maintenance and examination. 
Mileage Based 
Examination 
Maintenance schedule undertaken after movement of a train over a 
pre-determined distance. 
End-to-end Rake Rakes which are offered for examination and maintenance before 
every loading. 
Passenger profile   
Management 
Mapping of reservation demand against availability of 
accommodation with a view to optimize the latter. 
Rake links Deployment of passenger trains between originating and destination 
stations with a view to optimize utilization of rolling stock. 
Axle load The axle load is the maximum weight of an axle permitted on a given 
track and is a governing parameter for rolling stock and track design.  
It is calculated by dividing the gross weight of loaded freight 
wagon/coach/locomotive by number of axles of the rolling stock. 
Electronic Weigh 
Bridge 
A device used for weighing each loaded wagon of the train 
electronically. 
Wagon Impact Load 
Detector (WILD) 
Real-time online system to capture, analyze, and report the 
instantaneous loads exerted by the passing train wheels on the 
instrumented track section.  The system is capable of isolating and 
identifying wheels exerting excess impact load on the track and send 
this report immediately to the Divisional Control through an 
electronic network. 
Wharfage Charges accrued on use of railway premises beyond free time. 
Throughput 
Enhancement 
Throughput enhancement refers to any investment or activity that 
results in an increase in the capacity of a particular section or route to 
carry additional traffic measured in terms of gross ton kilometers. 
Route-wise Planning Route-wise planning refers to an approach whereby integrated 
planning is done for the entire route so that bottlenecks are 
eliminated completely leading to a significant increase in output as 
against piecemeal/incremental planning which often result in 
relocating, not fixing, the bottlenecks. 
353 
 
High Density Network 
(HDN) 
This comprises of the rail routes connecting the four metros of Delhi, 
Kolkata, Chennai, and Mumbai with each other and the Delhi-
Guwahati route.  HDN carries bulk of the freight and passenger 
traffic of Indian Railways. 
Double Line Track  Two separate unidirectional lines running in parallel. 
Block Section The portion of running line between two stations. 
IBS An arrangement of signaling in which a long block section is split into 
two block sections for enhancing line capacity. 
Multimodal Logistic 
Park 
An inter-model cargo landing and processing facility consisting of 
container terminals, warehouses, banks, office space, and mechanized 
facilities for landing, sorting/grading, cold chain aggregation/dis-
aggregation, and the like.  The objective of this facility is to provide 
an efficient and integrated logistics hub in or near special economic 
zones, industrial clusters, or other nodes of cargo convergence. 
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Annex 1.  Research Summary Matrix 
Objective Source(s) of 
Information 
Method(s) 
for Selecting 
Unit(s) of 
Analysis 
Method(s) 
for 
Data 
Collection 
Type of Analysis 
To provide a 
reference class for 
public utilities from 
world’s 15 largest 
economies (+ other 
interesting countries) 
by establishing the 
extent of state-
ownership in 
infrastructure sectors 
today. 
 
Various industry 
reports: Standard 
and Poors; Reuters; 
London Economics, 
and websites of 
regulators.  IMF for 
GDP. 
Variable: Gross 
Domestic Product. 
 
Author’s 
compilation, 
based on 
McCraw 
(1986) 
matrix on 
extent of 
state-
ownership 
in 7 
countries. 
Descriptive statistics 
used to compare 
market share of 
public with private 
sector ownership in 
utility infrastructure 
in each country 
expressed in 
percentages. 
 
To create a reference 
class for Indian 
Railways by 
comparing the Indian 
Railways with the 
largest Railways of 
the world, as 
measured by freight 
carried Net Ton 
Kilometers (NTKM). 
World Bank’s 
Railways 
Performance 
Database (2007). 
 
 
Variable: Net Ton 
Kilometers 
(NTKM). 
5 largest Railways 
of the world (USA, 
China, Russia, 
India, Canada) that 
account for 83% of 
global rail NTKM. 
Public 
access 
database 
downloaded 
from the 
World Bank 
website. 
Descriptive statistics 
used to establish the 
position of Indian 
Railways among the 
world’s largest 
railway systems 
through a 
comparison of size, 
output, and 
performance 
variables. 
 
Why study the Indian 
Railways? (Black 
swan, a counter 
intuitive case of how 
a public utility can 
improve performance 
without 
privatization.) 
Books, government 
documents, media 
reports, and 
interviews. 
 
Variable: Operating 
Raito, Revenue, 
Expenditure. 
Paradigmatic and 
critical case 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
Semi-
structured 
and open-
ended 
interviews 
as well as 
content 
analysis.   
Comparative case 
study with a 
deliberative and 
interpretivist 
approach. 
To craft a brief history 
of the Indian 
Railways including a 
timeline for 
modernization.   
 
Books and 
manuscripts as well 
as internal 
Railways’ 
documents like 
policy.  
memorandums. 
Variable: critical 
events in history: 
financing through 
bonds, evolution of 
technological 
choices, 
development of 
safety standards,   
and evolution of 
Archival 
research 
and review 
of pivotal 
literature. 
Historical analysis 
through archival 
research to identify 
critical events and 
craft a context for 
the case study. 
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Objective Source(s) of 
Information 
Method(s) 
for Selecting 
Unit(s) of 
Analysis 
Method(s) 
for 
Data 
Collection 
Type of Analysis 
institutional 
structure. 
To describe the 
Railways in India 
through vital 
statistics, 
organizational 
structure (with 
organograms), and its 
importance to the 
economy and society. 
Indian Railways’ 
Statistical 
Department, 
government 
documents and 
media reports.   
Variable: Operating 
Ration, Revenue 
and Expenditure. 
 
Application 
requesting 
the Indian 
Railways 
statistical 
department 
for the data. 
Interrupted time 
series analysis of 
key statistics 
including scale, 
output, and 
performance 
variables over a 50 
year period with a 
particular focus on 
points of inflection 
especially around 
2001, the near 
bankruptcy period. 
To elucidate the 
macroeconomic 
environment in India 
and its impact on the 
Railways’ 
performance and 
finances. 
 
Three114 Indian 
transport sector 
reports (Govt.  of 
India, World Bank, 
ADB) and 
interviews with 
macro economists 
analyzing the Indian 
economy. 
Variable:  
Macro—GDP 
growth rates, 
commodity prices;  
Railways—output 
and performance 
measures.   
Review of 
pivotal 
literature. 
Discourse analysis 
with a focus on 
liberalization of the 
Indian economy 
(including road 
transport) starting 
in the late 1980s, 
changing incentives 
of Railways’ major 
customers and 
diminished ability 
(and willingness) of 
the Government of 
India to provide 
budget support to 
the Railways. 
To explain the build 
up to the Financial 
crisis in the Indian 
Three Indian 
transport sector 
reports. 
Variable: Operating 
Ration, Revenue 
and Expenditure. 
Review of 
pivotal 
literature. 
Discourse analysis 
with a focus on the 
inability of the 
                                                 
 
 
 
114Government of India.  (2001).  Rakesh Mohan Committee Report,  
World Bank.  (2001).  Indian’s Transportation Sector: The Challenges Ahead 
Asian Development Bank.  (2001).  Railways restructuring study.   
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Objective Source(s) of 
Information 
Method(s) 
for Selecting 
Unit(s) of 
Analysis 
Method(s) 
for 
Data 
Collection 
Type of Analysis 
Railways (1997–2001) 
 
Railways to respond 
to the changing 
economic 
environment that 
led to a financial 
crisis (non-payment 
of dividends to the 
Central 
Government).  And 
the related Ideal Type 
reform proposed by 
the Government of 
India and 
international 
analysts. 
To craft the reform 
strategy through 
seeking answers to: 
How did the Indian 
Railways transform in 
four years? What 
specific steps led to 
the Railways revival?  
What was the role of 
the freight versus the 
passenger segments? 
What were the 
obstacles to change, 
how did the Railways 
over come them?  
How was corruption 
tackled?  
Interviews with the 
administrative 
hierarchy of the 
Indian Railway 
bureaucracy115, 
critical scholars and 
journalist, and 
freight and 
passenger customer 
(steel and soya).   
Variables: 
Management 
strategy towards 
political, market, 
organizational 
conditions.  Focus 
on faster, longer, 
and heavier trains. 
Nested unit 
of analysis: 
the 
bureaucracy 
of the 
Indian 
Railways, 
vertical and 
horizontal.  
Interview 
based on 
availability. 
 
Analysis of response 
through a 
Hirschman 
approach to non-
paradigmatic 
explanation, 
clustered into three 
broad categories of 
business, political, 
organizational 
constraints.  
Emphasis on the 
spaces for reform, 
diagnosis of 
constraints and 
organizational 
strategy of faster, 
longer, and heavier 
trains. 
                                                 
 
 
 
115 The Minister for Railways and his advisors, Railway Board (member traffic and finance) retired senior 
railway staff; founding director of Container Corporation of India, General managers Central Railways; 
zonal and divisional level staff and front line workers, critical scholars and journalist, and freight 
customer (steel and soya) and passenger. 
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Annex 2.  Assumptions for Cost Allocations 
Assumptions for cost allocations are as follows.  The costs are split into variable and fixed costs based on 
Railways’ cost allocation principles.  The variable costs are discussed, followed by fixed costs.  
First, unit cost of terminal expenses per passenger originating is applied and as such it is treated 
as a variable cost, although many of these costs are fixed in nature.  Terminal expenses include the 
expenses relating to ticket booking office, ticket checking, reservation and enquiry, special services such 
as expenses relating to retiring rooms, waiting rooms, platform inspectors, passenger guide, and traveling 
ticket checking staff.  Additionally, costs for miscellaneous services include expenses incurred on 
provision and maintenance of platforms, washing, cleaning, and water provision for coaches, train 
examinations, and shunting activities.   
Second, unit cost per coach kilometer (number of coaches multiplied by the kilometers traveled) 
is applied to compute line haul cost of traction—the unit cost for hauling a train for one kilometer and 
thus varies with the number of coaches—includes cost of fuel, maintenance cost of overhead electric 
traction, repairs and maintenance of locomotives, and related depreciation, interest as well as cost of 
crew, therefore it's a variable cost.  
Third, the line haul cost of track maintenance is considered a variable cost. While many of these 
costs are fixed in nature but are treated as variable because they are computed based on the unit cost per 
coach kilometer.  It includes all the repairs and maintenance cost of tracks, depreciation and interest on 
tracks.   
There are two types of costs that are treated as fixed where addition or removal of coaches does 
not change costs on unit distance traveled. Therefore, unit cost per train kilometer is a fixed cost. Line 
haul cost of transportation includes cost of maintenance of structures (other than track), operating staff, 
train passing staff, and the cost of signaling are computed based on the unit cost per train kilometer of 
these activities.   
To account for overheads, central charges are added as a percentage of total direct costs and 
therefore they too vary with the number of coaches.  Further, repairs and maintenance, depreciation and 
interest of coaches vary directly in proportion to the number of coaches and are calculated on travel time 
of the train and are based on the capital cost of coaches. 
As a result of the application of the above unit cost adopted by the Indian railway—where most 
costs components are treated as variable, although many of these costs are fixed in nature—the cost per 
train kilometer function increases in a linear manner. 
 
Annex 3.  Weighted Index of Inputs for Railways 
Weighted index of inputs for Railways (WIIR) is prepared annually in order to measure change (increase 
or decrease) of Railways’ input costs over the time. The purpose of this index is to compute a single index 
from price indices of the inputs relevant to the Railways, taking into consideration their relative weights 
in order to produce a composite metric.   
The wholesale price indices (WPI) consider a general basket of commodities, composed of (a) 
primary articles—food and agricultural products; (b) fuel, power, light and lubricants; (c) manufactures 
products.  Many of these articles are not relevant for the Railways’ operations. Therefore, railway specific 
inputs constitute the WIIR—diesel, electricity, transport equipment, non-ferrous metals, electrical 
machinery, lubricants, oil, manufactured products, heavy rails,  and ferrous metals.  Further, the WPI has 
indices for these constituents, and are used to derive the WIIR.  Therefore, the base years of these 
constituents correspond to the base years of WPI.  For the purpose of computing real prices for the 
Railways, inflation adjustments are made based on this railway specific WIIR and not the general WPI. 
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Source: Statistics and Economics Directorate, Ministry of Railways, Government of India, 2008.   
Annex 4.  Plan Expenditure (2001–2008) 
(All amounts in crore rupees) 
 Total  
 
General 
Exchequer 
Internal 
Resources 
External 
Resources 
2001 9395 3269 3229 2897 
2002 10177 5517 2485 2175 
2003 11408 5778 3113 2517 
2004 13394 7081 3476 2837 
2005 15422 8669 3712 3041 
2006 18838 8073 7034 3731 
2007 25002 7914 12233 4855 
2008  28680 8668 14948 5064 
 
Annex 5.  Radical Incrementalism:  Gradual Increase in Axle Load (2004–2008) 
Rate Circular Number & date  On routes applicable  
CC+2  
R C No.22 of 2004 w.e.f 1.9.2004 All loose and bulk commodities  
R.C No. 31 of 2004 dated 16.09.2004 Consolidation of all earlier circulars for chargeable 
weight for cc commodities. 
CC+4  
RC No. 48 of  2004 dated 7.11.2004 For all 8 wheeled wagons for loose and bulk commodities  
CC+6  
R.C .No. 67 of 2005 dated 21.1.2005 Six routes of CC +6 were introduced  
RC. No. 11 of 2006 dated 01.02.2006 Some new routes added in CC+6 routes  
RC No 15 of 2006 dated 17.02.2006 New routes added  
RC No 27 of 2006 dated 29.03.2006 New routes added 
RC No. 41 of 2006 Compilation of CC+6 routes  
RC No 82 of 2006 dated 5.10.2006 10 new CC+6 routes are added from different Railways 
RC No 96 of 2006 dated 13.11.2006 4 new CC+6 routes are added 
RC. No. 103 of 2006 dated 30.11.2006 5 new CC+6 routes are added 
RC No. 10 of 2007 dated 07.02.2007 17 new CC+6 routes added 
RC.No.16 of 2007 dated 28.02.2007 One new CC+6 routes added 
RC. No. 69 of 2007 dated 27.06.2007  Consolidation of all CC+6 circulars issued till date  
RC. No 77 of 2007 dated 24.07.2007 11 new CC+6 routes added  
Add-II dated 05/07/2007 Two new CC+6 routes added 
RC No 76 of 2007 dated 20.07.2007 All route except a few has been notified as universalized 
CC+6 routes effective from 06.08.2007  
CC+8  
R C No. 25 of 2005  dated 10.05.2005effective from 
15.05.2005 
 16 CC+8 routes identified   
RC.No. 29 of 2005 dated 2.06.2005 4 more CC+8 routes added 
RC.No. 42 of 2005 date 13.07.2005 One more  CC+8 route added 
RC.No 45 of 2005 of dated 19.07.2005  Tow new CC+8 routes added effective from 22.07.2005 
RC No. 73 of 2005 dated 19.12.2005 Two new CC+8 routes added effective from 01.01.2006 
RC. No 76 of 2005 dated 29.12.2005 Three new routes in CC+8 are added effective form 
15.01.2006 
RCNo.10 of 2006 dated 01.02.2006 Three new routes added in CC+8 
RC. No 41 of 2006 dated 10.05.2006 Compilation of all CC+8 routes  
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R.C. No. 51 of 2006 dated 08.06.2006 Sugar, rice, cement in BCNA/BCNHS as 64 tones and 61 
tones in BCN on CC+8/CC+6 routes 
RC. No 97 of 2006 dated 1.11.2006 When traffic moved comparing on CC+8/CC+6 and 
normal routes-PCC of wagons  
RC. No. 48 of 2007 dated 26.04.2007 One CC+8 route added 
RC No 54 of 2007 dated 18.05.2007 One CC+8 route added 
RC. No 69 of 2007 dated 27.06.2007 Consolidation of all CC+ 6/CC+8 circulars  
Addendum No 3 of RC No 69 dated 10.07.2007 Two CC+8 routes added 
Addendum No 4 of RC No 69 dated 10.09.2007 Five CC+8 routes added 
Addendum No 5 of RC No 69 dated 21.09.2007 Two CC+8 routes added 
Addendum No 6of RC No 69 dated 22.11.2007 Eight CC+8 routes added 
Addendum No 7 of RC No 69 dated 30.11.2007 25 new CC+8 routes added 
Addendum No 9 of RC No 69 dated04.01.2008 24 new CC+8 routes added 
Addendum No 10 of RC No 69 dated 08.04.2008  9 new CC+8 routes added 
Addendum No 11 of RC No 69 dated 08.04.2008   One new CC+8 route added 
RC No 77 of 2007 dated 24.07.2007 Slag, E&F grade coal permitted to be loaded up to CC+8 
i.e. 67 tones in BOXN/BOXNHS on CC+8 routes 
RC. No. 102 of 2007 dated 6.11.2007 PCC of BOXNCR and BOXNHA on CC+6/CC+8 routes 
have been notified 
RC. No.28 of 2008 dated 18.06.2008 Compilation of all CC+8 routes circulated 
Addendum No 1 of RC No 28 of 2008 dated 20.06.2008 One new route included which was left out while 
compiling 
Addendum No 92 of RC No 28 of 2008 dated 
08.07.2008 
Two more CC+8 routes added 
 
Annex 6.  Incrementalism:  Gradual Improvements in Wagons Design (1987– 2004) 
Minimum weight condition (MWC) for different commodities till 1987;  Introduction of BOXN wagon 
(1983);  MWC of Slack Coal—Marked 55 tones in BOXN wagon (1987);  Slack Coal notified to be charged 
at CC in BOXN wagons (1997);  ROM Coal and Iron & Steel are notified to charges at CC+2 in BOXN 
wagon  (1998);  On KK Line –Iron Ore in BOXN wagon is being charged at CC+4 (1986);  In South Eastern 
Railway, Local Iron is being charged at CC+2 (1987);  In Korba and I B Valley Slack Coal is being charged 
at CC+2  (1990);  In South Eastern Railway Iron Ore Dolomite, Limestone, Manganese Ore, Powerhouse 
Coal, and Washed Coal are notified to be charged at CC+4 (for 1st February to 31st March 2004). 
 
  
361 
 
Annex 7.  Statement of Cash and Investible Surplus  
The Railways’ accounting method was revised between 2005 and 2008.  For the data to be comparable all 
figures presented below (2001–2008) are recomputed based on the prevalent accounting method.  
 
All amounts in crore rupees  
    
Description  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
1.  Ordinary Working Expenses  26,449.35  27,586.44  28,407.87  29,311.53  31,718.45  35,029.53  37,432.53  41,033.17  
2.  Appropriation to Pension Fund 4,841.85  5,600.00  5,950.00  6,263.09  6,680.00  6,950.00  7,426.00  7,989.00  
3.  Miscellaneous Expenditure 227.12  230.44  244.66  275.11  287.44  319.11  407.45  423.59  
4.  Total [1 to 3] 31,518.32  33,416.88  34,602.53  35,849.73  38,685.89  42,298.64  45,265.98  49,445.76  
   Passenger Earnings 10,515.07  11,196.45  12,575.44  13,298.33  14,112.54  15,126.00  17,224.56  19,844.17  
5.  Gross Traffic Receipts 35,154.31  38,140.71  41,377.23  43,143.62  47,661.58  54,773.29  63,040.50  71,720.06  
6.  Miscellaneous Receipts 1,130.47  1,520.22  1,673.25  2,005.68  1,676.37  1,824.13  2,054.34  1,556.51  
7.  Total Receipts [5 + 6] 36,284.78  39,660.93  43,050.48  45,149.30  49,337.95  56,597.42  65,094.84  73,276.57  
8.  Interest on Railway Fund Balances  23.04  42.53  135.30  252.70  392.17  580.35  818.63  1,175.38  
9.  Cash Surplus before Dividend [(7+8) - 4] 4,789.50  6,286.58  8,583.25  9,552.27  11,044.23  14,879.13  20,647.49  25,006.19  
10.  (a) Dividend Payable to General Revenues116 581.47  1,640.30  2,973.84  3,325.76  3,007.38  3,286.83  3,892.81  4,238.93  
  (b) Payment of Deferred Dividend     ..       ..   50.00  300.00  483.30  663.00  663.00  664.00  
  Total Dividend Payment 581.47  1,640.30  3,023.84  3,625.76  3,490.68  3,949.83  4,555.81  4,902.93  
11.  Cash Surplus after Dividend [ 9 - 10 ] 4,208.03  4,646.28  5,559.41  5,926.51  7,553.55  10,929.30  16,091.68  20,103.26  
12.  Appropriation to D.R.F. along with interest 2,305.43  2,024.49  2,482.11  2,742.83  2,893.29  3,843.06  4,445.73  5,703.17  
13.  Appropriation to Development Fund  
along with interest 
744.98  449.50  553.85  748.99  1,943.96  2,039.46  2,128.53  2,629.64  
14.  Appropriation to Capital Fund  
along with interest 
1,118.30  1,365.95  1,842.81  1,687.46  1,671.43  4,086.32  8,541.14  11,592.83  
15.  Appropriation to Railway Safety Fund     ..   302.74      ..       ..   132.46  67.54      ..       ..   
16.  Appropriation to Special Railway Safety Fund ..   455.10  602.51  631.57  779.16  748.60  817.66  ..   
17.  Open Line Works - Revenue 35.26  31.53  28.32  33.24  37.56  42.80  51.07  46.79  
18.  Net Investible Surplus [12 to 17] 4,203.97  4,629.31  5,509.60  5,844.09  7,457.86  10,827.78  15,984.13  19,972.43  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
116 Default in the payment of dividend to the Government of India in 2001 and 2002 was 1,823 and 1,000 
crore rupees (US $424 million and US $233 million) respectively. 
362 
 
Annex 8.  Detailed Financial Results  
The data presented here does not reflect the changes in the Railways’ accounting method117 that occurred 
between 2005 and 2008.  Instead for each year, the data reflects the accounting practice prevalent in that 
year.  For comparable data refer Annex 7, Statement of Cash and Investible Surplus.  
Note: (1) All amounts in crore rupees; (2) * Includes Safety Surcharge Collection.; (3) **Excludes transferred to Deferred Dividend Liability Account. 
   2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
1. a. Capital-at-Charge 32,662    36,758    40,709    45,672    48,957    53,062    58,145    63,981  
  b. Investment From Capital Fund 10,390    10,390    10,390    10,390    10,390    12,816    17,886    24,540 
  c. Investment in Metropolitan Transport Projects 2,999    3,280    3,593    3,944    4,264    4,476    4,728    5,130   
  d. Investment in National Projects ..        ..        ..        ..        1,888    2,888    3,738    4,634  
      Total 46,051    50,428    54,692    60,006    65,499    73,242    84,496    98,285 
2. Traffic Receipts                 
  a.  Passengers 10,515    11,196    12,575    13,298    14,113    15,126    17,225    19,844    
  b.  Other Coaching  764    872    988    922    990    1,152    1,718    1,800    
  c.  Goods 23,305    24,845    26,505    27,618    30,778    36,287    41,716    47,435    
  d.  Sundry Other Earnings 703    945    1,080    1,004    1,157    1,839    1,712    2,565    
  e.  Total Earnings (a to d) 35,288    37,858    41,148    42,842    47,038    54,404    62,371    71,645    
  f.  Suspense -407    -21    -80    63    332    87    361    75    
  g. Gross Traffic Receipts (e+f) 34,880    37,837    41,068    42,905    47,370    54,491    62,732    71,720    
2. Miscellaneous Receipts 1,130    1,520* 1,673* 2,006* 1,676* 1,824* 2,054* 1,557    
3. Total Receipts 36,010    39,357    42,741    44,911    49,046    56,315    64,786    73,277    
4. Ordinary Working Expenses 27,534    28,703    29,684    30,637    33,389    35,030    37,433    41,033    
5. Appropriation to Depreciation Reserve Fund 2,301    2,000    2,402    2,593    2,700    3,604    4,198    5,450    
6. Appropriation  to Pension Fund 4,832    5,590    5,940    6,253    6,670    6,940    7,416    7,979    
7. Total Working Expenses (4 to 6) 34,667    36,293    38,026    39,483    42,759    45,574    49,047    54,462    
8. Miscellaneous Expenditure 272    727    885    950    1,014    2,736    1,286    480    
9. Total Expenses (7 + 8) 34,939    37,020    38,911    40,433    43,773    48,310    50,333    54,943    
10. NET REVENUE (3 - 9) 1,071    2,337    3,830    4,478    5,273    8,005    14,453    18,334    
11. Dividend Payment to General Revenues 308 ** 1,337** 2,665    3,087    2,716    3,005    3,584    4,239    
12. Payment of Deferred Dividend ..     ..     50    300    483    663    663    664    
13. Total Dividend payment (11 + 12) 308    1,337    2,715    3,387    3,199    3,668    4,247    4,903    
14. Excess / Shortfall (10 - 13) 763    1,000    1,115    1,091    2,074    4,337    10,206    13,431    
15. Appropriation to Development Fund (including interest) 732    449    550    730    1,842    1,853    1,880    2,359    
16. Appropriation to Capital Fund (including interest) 31    248    ..     ..     ..     2417    8326    11072 
17. Appropriation to Railway Safety Fund ..     303    ..     ..     132    67    ..       
18. Appropriation to Special Railway Safety Fund ..     ..     565    361    100    ..   ..       
                                                 
 
 
 
117 For instances, the criteria to allocate lease charges was revised in 2006.  Similarly, other accounting 
changes were introduced in 2007 and 2008. 
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19. OPERATING RATIO (7/2e) 98.3%    96.0%    92.3%    92.1%    91.0%    83.2%    78.7%    75.9% 
20. Ratio of Net Revenue to Capital-at-Charge and  
investment from Capital Fund (10/(1a+1b) 
2.5%    5.0%    7.5%    8.0%    8.9%    15.4%    19.0%    20.7% 
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Annex 9.  Break-up of Actual Plan Expenditure 
 
Note: All amounts in crore rupees. 
 
Plan heads 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
provisional 
  i)  Socio economic projects 
New Lines (Construction) 701 860 1315 1493 1690 1991 2488 2667 
Gauge Conversion 454 686 812 1164 1121 1242 2136 3022 
Metropolitan Transport 
Projects 
263 281 312 351 317 212 253 401 
Total (i) 1418 1827 2438 3008 3128 3444 4878 6090 
Percentage of total plan 
expenditure 
15 18 21 22 20 18 20 21 
 
ii)Throughput enhancement and other plan expenditure 
Doubling 524 600 578 532 488 687 1202 1671 
Traffic Facilities & 
Computerization 
204 240 234 273 373 484 744 944 
Rolling Stock & Leased Assets 3639 3056 3479 3784 4541 6623 8060 9506 
Track Renewal, Road Safety 
Works-LCs, ROBs/RUBs 
1781 2024 2660 2948 3645 3486 4156 3568 
Signalling and 
Telecommunication Works 
350 369 551 690 818 1043 1179 1343 
Electrification Projects & 
Other Electrical Works 
395 367 367 268 272 233 452 709 
Passengers Amenities 136 169 175 181 223 256 408 668 
Other Plan heads 947 1524 927 1709 1935 2583 3923 4181 
Total (ii) 7977 8350 8970 10386 12294 15394 20124 22590 
Percentage of total plan 
expenditure 
85 82 79 78 80 82 80 79 
         
Total Plan Expenditure  
(i) and (ii) 
9395 10177 11408 13394 15422 18838 25002 28680 
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Annex 10.  Excerpts on sustainability, Minister’s budget speech (2007–2008) 
 
Part 1, February 26, 2008. 
 
Vision 2025  
Paragraph 62.  The financial turnaround of the Railways has been achieved by thinking beyond the 
beaten path, taking innovative decisions in commercial, operational and pricing policies and through 
cross functional cooperation and coordination.  For making this magical turnaround durable, we will 
prepare a Railway Vision 2025 Document within the coming six months which will present new ideas 
and initiatives in a novel manner.  This shall outline our preparedness and strategies for the future.  This 
document will set forth the target for the coming 17 years in the field of operational performance and 
quality of service.  It will also detail an action plan for achieving the stipulated targets and necessary 
investment plans thereof.  This document will also contain details of customer-centric modern passenger 
services and various freight schemes to sharpen the competitive edge of Railways.  This will have a blue 
print of an organization that encourages trans-departmental decision making to take the Railways to 
unprecedented heights.  Route-wise planning would be done to reduce traffic bottlenecks, expand the 
network and modernize the Railways.  The passenger services will be governed by two words ‘comfort 
and convenience’.  The buzz word in freight business will be ‘commitment and connectivity’.  All these 
efforts will lay a solid foundation for a resurgent Railway.  This document will inspire the Railway 
management and its employees to do new experiments, and will be like a guiding light for the future 
generation (p. 21–22). 
 
Innovation Promotion Group 
Paragraph 63.  During the last four years passion for creativity and risk taking has led to the magical 
turnaround of the Railways.  In the 21st century, the business scenario is changing fast at the speed of 
light.  It is necessary to make coordinated efforts to face the new challenges and to imbibe new technique 
and thoughts.  Therefore, we have decided to set up a multi-departmental innovation promotion group in 
the Railway Board.  All Railway employees and citizens of the country, will be able to send their 
innovative suggestions to this group. This group will be provided with appropriate facilities and 
resources for innovation (p. 22) . 
 
Strategic Business Unit  
Paragraph 64.  The last four years have seen a rise in Railways’ share in transportation of steel, cement, 
coal etc.  To maintain this progress, we have decided to set up a strategic business unit in Railway Board 
for coal, cement, steel and container traffic to facilitate timely settlement of all problems of our clients 
through a single window system.  This unit will be appropriately empowered for taking full advantage of 
emerging business opportunities and improving Railways’ competitiveness in the market (p. 22). 
 
Information Technology Vision 2012  
Paragraph 65.  In order to make improvements in operational efficiency, bring transparency in working 
and provide better services to the customers, Railways are trying to bring about radical changes in 
Railway technology systems and processes.  For achieving these objectives, attention is being focused on 
I.T. applications in three core areas namely freight service management, passenger service management 
and general management.  For getting maximum benefit in the coming years, the mantra for present and 
future I.T. applications would be seamless integration.  The Railways nationwide communication 
infrastructure will provide the foundation for a common delivery network and platform.  Modern 
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technologies like GIS, GPS and RFID will be applied progressively.  A centralized information system 
will not only be useful for the customers but also for the organization as well.  The customers will have 
accurate, fast and on-line access to information on various subjects.  For the customer it would result in 
superior experience with improvements in overall efficiency, safety of Railway operations, ease of 
transactions and value added services like infotainment, on-board television and knowledge kiosks with 
internet facilities.  For the organization, planning and deployment of resources would become much 
easier with a panoramic view of assets and this would have a multiplier effect on productivity, 
organizational efficiency and staff satisfaction.  The Vision for I.T. would be implemented over the next 5 
years (p. 23). 
 
 
Part 1, February 26, 2007. 
 
Railways’ New Profile - 11th Five year plan 
Paragraph 35.  The year 2007–08 is the first year of the 11th Five year plan.  Sir: 
Ho Izaazat to karun bayan dil apna, Sanjon rakkha hai maine rail ka ek sapna(Sir, if you allow me, I would like 
to share with you my vision for the Indian Railways, p. 11). 
Paragraph 36.  The Railways are targeting a freight loading of 1100 million tonnes and passenger traffic 
of 840 cr by the terminal year of the 11th Five year plan.  In order to make this unprecedented growth a 
reality, it is absolutely essential that in the next few years the Railways’ transport capacity be expanded 
and doubled, unit cost be brought down by playing the volume game and customers be provided world-
class services (p. 12). 
 
The quantum jump in Investment 
Paragraph 37.  During the 11th Five Year Plan, we will invest many times more as compared to earlier 
plans.  There is no readymade investment policy for a vast network like the Indian Railways.  The 
growing demand for transportation can only be met through a harmonious blend of short term and long 
term policies.  Our short term policy of investing in low cost high return projects has been successful in 
eliminating network bottlenecks and in ensuring effective utilization of rolling stock.  Alongside a twin 
mid-term and long-term investment strategy will be adopted to enhance productivity through, 
modernization and technological upgradation on the one hand and enhancement of capacity of the 
network and rolling stock on the other (p. 12). 
Paragraph 38.  Construction of the Eastern and Western Dedicated Freight Corridors will start in 
the year 2007–08.  These will be completed during the 11th Five Year Plan at a cost of about Rs.  30,000 
crores.  Even though the Golden Quadrilateral and its diagonals constitute 16% of the rail network, more 
than 50% of the traffic moves on these routes.  As these routes are super-saturated, I have given directions 
for conducting of pre-feasibility surveys for construction of East-West, East-South, North-South and 
South-South corridors.  My dream is to construct these corridors in a manner that they develop into 
efficient and economical trunk routes for speedier, longer, heavy-haul trains.  After completion of the 
freight corridors, the problem of passenger and goods trains running on the same network at different 
speeds will be solved and most of the level crossings would be converted into ROBs.  Where possible 
ordinary passenger trains running on these routes will be replaced by MEMU and DEMU trains.  This 
will facilitate increase in the speed of passenger trains (p. 12). 
 
Gauge Conversion 
Paragraph 39.  Sir, on account of partial gauge conversion on various routes of the Railway network, the 
remaining metre and narrow gauges have become like islands.  Cut off from the main network, these 
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lines give the Railways less than 1 per cent freight traffic whereas they still constitute 20 per cent of the 
total network.  As a result Railways are losing thousands of crores of rupees annually.  Even freight 
traffic has become a losing proposition on these lines.  Therefore we will make all efforts to convert the 
majority of the metre gauge lines to broad gauge during the 11th Five Year Plan.  Priority will be given to 
accord approval for execution of projects which will serve as alternate routes on the network; significant 
among these are Udaipur-Ahmedabad, Lucknow-Sitapur-Pilibhit-Shahjehanpur, Dhasa-Jetalsar, Jaipur-
Sikar-Churu-Jhunjhunu, Ratlam-Khandwa-Akola, Chhindwara-Nainpur and Ahmedabad-Botad.  
Projects where the State Governments contribute 50 per cent of the total cost would also be given priority 
in sanction and implementation.  Gauge conversion will facilitate integrating the remote and far-flung 
areas of the country with the national main-stream.  Integration with the unigauge network and 
consequent increase in traffic and reduction in unit cost of these lines will reduce losses being incurred on 
these lines (p. 13). 
  
Construction of High Speed Passenger Corridor 
Paragraph 40.  Sir, India is today seen as a rising power in the world.  The rapid growth of the economy, 
rising industrialization and urbanization and unprecedented growth in intercity travel, has opened 
infinite possibilities for developing high speed passenger corridors.  Hon’ble Prime Minister while laying 
the foundation of the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor had expressed the hope that the Indian 
Railways would also develop world class passenger systems.  Therefore, we have decided to conduct pre-
feasibility studies for construction of high speed passenger corridors, equipped with state of the art 
signaling and train control systems, for running high speed trains at speeds of 300 to 350 kms per hour; 
one each in the Northern, Western, Southern and Eastern regions of the country.  These trains will cover 
distances of up to 600 kms in two to three hours.  All alternatives including Private Public Partnership 
will be considered for implementation of these corridors.  Global warming and changing climatic 
conditions are a world wide concern today.  These energy efficient and environment friendly systems 
would go a long way in alleviating these concerns (p. 13). 
 
Suburban Service 
Paragraph 41.  Suburban services are the lifeline of our nation’s commercial capital Mumbai.  To mitigate 
the overcrowding of Mumbai’s trains, enhancement in capacity of these services will have to be 
undertaken during the 11th Five Year Plan.  During this plan period MUTP-Phase I will be completed.  
The work on Phase II costing Rs.5,000 crore is also proposed to be started.  Financing of the Rs.5,000 crore 
MUTP Phase II project will be done with the participation of Railways, State Governments and multi-
lateral funding institutions.  All out efforts will be made to complete both these phases within the 11th 
Five Year Plan so that suburban services and long distance trains are completely segregated.  This will 
enhance their capacity by 56 per cent.  Ongoing works on suburban services in Kolkata and Chennai will 
also be completed on priority basis.  During the 11th Five Year Plan efforts will be made to introduce air-
conditioned class services in suburban trains in Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata and escalators at major 
stations (p. 14). 
 
Rolling Stock Modernization and Capacity Augmentation 
Paragraph 42.  In view of the demands of growing traffic, along with expansion of network, availability 
of rolling stock will be increased through effective utilization of available rolling stock, technical 
upgradation and modernization and by setting up new production units.  During the 11th Five Year Plan 
production of rolling stock will be doubled as compared with the previous Plan.  Capacity of existing rail 
coach and loco production units will be enhanced through expansion of these units.  High horse power, 
energy efficient locomotives with new technology will also be produced.  During this plan, production of 
MEMU, DEMU and EMU coaches will also be stepped up. One new factory each for rail coaches, diesel 
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locomotives, electric locomotives and wheels will also be established.  The locomotives to be 
manufactured in these units will be equipped with state of the art technology and will be capable of 
hauling longer, heavier high axle load trains.  The new Rail Coach Factory will produce high capacity, 
modern and comfortable coaches.  Similarly production of 32 tonne axle load, higher pay load lower tare 
weight and track friendly wagons will start for the new Dedicated Freight Corridors (p. 14). 
 
Use of IT in the Railway services 
Paragraph 43.  In the XI five year plan, investment in I.T. projects will be increased to several thousand 
crore rupees to harness the immense possibilities offered by I.T. in the interest of Indian Railways.  I.T. 
applications will be deployed to increase passenger and freight earnings, improve the image of the 
Railways in the eyes of the customer, reduce operating costs, ensure effective utilization of human and 
physical resources and to help the top management in arriving at long-term policy decisions by 
developing MIS & LRDSS.  A commercial portal will be developed in the next 3 years for yield 
management, specially to attract traffic for returning empties and filling up vacant seats.  All modules of 
FOIS including rolling stock maintenance and examination, revenue apportionment, crew management, 
control charting COIS etc. will be integrated and implemented in a time bound manner for completion by 
2010.  Alongside ERP packages will be implemented in workshops, production units and selected zonal 
Railways.  A common website integrating the more than 50 different web-sites of Railways will be 
developed with built in facilities like e-payment and e-tendering.  For an integrated approach in I.T., 
CRIS will be entrusted with coordination of all IT applications of the Railways and for development of a 
comprehensive vision on IT.  CRIS will be developed as an autonomous and empowered organization, 
drawing officers from various Railways services.  Indian I.T. companies have hoisted the national flag all 
over the world.  We invite these companies to take part in various IT projects of the Railways under 
public private partnership (p. 14–15). 
 
Railway Electrification 
Paragraph 44.  The electrified network will be extended over the Golden Quadrilateral and its diagonals, 
and in all directions from Kashmir to Kanniya Kumari and Guwahati to Amritsar by the end of the 11th 
Five Year Plan.  Electrification of Thiruvananthapuram-Kanniya Kumari, Thrichur-Guruvayur, 
Tiruchirapalli-Madurai, Barabanki-Gorakhpur-Barauni-Katihar-Guwahati and Jallandhar to Baramullah 
sections will be completed during the 11th Five Year Plan.  In the first phase, electrification of Jalandhar -
Jammu, Barabanki-Gorakhpur-Barauni and Tiruchirapalli-Madurai sections are proposed to be taken up 
in 2007-08.  Similarly, doubling and electrification of Pune-Wadi-Guntkal and electrification of Daitari-
Banspani, Haridaspur-Paradeep new lines will be undertaken by Indian Railways’ Public Enterprise 
RVNL in the coming years (p. 15). 
 
Public Private Partnership Schemes 
Paragraph 45.  Investments at a much larger scale will be required for the above mentioned capacity and 
expansion network as compared with the provision made in the Tenth Five Year Plan.  The funding of 
this plan of several lakh crores would require multi-source approach based upon deployment of internal 
resources, market borrowing, public private partnership and budgetary support.  The improved financial 
performance of the Railways will enable a large share of the financing to be met from internal and 
external budgetary resources.  I am not in favour of blind privatization of the Railways nor is PPP a 
compulsion or fashion for us.  We are seeking partnership with the private sector on the terms that are in 
the interest of Railways and our customers.  For example, by leasing out catering and parcel services we 
have reduced our catering and parcel losses of more than a thousand crores.  We have enhanced our 
capacity by attracting private investments in the wagon investment schemes and siding liberalization 
schemes etc.  Even while retaining the core activity of train operations, we have awarded licenses to 
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private parties for running container trains, which is likely to attract investment of thousands of crores in 
wagons and construction of terminals over the next few years.  We want to have many more such PPP 
Schemes where one and one make eleven and not two.  Public Private Partnership options will be 
explored with the aim of modernization of metro and mini-metro stations with world class passenger 
amenities, development of agro retail outlets and supply chains, construction of multi-modal logistic 
parks, warehouses and budget hotels and expansion of network and increase in production capacity.  We 
have constituted a PPP Cell which will develop the policy framework to provide non-discriminatory level 
playing field to investors, prepare the bankable documents and set up the procedure for awarding 
partnerships through open tendering system (p. 15–16). 
 
Railway Safety 
Paragraph 46.  Railway safety is our prime concern.  I am glad to inform the House that funds for 
replacement of overaged Railway assets are now provided as soon as the assets become due for 
replacement.  Sir, we have allocated Rs.5,500 crore towards Depreciation Reserve Fund for the year 2007-
08 as compared to Rs.2,100 crore provided in 2001-02.  This has had a direct impact on Railways’ safety 
record.  Although the gross traffic volume has increased from 724 Million train kilometers in 2001-02 to 
825 Million train kilometres in 2005-06, the number of accidents is expected to be less than 200 in 2006–07 
against 473 in the year 2001 (p. 16). 
 
Organizational and Human Resource Development 
Paragraph 56.  Railways will have to develop a strong management team in which players play, not for 
themselves, but for the success of the team to tackle complex situations of the competitive market and to 
fulfill the growing expectations of its customers.  A decision in the matter would be taken by December 
2007, after evolving a consensus through dialogue with representatives of all Railway services and based 
upon recommendations of different expert groups constituted so far.  The institutions of GMs, DRMs and 
CAO (Construction) would be strengthened and developed as profit centre, business unit and project unit 
respectively by suitable empowerment (p. 19). 
Paragraph 57.  Sir, Railway employees and officers require training at periodical intervals in view 
of rapid changes in the underlying economic and competitive environment.  We have, therefore decided 
that Railway officials will be sent on training to reputed national institutions once every five years and for 
foreign training every ten years.  Officers would have to undergo a mandatory training before promotion 
to JA, SA and HA grade (p. 19). 
Paragraph 58.  The Railway Staff College Building in Vadodara will be renovated in consultation 
with renowned architects in such a way that its old elegance and splendor is retained even while it is 
equipped with all modern amenities.  Rail Bhawan would be made centrally air-conditioned and a 
building equipped with modern facilities (p. 19–20). 
